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THE NEW GEOGRAPHIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
DIONYSIA KATELOUZOU* AND PEER ZUMBANSEN** 
ABSTRACT 
Today, the business corporation is ubiquitous.  Incorporated 
according to local and national laws, it exists and functions in an 
almost borderless physical and digital space that regulators find 
hard to penetrate.  As a global actor of enormous economic and 
political weight, the corporation is both immersed in and shaped by 
borderless financial flows.  In response, over the past few decades, 
corporate governance has continued to evolve as a complex 
assemblage of laws, regulations, guidelines, standards, and 
corporate self-regulation.  But, given the corporation’s powerful 
position in society, corporate governance is no longer perceived to 
only concern relationships between managers and investors, but to 
also encompass a much wider range of the firm’s stakeholders, 
including employees, contractors, suppliers, communities and the 
environment.  In light of these developments, this Article focuses on 
corporate governance as a transnational field of regulatory norm-
production, policymaking and political contestation.  With the 
corporation itself as the key organizational and financial vehicle for 
global markets, questions regarding political, democratic 
engagement with the corporation continue to produce frustrating 
answers.  In our Article, we develop an analysis that combines a 
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historical, sociological, and political economy investigation into 
how the corporation has been governed by law over time.  The 
research featured in this Article reveals a significant proliferation, 
nationally and transnationally, of norm producers in and around the 
corporation, offering important insights into the relationship 
between markets and political governance, and into the way in 
which, going forward, we might rethink existing notions of public 
and private authority, accountability, and responsibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance today is a transnational field of 
regulatory norm-production, policymaking, and political 
contestation.  To begin with, we must ask what follows from the 
proposal that corporate governance should today be understood as 
a transnational field of regulatory norm-production, policymaking, 
and political contestation.  More specifically, we must determine the 
consequences of our engagement with the political field of corporate 
governance, what our environmental responsibilities are, and the 
place of corporate law in the democratic nation-state.  The 
sociological lens we are suggesting in this Article reveals a 
fundamentally changed regulatory landscape for corporate 
governance today.  It constitutes the interplay between both public 
and private actors, which include states, a wide range of global 
investment funds, multinational corporations, unions, corporate 
and public policy think tanks, as well as diverse civil society interest 
groups.  Despite long-standing attestations to the contrary,1 its key 
normative foundations are continuously and, recently, with 
increasing intensity, scrutinized and challenged. 2   Today, the 
transnational spaces in which the publicly held corporation’s role in 
society, its function, and its purpose are being scrutinized, mirror 
the cross-border organizational scope of corporations as governance 
institutions, lawmakers and wielders of enormous power and 
influence.3  In other words, the ongoing and intensifying debates 
 
 1 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“There should 
be no confusion . . . of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the 
stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his 
codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders . . . .“); Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 1.  
 2 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood 
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 
YALE L.J. 1870, 1873 (2017) (“The republic upon which typical Americans depend is 
one where the debate is between corporate-manager agents and money-manager 
agents, both of whom have different interests than ordinary human investors.”).   
 3  See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 229, 231 
(2015) (“[C]orporations have developed the capacity to negotiate with states to 
create norms of international law—norms that bear a particular kind of relationship 
of priority to the state party’s domestic legal order.”); Christopher May, Who’s in 
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Charge? Corporations as Institutions of Global Governance, PALGRAVE COMMC’NS., Dec. 
22, 2015, at 5 (“[C]orporations construct regimes of private law to govern the 
relations between the various elements, while also seeking to influence public law 
institutions. . . .  The use of private law (contract provisions and arbitration 
agreements) often utilises public international law as a background justification but 
equally is crafted to serve the needs of the particular corporate network in which it 
is deployed . . . .”); see also David L. Levy & Rami Kaplan, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Theories of Global Governance: Strategic Contestation in Global Issue 
Arenas, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK  OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 432, 432-33 
(Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the increasing importance of corporate 
social responsibility and calls for multinational corporations to use their authority 
to establish new governance structures). 
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around corporate governance, 4  corporate social responsibility, 5 
“corporate stewardship,”6 and “corporate purpose”7 illustrate the 
 
 4 See Lynn S. Paine & Suraj Srinivasan, A Guide to the Big Ideas and Debates in 
Corporate Governance, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 14, 2019, at 2, 
https://hbr.org/2019/10/a-guide-to-the-big-ideas-and-debates-in-corporate-gove
rnance [https://perma.cc/3UQY-J67L] (noting the diversification of corporate 
governance debates in light of growing public concern around companies’ roles in 
mitigating or accelerating climate change, fighting income inequality, responding 
to digitalization, and the rise of populism).  For an earlier, comprehensive analysis 
of different conceptions of and approaches to corporate governance see Gregory 
Jackson & Andreas Moerke, Guest Editorial, Continuity and Change in Corporate 
Governance: Comparing Germany and Japan, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 351, 352 (2005) 
(comparing the different degrees of adaptation to global financialization in 
Germany and Japan’s corporate governance systems), and Thomas Clarke, The 
Continuing Diversity of Corporate Governance: Theories of Convergence and Variety, 16 
EPHEMERA 19, 20-21 (2016) (doubting that the pressure of financial markets will 
ultimately result in a global, uniform model of corporate governance).  This 
contention, of course, has to be viewed against the background of the claim made 
by other scholars that such a convergence has already taken place.  See, e.g., Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 468 (2001) (arguing that worldwide triumph of the principle of shareholder 
value maximization is assured).   
 5  See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and 
Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility and Accountability, 14 J. HUM. 
RTS. 237, 238 (2015) (analyzing the development of the “Business & Human Rights” 
approach in recent years as a response to the “Corporate Social Responsibility” 
framework).   
 6 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the 
Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1001-12 
(2014) (critically reviewing the UK’s approach to improving corporate stewardship 
and accountability through transparency regulation); Dionysia Katelouzou, 
Shareholder Stewardship: A Case of (Re)Embedding the Institutional Investors and the 
Corporation?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 581 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 
2019) (showing how shareholder stewardship is moving from the periphery to the 
mainstream of policy making around the world and conflating stewardship with 
the concurrent topic of corporate sustainability).  
 7 See Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram & James P. 
Walsh, The Purposes and Accountability of Corporations in Contemporary Society: 
Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 77 (1999)  (“[T]he 
purpose of the corporation should continue to be to maximize the value of its 
residual claimants—stockholders—within the constraints imposed by law, social 
norms, customs, and mores.  Furthermore, there is no need to jettison the basic 
tenets of the contractarian view of the corporation to achieve this purpose.”).  See 
also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My 
Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176, 177 (2017) (arguing that more should 
be done to make corporations assume responsibility for non-shareholder 
constituencies); Malcolm S. Salter, Rehabilitating Corporate Purpose: How the Evolution 
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degree to which such contentions are not only about the corporation 
as a matter of corporate law, but about its actual scope of operation 
in a changing socio-economic, cultural, and political environment 
and in spaces that are not confined to the borders of nation-states.  
As the scope of the corporation’s activities has continued to expand 
functionally8 and geographically,9 questions arise as to how law—
and, which law, which authority, and which enforcement regimes—
configures, relates to, and enables the corporation to posture itself 
with particular urgency.  We will describe the emerging 
configuration of corporate governance regimes that results from 
collaboration and competition among public and private actors from 
a legal pluralist perspective, which challenges existing, more 
traditional, nation-state-oriented understandings of corporate law.   
Central to this description is the observation of how corporate 
governance norms today contain elements of “hard” and “soft,” or 
mandatory and voluntary, rules.  As we will show in detail below, 
these norms are being introduced, disseminated, revised, and 
 
of Corporate Purpose Has Contributed to a Widening Breach Between Capitalism and 
Justice . . . and What to Do About It 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19-104, 
2019), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/19-104_fcc0a086-d33c-
4c81-a933-b77fb2eb70f7.pdf [https://perma.cc/D92X-AKQS] (criticizing how the 
emphasis on shareholder value has resulted in the immunization of business 
corporations from social demands); Paddy Ireland, Corporate Governance, 
Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards a Less Degenerate Capitalism?, 23 J.L. & SOC’Y 
287, 295-306 (1996) (arguing that because the corporation is, in reality, controlled 
and its fate decided by financial markets, the idea of a “stakeholder corporation” is 
bound to fail).  
The company is, and will always be, the personification of 
industrial capital and, as such, subject to the imperatives of 
profitability and accumulation.  These are not imposed from the 
outside on an otherwise neutral and directionless entity, but are, 
rather, intrinsic to it, lying at the very heart of its existence.  No 
amount of fiddling with company law – whether it is with the 
fiduciary duties of directors or with the structure and 
composition of company boards – can change this.   
 Id. at 304.   
 8 Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram & Walsh, supra note 7, at 15-28.   
 9 See John Gerard Ruggie, Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority 
and Relative Autonomy, 12 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 317, 318-26 (2018) (mapping 
multinational corporations’ scope of global operations and impact on regional 
governmental actors); see also Gralf-Peter Calliess, Introduction: Transnational 
Corporations Revisited, 18 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 601, 601-02 (2011) (discussing the 
growth of transnational corporations and need for further analysis of the scope of 
their global economic activities).   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
58 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:1 
   
 
adapted by both public and private actors, who operate within 
national legal systems but also through international organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), and private corporate 
business institutions.   
Instead of taking these observations as a cue to leapfrog into an 
abstract or hypothesized “global” understanding, this Article 
contends that transnational legal pluralism in corporate governance 
must be studied against the background and, in fact, in the context 
of continuing state transformation.  Our emphasis on both the 
transnational and legal pluralist dimensions of corporate 
governance today is based on the belief that such regulatory regimes 
arise out of state transformation processes that have been occurring 
for a number of decades in advanced industrial and post-industrial 
societies.  At the heart of these processes has been not a retreat of 
“the state” per se, but a thoroughgoing differentiation of the state’s 
regulatory and institutional architecture towards a higher degree of 
privatization (of formerly public responsibilities and services) and 
towards a regulatory infrastructure that complements, rather than 
replaces, state action with a growing number of private ordering 
and “self-regulation” processes in numerous areas of governmental 
activity.10  As this Article will show, this shift in political economy 
did not merely affect the role played by the state in economic affairs, 
but significantly repositioned and repurposed powerful economic 
actors themselves, and, above all, the business corporation.11  
If, in light of competing political visions for the corporation, 
corporate governance raises challenging questions in the domestic 
arena, these challenges are exacerbated in the transnational realm.  
Seen through a public lawyer’s eyes, almost everything about the 
transnationalization of corporate governance appears to raise 
 
 10  See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343-44 (2004) (“In 
all of these contexts, government harnesses the power of new technologies, market 
innovation, and civic engagement to enable different stakeholders to contribute to 
the project of governance.”);  see generally Basak Kus, Neoliberalism, Institutional 
Change and the Welfare State: The Case of Britain and France, 47 INT’L. J. COMPAR. SOCIO. 
488 (2006) (comparing the different policy responses in Britain and France following 
the 1970s oil and financial crisis with the UK opting for a neoliberal stripping of the 
state and France reforming state strategies in the pursuit of macroeconomic 
efficiency).   
 11 See infra Part II.   
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questions of legitimacy. 12   In other words, who, if not a 
democratically elected lawmaker, should create norms that 
potentially affect hundreds of thousands of workers and significant 
other parts of society?  But which, if any, processes are in place today 
to ensure adequate societal input into the design of norms, their 
enforceability, and their amenability to reform or adaptation?  
Where is the norm-creating authority of these largely private actors 
located?  How must we imagine democratic control of corporate 
activity, including the creation of governance norms by corporations 
themselves, in the absence of an effective local or global regulator?13 
The following analysis intervenes in this debate through three 
accounts, which we will unfold in detail after presenting the overall 
argument in concentrated form in Part II.  The following Parts III 
and IV provide an in-depth presentation of the material on which 
our argument is based, while Parts V and VI argue for a renewed 
political critique of corporate governance.  Our first intervention is 
a historical one (Part III), our second a sociological one (Part IV), and 
our third argument draws on the first two and engages corporate 
law and corporate governance as a matter of political critique (Parts 
V and VI).  Historically, we show how the development of corporate 
governance norms, first domestically and then increasingly 
transnationally, have been keeping pace with and must be seen in 
close connection with particular shifts in the distribution between 
public and private actors in carrying out essential social functions in 
modern contemporary democracies.  While corporations primarily 
 
 12 See Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems 
of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 
1745 (2007) (“[A]s economic activity increasingly crossed borders . . . public law, as 
either substantive rules or as systems of governance, has proven increasingly 
unable to respond efficiently to the problems of the governance of economic 
relations.”);  Id. at 1747 (“The ability to disperse ownership and operations across 
the globe has made it possible for the largest multinational corporations to become 
essentially self-regulating . . . the absence of regulation might itself be inefficient, at 
least to the extent that it enhances unpredictability and arbitrary conduct . . . .“).   
 13 See Tim Bartley, Transnational Corporations and Global Governance, 44 ANN. 
REV. SOCIO. 145, 155 (2018) (highlighting the increasing importance of private 
corporations as “direct providers of global governance”).  See also Arthur S. Miller, 
The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. REV. 1539, 
1550-51 (1960) (addressing “the poverty of constitutional (and political) theory with 
respect to the place of the corporation in both the domestic and world economies, 
and to suggest that a need exists for the identification of means whereby the 
economic power of the large corporation can be tempered ‘in the public interest’”).   
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insulate the owners’ assets from liability claims through the creation 
of a separate legal entity,14 their larger social and economic role has 
long been as an investment vehicle for private placements and, in 
complementing the state’s varying protective regimes for old age 
security, in building a financial cushion for an ageing workforce.15  
Today, corporations assume central and controlling roles in a wide 
range of public functions, including the delivery of nearly all 
telecommunication services, 16  health care, 17  municipal waste 
disposal,18 and they assume leading roles in urban development and 
planning, 19  infrastructure financing, 20  and even military warfare 
 
 14  See Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 27,  
https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1896/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR5P-
HUBX] (“[I]f the company was a real company, fulfilling all the requirements of the 
Legislature, it must be treated as a company, as an entity, consisting indeed of 
certain corporators, but a distinct and independent corporation.”).  
 15 See generally Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 75 (1993) (analyzing the state’s interest in strengthening the private 
sector’s and, particularly, the corporation’s role in securing private pension 
investments).   
 16 See Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, The Impact of Privatization and Competition in the 
Telecommunications Sector Around the World, 47 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395-96 (2004) 
(mapping the significant transformation from public to private telecommunications 
provision since the 1980s and 1990s).   
17 See Dikaios Sakellariou & Elena S. Rotarou, The Effects of Neoliberal Policies 
on Access to Healthcare for People with Disabilities, 16 INT’L J. EQUITY HEALTH, 2017, at 
1, 2, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5688676/pdf/12939_2017_Art
icle_699.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TH7-UBCB] (“A series of policy developments – 
in the areas of health and labour, mainly – have promoted a neoliberal agenda that 
directly affects the lives of people with disability, causing in many cases material 
deprivation, insecurity, and stigmatisation.”).   
 18 See generally Carlo Fanelli, Neoliberal Urbanism and the Assault Against Public 
Services and Workers in Toronto, 2006-2011, ARTICULO J. URB. RSCH. (2014), 
https://journals.openedition.org/articulo/2380 [https://perma.cc/UN3P-4PVT] 
(discussing how Toronto’s pressure on municipal waste workers to agree to lower 
wages led to the unionized workers voting for a new austerity and privatization 
government).   
 19 See Eugene J. McCann, Collaborative Visioning or Urban Planning as Therapy? 
The Politics of Public-Private Policy Making, 53 PRO. GEOGRAPHER 207, 207 (2001), 
http://www.sfu.ca/~emccann/Professional%20Geographer%20Visioning.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7X94-F9R8] (“Planning is increasingly privatized and 
decentralized in U.S. cities.”).   
 20 See Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Provision of Public 
Infrastructure: An Organizational Analysis of the Next Privatization Frontier, 46 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 375, 375-78 (1996) (discussing the rising proliferation but also the risks 
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through extensive sub-contracting arrangements.21  As the range of 
corporate activities continues to expand, so does the scope of what 
is considered to be part of the regulatory-corporate governance 
framework that companies should comply with.  This Article charts 
these emerging political economies in contemporary corporate law 
and corporate governance against the background of three central 
(yet increasingly less convincing) themes in the literature’s 
continuing corporate governance debate over the past four decades.  
From a historical perspective, we recognize a triple fallacy:  first, we 
take issue with what has turned out to be ultimately inconclusive 
and less productive competition between shareholder versus 
stakeholder oriented concepts of the firm.  Secondly, we revisit the 
important work by the “Varieties of Capitalism” school in order to 
explore the connections today between specific models of corporate 
governance and, specifically, the political economies of corporate 
law regulation in different countries.  Such polarization is too often 
predicated on assumptions of economic efficiency that, in turn, 
result in an overdrawn opposition of two competing models of 
capitalist organization as demonstrated by the 
convergence/divergence debate of the 1990s and early 2000s. 
While these tensions form an important backdrop of corporate 
law’s history, we contend in Part V that this historical account needs 
to be complemented by another look at the facts on the ground.  It is 
in this vein that we review the shareholder/stakeholder conflict and 
the attendant attestations regarding convergence and divergence on 
the basis of sociological evidence regarding the actual forms, 
institutions, and processes of norm production in corporate law 
today.  While much of the historical story of this conflict and its 
trajectories takes a certain institutional regulatory framework of 
corporate law for granted, we are skeptical as to the accuracy of this 
framework.  We show that, rather than courts and governmental 
 
involved in governments’ reliance on private sector financing of public 
infrastructures).  
 21 P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry 
and Its Ramifications for International Security, 26 INT’L SEC. 186, 186 (2001) (“PMFs 
[private military firms] are profit-driven organizations that trade in professional 
services intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate bodies that specialize in 
the provision of military skills—including tactical combat operations, strategic 
planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training, 
and military technical assistance.”).   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
62 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:1 
   
 
departments acting as the exclusive corporate lawmakers or 
initiators of corporate governance norms, it is a wealth of non-state 
actors, such as institutional investors, expert committees, various 
financial actors, consultancies, business corporations as well as 
sector-specific and other civil society associations such as the 
“Business Roundtable,”22 who are engaged in forging new corporate 
governance standards.  Based on this evidence, we contend that 
corporate governance can no longer be described only against the 
background of a nation-state-based political economy and its system 
of judicial and legislative lawmaking.  Corporate governance, by 
contrast, illustrates a high degree of regulatory differentiation that 
is displayed across a range of different law-creating actors and 
institutions and manifests itself across a range of regulatory 
instruments from statutes to court decisions, recommendations to 
best practice guidelines, and codes of conduct.  Just as these 
institutions include public and private actors, as well as domestic 
and international actors, the type of norms that these actors generate 
encompasses different degrees of “hard” and “soft” law, which are 
generated through a variety of different lawmaking processes. 
From this sociological perspective, these emerging constellations 
of actors, norms, and processes represent what can most adequately 
be called “transnational legal pluralism,” which we place at the 
heart of our political economy analysis of what corporate 
governance is today and in whose hands and in which places it is 
being shaped. 23   The legal pluralist concept of transnational 
corporate governance describes and captures the field’s hybrid, 
mixed, and “in-between” nature, but avoids the risk of 
overstatement in terms of either characterizing these arrangements 
as non-legal or giving them the misleading label of “global law.”  As 
for the former, the transnational legal pluralism of corporate 
governance is constituted by an overlapping and co-existence of 
hard and soft, formal and informal, legal arrangements rather than 
by a neat choice between them.  It is therefore more accurate to refer 
to transnational regulatory arrangements as those that are created 
by actors that cut across jurisdictional boundaries but also include a 
mix of public and private institutions than to associate them with a 
 
 22  BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/HE4T-ZBX4]. 
 23 See infra Parts V, VI. 
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“global law” forum and a complementing global institutional 
infrastructure without explaining more specifically where this 
infrastructure is located, how it is created, and, furthermore, how it 
enforces global law.   
This evolution of transnational corporate governance 
arrangements prompts, in our view, the need to rethink the 
correlation between law creation and political economy.  This has 
two important components.  On the one hand, our interest in 
scrutinizing law’s relationship to the political economy to which it 
contributes and belongs echoes similar recent calls among critical 
legal scholars to interrogate the role of law in a political economy,24 
which is marked by high degrees of legal, socio-economic, racial, 
and gender inequality.  This prompts a detailed analysis of how law 
contributes to the perpetuation of these inequalities.25  We argue that 
corporate governance is not merely concerned with the regulation 
of investor-management relations.  Rather, it functions, in reality, as 
a much-contested regulatory forum in which the role of the 
corporation in society and towards its various stakeholders is 
scrutinized and negotiated.  A political economy analysis of 
corporate governance can thus help to unpack the separation of the 
firm as an economic actor, as part of “the market,” and of corporate 
law as belonging to the legal and regulatory system when we ask 
how corporate law shapes and facilitates and is in turn shaped by 
the business corporation as it performs its different societal 
functions.  By treating the corporation not as an abstract economic 
 
 24 David  Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 
77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2014) (“The questions that neoliberalism addresses at 
the deepest level, then, are not How much market?, or How much governance?, but 
Which interests will enjoy protection, whether as property rights, constitutional 
immunities, or objects of special regulatory solicitude, and which others will be left 
vulnerable or neglected? Unavoidably, these are contests over the distribution of 
economic claims and privileges and even of market discipline itself.”). 
 25 See, e.g., KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND 
THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019) 
(investigating the effects on racial inequality by the 1960s federal housing initiatives 
to promote single-family ownership in Black communities); Priya S. Gupta, 
Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 187, 188-
95 (2015) (showing how the facilitation of black homeownership through bank 
loans and federal regulation resulted in deepened neighborhood segregation and 
racial discrimination).  For an analysis of attempts by white individuals to derive 
commercial value from including black people in their employee or customer base, 
see generally Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013).   
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actor, but in the concrete context of changing societal expectations 
towards it, the reciprocal effects between law and the corporation 
become more clearly recognizable. 26   Corporate governance can 
again be seen in relation to a larger, encompassing debate around 
the corporation’s place in society, 27  and its corresponding social 
responsibilities.28 
The analysis in Parts V and VI of this Article aims at recognizing 
the degree to which the actual space of corporate governance 
regulation has been expanding beyond the institutional and 
jurisdictional boundaries of the state.  Institutionally, corporate 
governance is cared for today not just by ministries, parliaments, 
and courts, but by a public/private assemblage of governmental 
departments, expert committees, and working groups, as well as 
stock exchanges, banks, institutional investors, and companies’ legal 
departments.29   Meanwhile, geographically, the representation of 
political economy as an integrated system of political and legal 
governance grounded in the nation-state, which still provided the 
 
 26  See, e.g., Dana L. Brown, Antje Vetterlein & Anne Roemer-Mahler, 
Theorizing Transnational Corporations as Social Actors: An Analysis of Corporate 
Motivations, BUS. & POLS., Jan. 2010, at 1 (investigating corporate decisions to 
commit to social and environmental goals in response to changing societal 
expectations).   
 27 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 
(1954) (providing a landmark account of the political significance of large American 
corporations and their influence on American society).   
 28  See generally Ruth V. Aguilera, Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley & 
Deborah E. Rupp, Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative 
Analysis of the UK and the US, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE & SOC. RESP. 147 (2006) 
(highlighting the different national approaches to improve corporate law to make 
it more responsive to social concerns).   
 29  See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALI 
Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 873-83 (1992) 
(mapping the different public and private interest group interventions in the 
creation of the American Law Institute and the ongoing reform of the ALI 
Principles); CARY COGLIANESE, THOMAS J. HEALEY, ELIZABETH K. KEATING & MICHAEL 
L. MICHAEL, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  6-8 (2004), 
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2610009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SDB8-XECB] (debating the tensions between “regulation” by 
government and “self-regulation” by market actors in the area of corporate 
governance standard setting); Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise 
of Efficient Systems of Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007) (analyzing Wal-Mart’s self-regulatory activities across a 
variety of issues pertaining to workplace safety, employee relations, and company 
policy).  
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basis for “international political economy,”30 (IPE) has today given 
way to shifting transnational assemblages of regulatory regimes 
that, because they are made up of both public and private, and 
domestic and international, actors, do not neatly fit into the 
traditional political economy mold.31  These new constellations give 
rise to what we argue should be considered a multiplication and 
proliferation of transnational political economies of governance.  
This recognition of a transnationalization of political economy is not 
new, nor is our interest in the multilevel order of different types of 
regulators distinct.32  In arguing for the need to embrace the hybrid 
transnational nature of governance today, we both build on and 
extend the emerging work in political science, international 
relations, and critical international political economy. But, by 
shifting our focus onto corporate governance specifically, we 
contribute an important area of analysis, especially as, so often, 
corporate governance is reduced to a site of conflict between 
shareholders and stakeholders.  Our transnational political economy 
analysis shows that, in reality, corporate governance is a much more 
complex arena of competing concerns regarding the protection of 
 
 30  See Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, State, Market, and Global Political Economy: 
Genealogy of an (Inter-?) Discipline, 76 INT’L. AFFS. 805 passim (2000) (tracing how the 
newly emerging discipline of “international political economy” resulted in a 
context of globalizing economic relations and the perceived need of an analytical 
toolkit to move beyond nation-state grounded political economy understandings in 
order to study the international interactions between states).   
 31  See Jean-Christophe Graz, Hybrids and Regulation in the Global Political 
Economy, 10 COMPETITION & CHANGE 230, 231 (2006) (“The role of non-state actors is 
a key issue; they cooperate across borders to establish rules and standards widely 
accepted as legitimate by agents not involved in their definition.  Despite a fast 
growing body of scholarship on non-state actors in the global context, there is no 
clear definition of the relationship between those defining, implementing, 
recognising and monitoring these rules and those complying with them – global 
firms, capital markets, states, various non-state actors and, more generally, 
citizens.”).   
 32 See Jarrod Wiener, The “Transnational” Political Economy: A Framework for 
Analysis, LEX MERCATORIA 1-3 (1996), 
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/the.transnational.political.economy.a.framework.for
.analysis.jarrod.wiener.ukc/portrait.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2MP-TR5H] 
(introducing the concept of transnational political economy in response to a surge 
in “globalisation” studies still too much focused on the role of the state);  see also A. 
CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL 
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003) (arguing that a powerful 
transnational corporate elite is able to set their rules of engagement without 
effective control or intervention by the government).  
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different interests in highly volatile economic contexts.  From our 
perspective, then, corporate governance is embedded in a larger 
framework of critical analysis with regard to the complex political 
economies that, today, make up corporate governance regulation.  In 
that vein, we challenge the prevailing idea of neatly distinguishing 
between state-made/hard/binding law and non-state/soft/non-
binding law, given how transnational corporate governance is 
characterized by an interpenetration and co-existence of these 
different types and forms of norms.  Corporate governance allows 
us to scrutinize contemporary market governance arrangements as 
a political project and, from a historical and sociological perspective, 
opens up to an investigation of the differently emerging types of 
norms and processes without trying to qualify these as strictly 
“public” or “private,” or by drawing a line between “hard” and 
“soft” law. 
II. THE ARGUMENT 
In order to unpack the significance of the transnationalization of 
corporate governance as a transnational field of regulatory norm-
production, policymaking, and political contestation, we advance 
three arguments:  a historical one, a sociological one, and a political 
economy one.  Historically, we argue that the evolution of corporate 
governance norms must be seen against the background of ongoing 
and continuing transformations in the relationships between states 
and markets in the provision of a growing range of formerly 
“public” services and functions. 33   As the societal role of 
corporations expands beyond an essentially financial role, corporate 
governance norm production mirrors the diversification of 
regulatory concerns associated with the firm’s place in society.  
From a sociological perspective, we argue that the 
transnationalization of present-day corporate governance regimes 
constitutes not so much a categorically different state of corporate 
law in an age of “globalization,” but a continuation of corporate 
law’s inherent legal pluralism in terms of coexisting public and 
private, hard and soft, and formal and informal norms.34  The legal 
 
 33 See infra Part III. 
 34 See infra Part IV. 
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pluralist concept of transnational corporate governance describes 
and captures the field’s hybrid, mixed, and “in-between” nature but 
avoids the risk of overstatement in terms of either characterizing 
these arrangements as non-legal or giving them the misleading label 
of “global law.”  Our analysis draws attention to the pre-existing 
instability and unsettledness of regulatory norms in areas such as 
corporate law, securities regulation, labor law, or social protection.  
Legal sociologists have long been emphasizing the prevailing legal 
pluralist nature of regulatory governance in fields where public and 
private, formal and informal, “hard” and “soft” norms not only exist 
side by side, but, in fact, complement one another by addressing 
different aspects of social or institutional behavior.  Today’s 
diversified and cross-border nature, transnational constitution of 
corporate governance norm-production is not an anomaly of law-
making, but a further step in the evolution of legal norms in 
politically sensitive and continuously changing contexts.  By 
reviewing the development of corporate governance regimes as a 
particular form of regulatory governance “in context,” we argue that 
the transnational constellations of actors, norms, and processes that 
constitute today’s corporate governance regulation produce new 
and overlapping political economies.  No longer confined to the 
regulatory prerogative of a domestic lawmaker or regulator but also 
not (yet) having been reclaimed by an international financial 
regulator with global governance authority, corporate governance 
rules, today, appear, instead, as being negotiated, shaped, and 
disseminated, as well as “hardened,” through the interplay of major 
market players and supranational institutions, in relation to whom 
states have increasingly assumed the role of mediators or mere 
facilitators.  In our analysis, we show how transnational regulatory 
arrangements are created by both governmental and non-
governmental institutions that act across jurisdictional boundaries.  
As we focus on the organizations and actors engaged in contesting, 
creating, and disseminating corporate governance norms today, we 
reject the idea of an abstract notion of “global law” and of a 
complementing, global institutional infrastructure.  We apply a 
socio-legal lens to show, more specifically, where this infrastructure 
is located and how it creates and enforces these newly emerging 
forms of transnational corporate governance law.  
Finally, our political economy argument posits that corporate 
governance is not merely concerned with the regulation of investor-
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management relations but functions, in reality, as a much-contested 
regulatory forum in which the role of the corporation in society and 
towards its various stakeholders is being scrutinized and 
negotiated.35  A political economy analysis of corporate governance 
can thus help to unpack the separation of the firm as an economic 
actor, as part of “the market,” and of corporate law as belonging to 
the legal and regulatory system when we ask how corporate law 
both shapes and facilities and is in turn shaped by the business 
corporation as it performs its different societal functions.  Building 
on the insights of Varieties of Capitalism (“VoC”) scholars who 
distinguish between so-called “coordinated” and “liberal” market 
economies and on the work in comparative financial regulation,36 
we argue that today’s proliferation of public, private, and hybrid 
processes of corporate governance norm production requires an 
even more differentiated view on the relationship between states 
and local, regional, and global markets.  It is ultimately, from a 
pluralized political economy perspective on corporate law that we 
propose a reconceptualization of corporate law and, in particular, of 
corporate governance as a transnational field, which can no longer 
adequately be depicted through the categories that previously 
applied to corporate law as a domestic law and policy concern. 
Our historical, sociological, and political economy approach to 
the study of the transnationalization of corporate governance feeds 
into a political analysis of who, actually, calls the shots in this 
transnationally fragmented regulatory space.  As we map the 
interactions between public and private actors, it becomes more 
evident how they operate in part in a pluralistic world, which is not 
exclusively centered in national political and legal orders but 
continues to push and exist and proliferate beyond them.  At the 
same time, national corporate governance regulation is being 
transformed on the inside, above all, by the forces of global financial 
 
 35 See infra Parts V and VI.  
 36 See, e.g., Colin Mayer, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: A Review 
of the International Evidence, 154 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 144 (1998) (providing 
an overview of a surge in the 1990s of scholarly analysis of the correlation between 
financial regulation and corporate governance in countries including the United 
States, the United Kingdom, continental Europe, as well as Asia).  
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markets. 37   From this perspective, the proposal of a concept of 
transnational corporate governance has two key consequences.  On the 
one hand, it challenges the “end of history” claims regarding the 
inevitability of a worldwide convergence of corporate governance 
systems towards a singularly triumphant norm of shareholder value 
maximization,38 while, on the other, it pushes back against the idea 
of regulatory competition among different governments in pursuit 
of the most attractive and effective corporate governance system.  
With its origin in the United States’ system of competing regulatory 
charter states,39 the idea of regulatory competition gained renewed 
prominence during the years of heated debate over the proposed 
European Takeover Directive, which pitted competing views of 
different EU member states against one another.40  In contrast, our 
focus on the transnational legal pluralism of corporate governance 
today goes beyond an analysis that largely remains focused on state 
actors as we direct attention to the much messier landscape of public 
and private “norm entrepreneurs” who are acting nationally and 
transnationally.  We question the explanatory value of assertions 
regarding convergence and divergence as well as regulatory 
competition, because both are still too moored in a regulatory 
system presumably governed by state actors.  In turn, we want to 
draw attention to the particular nature and dimension of the 
political challenges that arise from the distinctly transnational, hybrid 
 
 37  See Mary O’Sullivan, The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 23 passim (2003) (showing how even countries 
such as Germany and France have been adapting their national corporate 
governance systems in the hope of making their companies gain access to global 
capital investments). 
 38  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 439 (“There is no longer any 
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to 
increase long-term shareholder value.”).  
 39 See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (discussing states use of regulation to compete for 
incorporation of companies); see also Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate 
in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987) (“[S]tates compete to provide 
firms with . . . corporate charters, in order to obtain franchise tax revenues.”). 
 40 Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142/12).  For a discussion of the different 
position in the debate, see John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC 
Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition (European Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 54, 2005), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id860
444.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XTE-LAC2]. 
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formation processes of corporate governance in globalized financial 
markets, characterized by the interplay of governments, 
institutional investors, but also unions, labor, and community as 
well as environmental activists.  This makes our proposal a crucial 
political intervention as well.  By showing how corporate 
governance norms are actually generated, administered, and 
implemented through a complex and transnationally spatialized 
interaction between financial, state, and civil society actors, we 
challenge the narrative of an “enabling” corporate law according to 
which corporate law almost miraculously emerges through market 
innovation and a more or less hands-off attitude on the side of courts 
and governments.41  By asking more specifically which elements in 
corporate law and corporate governance get regulated and by 
whom, we begin to see transnational corporate governance as a 
space for political contestation, intervention, and reform.  Our focus 
on such a space as a site of contestation and engagement continues a 
critical engagement with long-standing ideas and assumptions 
regarding the separation of state and society and distinctions 
between the political and non-political, rather than simply refuting 
them.  The significance of a separation of state and society and its 
accompanying distinction between a “public” and a “private” 
sphere, associated with which are respective denotations as political 
and non-political, for corporate law can hardly be overstated.  With 
the corporation constituting the linchpin, backbone, and engine of 
the economy, it is a key battlefield in the negotiation of social power, 
state governance and an all-consuming economic rationality. 
In our conceptualization of corporate governance as an 
instantiation of  transnational legal pluralism, we build on 
important work, which connects corporate law theory with a focus 
on both national and transnational political economy contexts. 42  
 
 41 See Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50 
CORNELL L.Q. 599, 601-02 (1965) (setting out four features of “enabling” corporate 
law); see also John C. Coffee Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An 
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1623-24 (1989) (challenging the 
idea of unlimited contractual “innovation”). 
 42 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe & Massimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its 
Political Economy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
56 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 
(2003) (providing an important comparative law analysis in corporate governance 
regulation).  
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While our approach importantly draws on VoC analysis of how 
historically evolving political economies form the key context and 
background for the regulation of economic activities—of which 
corporate governance is a part—we are going beyond the 
institutional analysis provided by the VoC scholars in order to shed 
more light on the emergence of private and self-regulatory regimes 
in corporate governance against the background of the state 
transformation that marks the fate of modern nation states in the 
global era.43 
A project of transnational corporate governance that takes its 
cues from history, sociology, and political economy is, furthermore, 
outright political, because it resists the lure of simplifying, 
ideological oppositional dualisms.  As has already become clear, a 
key dualism in corporate governance debates has been, and 
continues to be, that between shareholders and stakeholders.  We 
are critical of how well the juxtaposition of these two, allegedly 
distinct, groups can actually explain the politics of the modern 
business corporation.  To us, the distinction between a shareholder 
and a stakeholder approach to corporate governance eludes the 
actual diversity of interests in, and expectations of, the corporation.  
While its binary simplicity lends itself to persuasive rhetoric, as in 
the form of the already mentioned “end of history”44 claims, or the 
recurring idea of a “global market for corporate law,” 45  the 
juxtaposition effectively invisibilizes the scope of power that 
companies hold over communities and very differently situated and 
positioned interest holders.  It, furthermore, not only avoids a closer 
scrutiny of the competing forces that lay claim to the corporation 
and its role in society, but it also keeps out of view the complex 
political economy changes that impact the socio-economic and 
political real-world environment in which corporations exist. 
 
 43 See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 229, 230 (2012) (explaining how domestic state transformation must be 
studied in relation to the changes in global markets and global political 
developments).  
 44  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4 (arguing that shareholder value 
maximization has emerged as the globally triumphant organizing principle for the 
modern stock corporation).  
 45 ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 1 (2009) (arguing 
that parties, including individuals and corporations, can “shop for the law”).   
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While the resistance against the shareholder/stakeholder 
dualism is a crucial element in our substantive critique, it is also 
directly connected to our emphasis on the transnationalization of 
corporate governance.  By that we mean that a closer analysis of the 
transnational actors, norms, and processes in corporate governance 
renders visible the complex constituencies of corporations today 
and can thus help to recognize a much more differentiated variety 
of forces that impact the corporation and how it is governed.  A 
transnational legal pluralist approach to corporate governance then 
engages, but is not limited to, the domestic space as a still important 
forum for corporate governance creation. 46   It resists drawing 
categorical lines between the national, the supranational, and the 
international spheres of norm creation and instead acknowledges 
the specific processes of norm creation that occur among and 
through public and private actors within, as well as across, those 
boundaries.47  As such, it resists the normative consequentiality of 
the dominant narrative, which emphasizes the restrained role that 
governments should play in “regulating” corporate behavior per se 
while embracing the idea that restraint will eventually result in a 
perfect regulatory regime for corporations on a global scale.  The 
blindspot of this narrative remains the actually much wider political 
debate about the role that corporations play in modern societies.  
This debate touches on the immense impact of corporations on 
employment, social security, the environment, and, increasingly, 
privacy,48 and that oftentimes seems to be going on in considerable 
distance from the specialized corporate law circles. 49  But, 
 
 46 O’Sullivan, supra note 37, at 25 (“To emphasize the importance of economic 
forces is not to say that the political dimensions of the transformation of systems of 
corporate governance are unimportant.”). 
 47 See Julia Black & David Rouch, Special Feature, The Development of the Global 
Markets as Rule- Makers: Engagement and Legitimacy, 2 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 218 passim 
(2008) (considering the role of markets in the normative rule-making process).  
 48 For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the challenges posed by the 
digital technology and the quest by powerful corporations to predict and control 
behavioral patterns, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).  
 49 See, e.g., David Vogel, Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A 
Dissent from the New Conventional Wisdom, 17 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 385 (1987); Barbara 
Fryzel, Governance of Corporate Power Networks, FIN. & COMMON GOOD, 2005, at 28, 
28; Geert de Neve, Power, Inequality and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Politics of 
Ethical Compliance in the South Indian Garment Industry, ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 30, 
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financialization has not only transformed the corporation and 
corporate law.50  At a time when consumption patterns have become 
insulated from climatical or geographical facilities and where global 
exchange, extraction, and sale of data fuels 24/7 availability, 
informed and willing consumers and corporations hold significant 
power.  Meanwhile, the regulatory theories that focus on 
corporations and their internal and external relations are lagging 
behind. 
From this follows our central argument, which concerns the 
emergence of a different, pluralistic political economy of 
transnational corporate governance.  In light of a legal pluralist 
understanding of corporate governance norm production today, the 
related institutions of norm production, adjudication, and 
enforcement are taking on new forms.  Legal institutions, like law 
itself, do not exist in the abstract and ephemeral, but in concrete 
social contexts.  It is from them that they receive affirmation or 
rejection, impulses for change or continuity.  Legal doctrine, in 
corporate law and beyond, is a child of time, and as such must be 
understood in the context in which it is relied upon.  As we show in 
our analysis in Part V, this context for corporate law production has 
been undergoing significant changes with privatization and 
globalization driving a fundamental reconfiguration of traditional 
architectures of public lawmaking and administration.  As corporate 
governance codes, codes of conduct, and other best practice 
standards become more and more woven into the regulatory/self-
regulatory fabric of what constitutes corporate law around the 
world today, legal doctrine is quickly adapting to these new 
formations.  As codes formulate new modes of accountability, 
transparency, and compliance, doctrinal assessments of corporate 
and directors’ liability or a company’s and its investors’ reporting 
 
2009, at 63, 63; George Monbiot, Taming Corporate Power: The Key Political Issue of our 
Age, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/taming-corporate-
power-key-political-issue-alternative [https://perma.cc/LAS2-5MAT]; Nicholas 
Connolly & Manette Kaisershot, Corporate Power and Human Rights, 19 INT’L J. HUM. 
RTS. 663 (2015).  
 50 See Laura Horn, The Financialization of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION: 
A CRITICAL, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK 281, 281 (Grietje Baars & André Spicer 
eds., 2017); see also Costas Lapavitsas, The Financialization of Capitalism: ‘Profiting 
Without Producing’, 17 CITY 792 (2013). 
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obligations change.51   These adaptations are neither born out of 
essentialist assertions of legal causality and responsibility nor do 
they neatly adhere to law and economics principles underlying the 
“nature of the firm”:  instead, the new legal doctrines of corporate 
governance incorporate these continuously evolving standards but 
evaluate, assess and shape them in light of the changing sociological 
constellations that constitute the regulatory universe of corporate 
governance today. 
In order to further explicate the particular dynamics that 
characterize the transnational emergence of corporate governance 
norms today, we discuss, in Part VII, the evolving law of 
shareholder stewardship as a case-in-point.  We trace the 
shareholder stewardship movement from its beginnings with 
internalized self-regulatory processes, which translated into the 
“soft” UK Stewardship Code and other similar codes across various 
countries, forward to the time of the amended EU Shareholder 
Rights Directive (SRD II).52  We posit that shareholder stewardship, 
even though it started as a case of enrolling institutional 
shareholders in corporate governance regulation via soft, market-
invoking law based on conventional law and economics 
assumptions, became increasingly hardened and brought a public 
coloration into shareholder engagement and investment 
management integrating sustainability concerns.  At the same time, 
the adoption of stewardship codes across nineteen countries, the 
SRD II, and the development of supporting stewardship principles 
and codes of conduct by regional and international investor 
associations show that the national, regional, and international 
policy space is currently much more perplexed.   
 
 51 See Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG 
Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 734 (2019) (“Financial analysts increasingly 
consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in rating 
companies . . . .  The complication for a fiduciary is that these factors may also 
reflect benefits or costs beyond a company’s financial bottom line.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also Frederick Alexander, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: 
Widening the Fiduciary Aperture to Broaden the Corporate Mission, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., 
Spring 2016, at 66; Frederick H. Alexander, The Capital Markets and Benefit 
Corporations, AM. BAR ASS’N, (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/07
/05_alexander/ [https://perma.cc/B4VE-L75R]. 
 52 Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of 
Long-Term Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132/1) [hereinafter SRD II].  
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Our analysis intervenes at a particular intersection.  On one side 
lies the political challenge to the contemporary corporate 
governance model, which remains tied to a triple fallacy.  The first 
is a vain competition between shareholder-versus-stakeholder-
oriented concepts of the firm, the second a polarization between 
monolithic national models of corporate governance, and the third 
a binary distinction between state-made/hard/binding law and 
non-state/soft/non-binding law.  On the other side of this 
intersection we find, in an institutional sense, the increasing 
proliferation of non-state made corporate governance rules 
generated by private actors, including institutional investors, 
corporations, and specialized expert committees.  We argue that the 
resulting pluralization of corporate governance political economies 
today can only be scrutinized through a more differentiated, 
analytical lens that focuses on the emerging actors, norms, and 
processes that constitute the intersecting and overlapping 
transnational regimes of corporate governance today.  This shift in 
perspective has important repercussions for the forward-going 
engagement with corporate governance.  Instead of being a battle 
ground for what is often presented as being two irreconcilable sets 
of interests—shareholders and stakeholders—a socio-legal analysis 
of how corporate governance norms are created and disseminated, 
the complex regulatory, transnational regime of corporate 
governance production becomes a methodological laboratory in 
itself.  As such, it allows us to situate and contextualize corporate 
governance as part of a critical inquiry into emerging forms of 
authority and legitimacy of market regulation.  By approaching 
corporate governance both as a transnational regulatory landscape 
that brings together public and private actors in a struggle over 
regulatory authority and as a normative field of political conflict and 
contestation, an engagement with corporate governance becomes an 
opportunity to connect sector-specific debates with larger questions 
of democratic market governance.  In trying to better understand 
what is and who drives corporate governance rules today, we 
scrutinize competing assertions of authority and legitimate 
authorship and claims of accountability and impact. 
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III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
It is our contention that an analysis of transnational corporate 
governance must pay close attention to the changes that have been 
underway within advanced nation-states since the 1970s.  During 
that time, the world saw the end of the Bretton-Woods system of 
currency exchange rates pegged to the U.S. dollar and to the price of 
gold and a rising global competitiveness among states to provide 
attractive investment destinations while, at the same time, achieve a 
reduction in public expenditures.53  While this background is crucial 
for an understanding of the corporation and its law, we argue that 
there must be more emphasis placed on the concrete, in-context 
analysis of corporations and of the legal regimes that address and 
empower them.  This focus on context and, in particular, on the 
historically evolved environment of the nation state where a 
corporation is headquartered is a prerequisite for a more adequate 
appreciation of the different forces that push and pull on the 
corporation as an object of regulation.  It is also an important aspect 
of present-day corporate governance analysis.  We think that even 
where such analysis takes into account the historical and 
institutional variations across different countries and their legal 
cultures with regard to how labor and corporate governance 
systems are complementing each other as a result of normative, 
 
 53 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary and financial system was 
followed by loosened domestic regulations on finance and financial 
institutions, giving rise to a wave of financial innovations, especially 
in the U.S. and U.K., as both countries aspired to nurture their 
financial sectors.  The introduction of new market players, such as 
pension and mutual funds, expanded, deepened, and increased the 
attractive power of financial markets, so that (for example) borrowing 
money by selling bonds began to replace traditional bank loans.  In 
order to attract investment and/or loans, or, somewhat later on, to 
satisfy conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), now repurposed as an instrument of neoliberal “structural 
adjustment”, [sic] developed and developing countries alike had to 
liberalize their own financial markets. 
Glenn Fieldman, Finance Unchained: The Political Economy of Unsustainability, 
SUSTAINABILITY, Mar. 24, 2020, at 1, 2 (footnotes omitted). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3
2020] New Geographies of Corporate Governance 77 
   
 
political choices,54 we must still develop a sharper analytical lens for 
the transnational variety of public and private, and domestic and 
international actors that are now shaping corporate governance 
norms.55 
This need follows from the ongoing diversification of actors, 
norms, and processes in the area of corporate governance, a sector-
specific development that mirrors analogous trends in other 
regulatory areas today.56  The institutional and normative variety of 
corporate governance today suggests that it does not simply 
represent a regulatory object or the outcome of a political decision 
for or against something.  Instead, corporate governance today is a 
veritable arena for competing visions of market regulation, and as 
such, the notions of “market” and “regulation” are both under 
political scrutiny rather than merely being two elements in a cause-
effect equation.  Markets are, by default, integrative, expansive, and 
potentially infinite,57 making the question about law’s relationship 
 
 54 See Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, 
and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity? 41 L. & SOC. REV. 865, 871 
(2007) (“[T]he timing of industrialization, the structure of firms and of labor unions, 
the degree of liquidity of capital markets, and more generally the role of the state 
in regulating economic life, are among the many factors which might be expected 
to influence the evolution of distinctive legal ‘varieties of capitalism.’”).  
 55 See Tim Bartley, Transnational Corporations and Global Governance, 44 ANN. 
REV. SOCIO. 145, 155-57 (2018) (mapping transnational corporations’ self-regulation 
in various areas where governmental regulation is absent); see also Peer Zumbansen, 
Neither ‘Public’ Nor ‘Private’, ‘National’ Nor ‘International’: Transnational Corporate 
Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 50 (2011) (highlighting 
different examples of the state’s interaction with market actors in creating corporate 
governance norms). 
 56  See, e.g., Lobel, supra, note 10; Robert Falkner, Private Environmental 
Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links, GLOB. ENV’T POL., May 
2003, at 72 (discussing the growing significance of corporate actors in devising 
environmental regulatory instruments); Doris Fuchs & Agni Kalfagianni, The 
Causes and Consequences of Private Food Governance, BUS. & POL.,  Oct 2010, at 1 passim 
(2010) (offering a critical assessment of the rise in importance and influence of 
private actors controlling the production and accessibility of food stuffs); John 
Biggins & Colin Scott, Licensing the Gatekeeper? Public Pathways, Social Significance 
and the ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, 6 TRANSNAT’L. LEGAL 
THEORY 370 (2015) (mapping the interpenetration of public and private authority in 
licensing credit derivatives).  
 57 See, e.g., Theodore Levitt, The Globalization of Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., May-
June 1983, at 92, https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-globalization-of-markets 
[https://perma.cc/K3FQ-CRA7] (“[There is a] new commercial reality—the 
emergence of global markets for standardized consumer products on a previously 
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to and in markets a complex challenge.  Given the differences 
between particular markets and between various ways in which law 
is used to create obstacles, facilitate activities, or impose rules for 
product quality or information transparency, 58  terms such as 
“regulation” or “intervention” do not adequately describe this 
relationship, nor can  they be expected to effectively capture the 
shortcomings of different regulatory forms. 59   While the 
differentiation of regulatory processes into “mandatory” or 
“voluntary” or “optional” mirrors the challenges of addressing 
historically embedded institutional differences while effectively 
responding to different companies’ abilities to adapt to changing 
regulatory demands,60 a more in-depth analysis of the transnational 
sociology of public and private regulatory governance is still 
outstanding.  Corporate governance, in our view, offers a promising 
example of such an analysis, not least because of the wealth of 
research that continues to be done in this area.  Corporate 
governance as a “field” of investigation, policymaking, and law 
reform, but also one of public contestation and critical political 
debate, cuts across the theory-practice divide and engages 
 
unimagined scale of magnitude. Corporations geared to this new reality benefit from 
enormous economies of scale in production, distribution, marketing, and 
management.”).  
 58 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201-03 (1999) (highlighting a 
variety of non-financial disclosures of a company’s activities, places of operation, 
and impact); Aaron A. Dhir, The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate 
Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47, 57-60 (2009) 
(explaining the shift from direct intervention and regulation to models of 
“reflexive” governance in making companies create more transparency); Dan S. 
Dhaliwal, Oliver Zhen Li, Albert Tsang & Yong George Yang, Voluntary 
Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reporting, ACCT. REV., Jan. 2011, at 59, 62-63 (arguing that firms pursue 
non-financial (“social”) reporting in the hope of reducing the cost of attracting 
equity capital). 
 59  See David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non-Financial Disclosure and the 
Responsibility of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 5, 7 (2019) (listing 
the reasons why regulators continue to invest in transparency regulation despite 
known shortcomings). 
 60 See Gerard Hertig & Joseph A. McCahery, Optional Rather than Mandatory 
EU Company Law Framework and Specific Proposals 1 (European Corp. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 78, 2007), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id958
247.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6QR-XE3E] (proposing optional regulations which 
will benefit small and medium size enterprises and will allow for more flexibility). 
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regulators, scholars, and civil society actors simultaneously.  As 
these debates are no longer confined to national political economies, 
the strategies that are being discussed reach beyond the legal 
confines of “corporate law” in country A or country B.  Instead, 
corporate governance becomes a transnational regulatory concern, 
highlighting the need to understand the historical, legal, and socio-
cultural arguments, on which calls for different types of corporate 
governance regulation are being formulated.61  With that, however, 
arises the need to better understand the historically evolved 
institutional varieties of corporate governance regulation that we 
have now come to witness in their adaptation to globalizing 
financial markets.62 
This Article intervenes at a critical juncture.  We think this 
juncture is constituted, on the one hand, by a revitalized and 
burgeoning debate around the social and political significance of the 
corporation in society and, on the other, by a continuing disconnect 
between concepts of corporate law associated with the nation-state 
and the sociological reality of transnational spaces in which the 
corporation actually operates.  The background for this disconnect 
can be illuminated by contrasting the traditional political economy 
analysis of corporate law as grounded in the nation-state with a host 
of emerging sociological studies of transnational governance forms, 
of which we believe corporate governance is a powerful illustration.  
An effective intervention in this constellation, in our view, will 
depend on the degree to which we can show that the political 
economy of national corporate law should be made part of a larger 
political economy analysis of neoliberal state transformation since 
the late 1970s.  It is since that time that the private business 
 
 61 One of the present authors has investigated this angle in the context of 
European Company Law Regulation.  See Peer Zumbansen, ‘New Governance’ in 
European Corporate Law Regulation as Transnational Legal Pluralism, 15 EUR. L.J. 246, 
271 (2009) (pointing to the insights from the Varieties of Capitalism analysis in 
employment, corporate and social welfare law in different EU member states 
regarding the “embeddedness of regulatory regimes in historically grown cultural, 
political and economic institutions”). 
 62  See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of 
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); Anthony 
Gould, Michael Barry & Adrian Wilkinson, Varieties of Capitalism Revisited: Current 
Debates and Possible Directions, 70 INDUS. RELS. 587 (2015) (analyzing both the 
influence and critique of Hall’s and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism approach). 
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corporation has increasingly stepped into the shoes of the state in 
providing key public infrastructure support and delivery across a 
range of formerly or allegedly “public” services. 63   With the 
corporation’s changing role as a societal actor, however, its legal 
status has become ever more ambiguous.  While corporate law 
conceives of the corporation as a private entity that comes into being 
through the surprising, perhaps improbable, combination of 
contractual agreements between investors and managers64 and its 
legal recognition as a “separate legal entity,”65 we will still need to 
unpack this paradox as we simultaneously work towards a concept 
of corporate law that can fully and adequately capture the reality of 
the corporation as a powerful societal actor.66 
 
 63 See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative 
Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (2000) (“Contemporary regulation might be best 
described as a regime of ‘mixed administration’ in which private actors and 
government share regulatory roles.  In fact, many private actors participate in 
governance in ways that are rarely recognized by the public, acknowledged by 
politicians, or carefully analyzed by legal scholars.  Private individuals, private 
firms, financial institutions, public interest organizations, domestic and 
international standard-setting bodies, professional associations, labor unions, 
business networks, advisory boards, expert panels, self-regulating organizations, 
and non-profit groups all help to perform many of the regulatory functions that, at 
least in legal theory, we assume agencies perform alone.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 64 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) 
(describing the relationship between owners and managers as one of “pure 
agency”). 
 65 Murray A. Pickering, The Company as a Separate Legal Entity, 31 MOD. L. REV. 
481, 481 (1968) (“Under English company law the company is a separate legal entity. 
Yet, although this is a fundamental concept, it has proved extremely intractable to 
define and to describe satisfactorily.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O’Byrne, “Can You Hear Me Now . . . 
Good!” Feminism(s), the Public/Private Divide, and Citizens United v. FEC, 20 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 40 (2013) (“[A]s feminists sought to challenge the public/private 
distinction by making the private more public, corporations (representing the 
hierarchical, male-dominated private sector that feminists were opposing) were 
also resisting the divide between public and private, but with a pernicious intent. 
Through lobbying, campaign contributions, sheer economic power, and most 
recently, by a largely unsolicited boost from the United States Supreme Court in 
Citizens United v. FEC, corporations have worked to privatize much of the public 
sphere—up to and including the electoral process in the United States.”); see also I. 
MAURICE WORMSER, Corporate Ills and Abuses, and Their Cures, in FRANKENSTEIN, 
INCORPORATED 137-38 (1931) (highlighting the absence of law suited to address the 
actually existing disconnect between investors and managers).  
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IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE’S TRANSNATIONAL DNA:  A 
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The search for such a law is as important today as it has ever 
been.  Our intervention in this endeavor seeks to show how treating 
the corporation’s legal status solely from within corporate law and 
its established doctrine is bound to fall short of developing a more 
comprehensive legal concept of the corporation.  It is out of that 
concern that our analysis places the corporation in the context of a 
political economy analysis of state transformation, privatization, 
and globalization.  These developments have led to a significant 
reconfiguration of the landscape in which corporations operate and 
in which different attempts at regulating corporate activity have 
been and are being made.  Corporate law, then, for us, is part of a 
larger investigation into the relationship between law and the 
changing political economy in an age of state transformation.  It is 
from that perspective that we focus our analysis on the connections 
between the growing disillusionment with the corporation as a 
seemingly untamable purveyor of power and the transnational 
fragmentation of regulatory governance.  As a result, we are 
concerned with the challenges for an adequate political governance 
regime vis-à-vis the corporation.  In other words, it is our goal to 
illustrate the continuities between the transformation of national 
political economies in the names of marketization, privatization, and 
globalization, on the one hand, and the emergence of hybrid, public-
private regulatory regimes that appear to defy traditional 
understandings of democratic legitimacy, on the other.  Such a 
project requires that we pay close attention to the “internal” 
corporate law debates and, equally, look for evidence of how the 
corporation is being experienced and contested outside that narrow 
purview.  It is here where we find intriguing revelations of 
governance innovation that mark both corporate law and regulation 
on a much larger scale.  We are bound to learn much about the 
cause-effect relationship that underlies traditional ideas of 
regulation and that remains confined to an analysis of how a certain 
outcome can be brought about by the intervention of A upon B.  
Contemporary regulatory governance, however, reveals itself as a 
complex process which involves context-dependent combinations of 
planning and spontaneity, flexible shifting between strategy and 
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improvisation, and the decentering of a designated “author” of a 
decision by unstable coalitions and compromises among different 
stakeholders with interests in the result—or, its avoidance.67 
Seen in this light, corporate governance seems to be about more 
than how companies are run and managed.  Corporations, in fact, 
are both the target for reform proposals and interventions, while 
also being the co-producers and co-authors of their own regulatory 
framework.  Corporate governance emerges from an institutional 
and procedural perspective as a continuously evolving assemblage 
of norms, which, due to their hybrid nature between obligation and 
recommendation, public order, and private standard, sit 
uncomfortably with traditional notions of law as statute, court 
order, or treaty.  Today’s corporate governance norms display a 
significantly broad regulatory focus, ranging from matters such as 
board composition in terms of gender or race and risk oversight to 
executive pay, shareholder activism, and non-financial reporting.  
While this expansion of corporate governance is, at least in part, also 
a response to changing societal attitudes towards today’s corporate 
business enterprise and its enormous socioeconomic power over its 
various stakeholders, the legal nature of “social,” “green,” or 
“sustainable” corporate norm-making initiatives is by no means 
settled and remains under-explored. 68   Furthermore, the more 
recently emerging policy push for increased gender and racial 
 
 67 See Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, On Experimentation and Real Options in 
Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S121, S123 (2014) (“[A]n issue that continually 
plagues empirical corporate governance research is the challenge of using 
observational studies to demonstrate much of anything, much less the likely effects 
of novel reforms.”). 
 68 See Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 
78 (2017) (“Of all the social and economic challenges to the current state of Delaware 
corporate law, perhaps the most potentially cataclysmic is the shift in attitudes 
about the very purpose of corporations.”); see also Martin Lipton, Corporate 
Governance: The New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 11, 
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governance-the-
new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/D7UE-SGMB] (“The effects of short-termism 
are damaging to the economy as a whole. . . .  To provide greater macroeconomic 
and financial stability and to raise productivity, it is essential that markets work in 
the public interest and for the long term rather than focusing only on short-term 
returns.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3
2020] New Geographies of Corporate Governance 83 
   
 
representation on corporate boards 69  and pay transparency, 70  as 
well as for wider societal engagement with the “purpose” of the 
corporation, 71  has to be seen against the background of long-
standing critiques of mainstream corporate law’s blindness to 
different structural forms of inequality and its alleged objective 
neutrality.72 
How does today’s corporate governance landscape and its 
distinctly transnational constitution compare to the prevailing 
understanding of corporate law as a predominantly domestic 
concern, while only rarely an international or global concern?  While 
this is not the place for an exhaustive account of the origins of the 
modern corporation and contemporary corporate governance, 73 
 
 69  See generally AARON A. DHIR, TOWARDS A RACE AND GENDER-CONSCIOUS 
CONCEPTION OF THE FIRM: CANADIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LAW AND DIVERSITY 
2-5 (Peer Zumbansen, John W. Cioffi & Lindsay Krauss eds., 2009), 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&co
ntext=clpe [https://perma.cc/9Z4L-AK5H] (highlighting the degree of 
underrepresentation of females and racial minorities on corporate boards).  
 70 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (analyzing the wide 
degree of discretion for managers to sustain high levels of compensation while 
preventing improvement regarding transparency); Sébastien Point & Shaun Tyson, 
Top Pay Transparency in Europe: Codes, Convergences, and Clichés, 17 INT’L J. HUM. RES. 
MGMT. 812 (2006) (providing a critical overview of emerging regulation and 
corporate self-regulation regarding management compensation transparency).  
 71 See Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Our Commitment, BUS. 
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ 
[https://perma.cc/5UQZ-WDXU]; see also Dionysia Katelouzou & Peer 
Zumbansen, The Transnationalization of Corporate Governance: Law, Institutional 
Arrangements & Corporate Power, 37 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3601379 [https://perma.cc/L5AA-EFKE] (arguing that 
the current debate around “corporate purpose” must be understood in light of both 
historical perspective and the changing societal functions that corporations assume 
today).  
 72 See, e.g., Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 
1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457, 467-68 (2002) (asserting that corporate decisions based 
on “shareholder wealth maximization” and “efficiency” often remain blind to their 
impact on perpetuating gender inequalities). 
 73 For a historical account of the modern corporation, see, for example, Oscar 
Gelderblom, Abe de Jong & Joost Jonker, The Formative Years of the Modern 
Corporation: The Dutch East India Company VOC, 1602-1623, 73 J. ECON. HIST. 1050 
(2013); Ron Harris, Law, Finance, and the First Corporations, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE RULE OF LAW, 145 (James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson & Lee Cabatingan 
eds., 2010); Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, 
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there are two stories to follow here, and the distinction between 
them will inform our ensuing analysis. 
Within the discipline—the legal field of corporate law—the 
theme of corporate governance emerged as a field of study in the 
mid-1970s, and it was throughout the 20th century that corporate 
governance scholarship and debate have stayed relatively close to 
the general understanding of the corporation as, above all, an 
investment vehicle.  As a result, discussions among corporate law 
scholars and practitioners mainly focused on a handful of key 
themes and issues, including the operation, duties, and composition 
of the board of directors, 74  as well as on the tension between 
managerial authority and shareholder rights, 75  on executive 
remuneration, and, to some degree, on the differences among 
national systems of corporate governance.76   The focus here was 
predominantly on the functional role of corporate law. 77  
 
The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 791 (2002). 
 74 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the 
Monitoring Board, and the Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623 (1981); Franklin 
A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004).  
 75  See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist 
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. 
Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45 (2002).  
 76 See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d ed. 2017) (putting forth a discussion 
of comparative corporate law that is now considered a classic).  For an overview of 
the differences between the United States and the UK specifically, see CHRISTOPHER 
M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013).  For a discussion on the recent change 
in the corporate governance debate in the United States see Our Commitment, BUS. 
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ 
[https://perma.cc/5UQZ-WDXU].  For one of the most astute and perceptive 
comparative accounts on comparative corporate governance see John W. Cioffi, 
State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of 
the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501 (2000) (offering an in-depth 
overview of different countries’ approaches to corporate governance regulation in 
the context of financial globalization).  
 77 Two classic accounts are FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (putting forth an economic 
explanation of corporate law building on the law and economics of contracts), and  
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 2 (analyzing “the role of corporate law in 
minimizing coordination and agency problems” to make “the corporate form 
practicable”).  
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Correspondingly, seeing the law’s role with regard to the 
corporation as “enabling” 78  rather than mandatory, corporate 
governance norms were measured primarily with regard to their 
ability to facilitate the attraction of capital.79  Mirroring the rise in 
the importance of the idea of shareholder wealth maximization as a 
firm’s definitive performance measure, corporate governance rules 
have been at the center of a continuing debate over how to best 
organize and run a company. 
Meanwhile, there has been for a long time a parallel corporate 
governance discourse, which is concerned with the socio-economic 
context of the actual firm.  This discourse is grounded in a political 
economy analysis of the historically evolving institutional and 
normative frameworks that constitute the firm’s regulatory 
environment, implicating a much expanded and contextual 
perspective on the corporation and its manifold stakeholders. 80  A 
political economy approach to the corporation breaks free from the 
confines of explaining corporate governance by focusing only on the 
“separation of ownership and control” which remains the standard 
focus of corporate law.81  A political economy analysis of corporate 
governance sees corporate law rules in relation to the laws that 
govern industrial relations, social protection, and employment—but 
also the environment.82  In that light, scholars of history, economics, 
 
 78 For an insightful discussion see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1626 
(1989) (arguing that “in an economic environment increasingly dominated by 
sophisticated institutional investors,” deviations from mandatory corporate law 
standards should anticipate and respond to judicial competence in finding an 
intermediate position between innovation and protection from opportunism).  See 
also Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50 
CORNELL L.Q. 599, 601 (1965) (discussing the “enabling” philosophy of modern 
American corporate law). 
 79 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 441-42.  The authors observe that 
the “standard shareholder-oriented model” has become consensus as it signals to 
investors that managers should only be accountable to investors.  Id.  
 80 In this regard see Katelouzou & Zumbansen, supra note 71, at 13-14. 
 81 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983) (arguing that the separation between ownership, i.e. 
shareholders who invest in the corporation, and control, i.e. managers who handle 
that investment as agents of the shareholders, can be observed as standard model 
in large corporations as well as in a number of other organizations).  
 82 See Joe DesJardins, Corporate Environmental Responsibility, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 
825, 826 (1998) (contrasting the neoclassical economic view of corporate 
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sociology, politics, socio-legal change, and climate change situate 
the study of corporate governance within the transformation context 
of public and, increasingly, private governance regimes in more and 
more areas of social, political, and economic areas of life.83  The 
difference in perspective between a more conceptual and this 
contextual approach is crucial, especially when we seek to explain 
the increasing significance of corporate governance regulation on a 
global scale.84 
The global dimension of corporate governance as a contested 
and fast-evolving policy field is reflected in debates over the 
organization of the firm, the rules governing the relationships 
between shareholders and managers, the level of executive pay and 
of diversity on the board, as well as the firm’s philanthropic and 
environmental engagement, as they are intimately intertwined with 
the dynamics of global investment. 85   Because a company’s 
 
responsibility shaped by the belief that, ultimately, the corporation needs to 
respond to and serve market interests with the emerging view among 
environmentalists that economic growth is not a value in itself); Peter A. Hall & 
Daniel W. Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the 
Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 449, 452 (2009) 
(describing how the varieties of capitalism approach considers how firms interact 
with other external actors); Claire Methven O’Brien, Reframing Deliberative 
Cosmopolitanism: Perspectives on Transnationalisation and Post-National Democracy 
from Labor Law, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1007, 1031-38 (2008) (discussing the historical 
relationship between labor law, corporate law, and social rights).  
 83 See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 2  
(J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997) (arguing “that markets and 
other coordinating mechanisms are shaped by and are shapers of social systems of 
production”); see also Myria W. Allen & Christopher A. Craig, Rethinking Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the Age of Climate Change: A Communication Perspective, INT’L 
J. CORP. SOC. RESP., July 5, 2016, at 1, 1 (“Climate change challenges present 
organizations (e.g. companies, corporations, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs)), communities, and citizens with the need to redefine current views on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) from a voluntary luxury as being a 
necessity.”); Lobel, supra note 10, at 343-44 (describing the paradigmatic shift from 
a regulatory model to a governance model, producing a mutually reinforcing 
system of economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy).   
 84 See generally ALAN J. DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2009) (examining change and transformation in the 
corporate governance systems of the UK, the US and Germany as a result of 
economic globalization).  
 85 See Douglas Cumming, Igor Filatotchev, April Knill, David Mitchell Reeb & 
Lemma Senbet, Editorial, Law, Finance, and the International Mobility of Corporate 
Governance, 48 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 123, 125 (2017) (“The financial impact of good 
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corporate governance set-up is received as a signal by the market for 
corporate investment and translates into the firm’s traded value, 
there is a constant push and pull between a firm’s efforts to attract 
capital and its ability to prove its compliance with the type of 
corporate governance that markets will reward. 
These dynamics unfold across a turbulent history of scandal, 
crisis, pressure for reform, and a wider debate regarding the place 
and role of the large business firm in society.86  The opening decade 
of the twenty-first century witnessed a series of large-scale corporate 
scandals, including those of Enron, Royal Ahold, Parmalat, Satyam 
and Tyco,87 and market failures, from the bursting of the dot-com 
bubble in 2000-2001 to the Great Financial Crisis (“GFC”) in 2008-
2009.88  While these events have been associated on different scales 
with poor corporate governance practices or management 
misconduct, and have significantly eroded public trust in large 
corporations and businesses more generally, they have also been 
formative in the creation of the current momentum of public debate 
about the corporation, its purpose, and its responsibilities. 
 
governance on the firm is unambiguously positive, both in terms of short-term 
efficiency outcomes and longer-term sustainability of the business. Perhaps most 
intuitive is that good governance, which minimizes the chance of managerial 
tunneling—defined . . . as the expropriation of corporate assets or profits—leads to 
an enhanced capability of the firm to raise external capital . . . . provide important 
metrics for the robustness of governance at the firm level and find that good 
governance firms have higher firm value, profits, and sales growth.”). 
 86 See Dorff, supra note 68, at 78-82 (discussing the shift in attitude about the 
purpose of corporations, particularly with the rise of public benefit corporations); 
Lipton, supra note 68 (describing the effects of “the New Paradigm” in corporate 
governance). 
 87 For summaries of the scandals see Geeta Anand, The Satyam Scandal: Friends 
Try to Reconcile 2 Sides of Indian Executive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A9; Gregory 
Crouch, Ahold to Pay $1.1 Billion to Settle Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at 
C10; Vanessa Valkin, Tyco Unwilling to Certify Accounts, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 24 2002, at 
25; Looking Back at the Rise and Fall of Enron, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 28, 2018, 10:25 AM 
CST), https://www.chron.com/local/history/economy-business/article/The-
rise-and-fall-of-Enron-9712210.php [https://perma.cc/3N8P-Y6LF]; How Parmalat 
Went Sour, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2004-01-11/how-parmalat-went-so
ur [https://perma.cc/2N3L-Q75A].  
 88 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the 
Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2009) (attributing the Great 
Financial Crisis largely to economic dependence on the credit rating agencies and 
to an increase in self-regulation). 
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In trying to better understand the direction of contemporary 
corporate governance norm-making, whether through the 
proliferation of private ordering processes or the creation of codes,89 
judicial intervention, 90  or legislative innovation, 91  one must 
understand that these developments do not occur in a vacuum.  
Instead, one has to consider the changes in the general political 
economy after the height of the redistributive welfare state of the 
1970s on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the transformation 
that corporate law and corporate governance systems have 
undergone since that time under the influence of globalizing capital 
markets.  As the end of “embedded liberalism”92 followed on the 
 
 89 See, e.g., Jean J. du Plessis & Chee Keong Low, Corporate Governance Codes 
Under the Spotlight, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3-20 
(Jean J. du Plessis & Chee Keong Low eds., 2017) (reflecting on the extent to which 
corporate governance codes have contributed to improve corporate governance 
practices); see also Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate 
Governance and Globalization, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 129, 149 (2004) (discussing 
the introduction of new corporate governance codes in European countries, as well 
as changes in U.S. and Japanese practices, indicating a convergence toward the 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model). 
 90 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 46 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (holding that defendant directors’ ROFR/Dilutive Issuance failed the price 
element of the entire fairness test and did not advance a proper corporate purpose, 
rendering the Issuance invalid and constituting a breach of the directors’ duty of 
loyalty); Gordon Smith, eBay v. Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Company, CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 9, 2010), 
https://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-a-modern-
version-of-dodge-v-ford-motor-company.html [https://perma.cc/ALY6-QNMR] 
(noting the court’s “unusual” application of the Unocal standard and assessment of 
threat but its consistency overall with the court’s treatment of “minority oppression 
cases”).  But see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(holding that corporations and unions are free to donate unlimited sums to election 
campaigns, protected by the constitutional right of free speech).  
 91 See 79 Del. Laws, c. 122, § 8 (2020) (outlining the obligations of “public 
benefit corporations” as for-profit corporations organized to produce a public 
benefit); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to “Do the Right 
Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 passim (2014) (arguing that “public benefit 
corporation” statutes can create meaningful change in giving corporate managers 
greater ability and an enforceable duty to “do the right thing”);  Council Directive 
2014/95, 2014 O.J. (L 330) (requiring large public-interest companies with more 
than 500 employees to disclose non-financial and diversity information).  
 92 See generally John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and 
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 392, 
passim (1982) (discussing the evolution of the post-World War II economy and 
defining “embedded liberalism” as “[t]he liberalism that was restored after World 
War II[, which] differed in kind from that which had been known previously”). 
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abdication of the gold standard and the powerful take-off of global 
financial flows, borders between differently legitimated regulatory 
authorities became increasingly blurred.  As public and private 
regulators have been developing frameworks to more efficiently 
meet sector-specific demands in a now globally integrated 
marketplace for goods, services, capital, knowledge, and data, they 
also raise difficult questions in terms of what they tell us about the 
relationship between “public authority” and “private power.”93 
Today, twenty years into the twenty-first century, corporate 
scandals, including those of Olympus, Wells Fargo, Nissan, and 
Sports Direct, continue to expose corporate governance gaps in 
recent reforms and business practices94 with regard to, for example, 
executive compensation, directors’ independence, institutional 
investors, disclosure, or risk management.  At the same time, 
corporate governance debates today have widened significantly and 
are concerned with the corporation itself and the recognition of and, 
in fact, the active engagement with claims for gender equality, 
environmental conservation, and climate change mitigation. 95  
 
 93 See Black & Rouch, supra note 47, at 223-28 (examining issues of legitimacy 
in the global marketplace under the prevalence of private rulemaking).  For a 
critique of private ordering in a global context, see CUTLER, supra note 32. 
 94  See, e.g., Olympian Illogic: Europe and US Should Heed Lessons of Japanese 
Scandal, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/a3f20100-0a26-
11e1-92b5-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/8RUG-GLHV]; Rachel Louise Ensign, 
Wells Fargo Struggles to Regain Footing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2019, at B1; Leo Lewis, 
Nissan’s Parable of Shoddy Governance, FIN. TIMES (May 12, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d6aca7b8-39d9-11e9-9988-28303f70fcff 
[https://perma.cc/67QV-G44G]; Deirdre Hipwell, Weak Pound and Governance 
Scandal Hits Sports Direct Profits, TIMES (DEC. 8, 2016), 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/weak-pound-and-governance-scandal-hits-
sports-direct-profits-22prcvb6c [https://perma.cc/JT7D-6RZ6]; see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 198, 206-09 (2005) (examining the Parmalat and Hollinger scandals 
as examples of gatekeeper failure).  
 95  See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin, Corporate Governance That 
‘Works for Everyone’: Promoting Public Policies Through Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms, 18 J. CORP. L. STUD. 381, 400-03 (2018) (providing an overview of 
corporate governance codes that increasingly task corporations with a 
responsibility to promote diversity and with non-financial disclosure 
requirements); see also Lenore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, Towards Accountable 
Capitalism: Remaking Corporate Law Through Stakeholder Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/towards-accountable-capitalism-
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Reflected also in the current and deepening crisis of MBA programs 
today,96 it is this wider and more comprehensive engagement with 
the business corporation and its place in society that shapes much of 
the debates at the moment, whether that concerns the largely 
untamed “power” of corporations over labor, consumers, local 
communities, and the environment, or the growing influence of “big 
business” on social, economic, and political processes. 97   This 
contextualization of the corporation not just as an investment 
vehicle but as a powerful actor in a socio-economic, planetary 
context in a state of dramatic transformation, 98  prompts an 
appreciation of the company and its laws through a sociological and 
historical lens.  What now becomes clear is a non-linear, complex 
trajectory of the business corporation from the time of Lochner99 and 
 
remaking-corporate-law-through-stakeholder-governance/ 
[https://perma.cc/97S2-BT9A] (arguing that the main theories justifying 
shareholder-primacy as the “dominant framework” of corporate governance 
“ignore the reality that other groups of stakeholders beyond shareholders—
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and taxpayers—have a stake in 
corporate productivity . . . .  Under shareholder primacy, these stakeholders have 
no voice inside an institution.”). 
 96 Peter Beusch, Towards Sustainable Capitalism in the Development of Higher 
Education Business School Curricula and Management, 28 INT’L J. EDUC. MGMT. 523, 524 
(2014); Ivor Hangout, The MBA, Disrupted; The Future of Management Education, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2019, at 14. 
 97 See, e.g., John Dunbar, The ‘Citizens United’ Decision and Why it Matters, CTR. 
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, (Oct. 18, 2012), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-
politics/the-citizens-united-decision-and-why-it-matters/ 
[https://perma.cc/VB3P-JSUA] (last updated May 10, 2018, 9:40 AM ET) 
(discussing the political ramifications of the Citizens United decision). 
 98 See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. STATE UNIV. L. REV. 155, 187 
(2000) (noting that prison privatization, an example of government contracting with 
private actors, has sparked a rigorous legal, political, and policy debate); IAN 
HARDEN, NORMAN LEWIS & COSMO GRAHAM, THE CONTRACTING STATE (1992) 
(examining the influence of political party ideology and constitutional rights on the 
role of contract in local government services in the United Kingdom); Catherine E. 
Rudder, Private Governance as Public Policy: A Paradigmatic Shift, 70 J. POL. 899, 906-
09 (2008) (highlighting the expanded role of the private sector in public 
policymaking and that of multinational corporations in solving “collective 
problems.”).  
 99 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state maximum 
hours statute was unconstitutional as it impermissibly interfered with employees’ 
freedom to contract with employers). 
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Dodge100 through the period of the “affluent society”101 and the “new 
property”102 on through the transnationalization of the corporation103 
with its trials and tribulations104 until the present time as a central 
nodal point in the acquisition and control of “information,” “data,” 
and “knowledge.”105 
The emerging new geographies of corporate governance also 
mirror in part the reconfiguration of the state whose role is today 
less and less that of a central anchor of regulatory authority, but a 
co-regulator in an increasingly diverse constituency of norm 
makers.  Since the 1990s we have seen a surge in the creation of 
corporate governance codes and best-practice guidelines in 
countries all around the world, 106  the main drivers for this 
 
 100  See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (holding that the 
defendant corporation’s decision not to release additional shareholder dividends 
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty).  
 101 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958) (analyzing the 
increase in economic disparities between the private and public sectors following 
the rise of consumerism after World War II).  
 102  Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964) 
(discussing the growth of “government largess,” or the property and “valuables” 
received from individuals and entities derived from the government).  
 103  See Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for 
Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 740-44 (1970) (introducing the difficulty 
posed by the multinational enterprise, stemming from shortcomings in the legal 
recognition of international corporations). 
 104 See, e.g., Jennifer Bair & Florence Palpacuer, CSR Beyond the Corporation: 
Contested Governance in Global Value Chains, 15 GLOB. NETWORK (SUPPLEMENTAL 
ISSUE) S1 (2015); Ruggie, supra note 9; Christina Stringer & Snejina Michailova, Why 
Modern Slavery Thrives in Multinational Corporations’ Global Value Chains, 26 
MULTINATIONAL BUS. REV. 194, 196-201 (2018); Peer Zumbansen, What is Economic 
Law? 1 (Transnat’l L. Inst., Research Paper 20/2020, 2020).  
 105  See Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New 
Construct for Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220 (2018) (arguing for a 
transnational legal framework to govern data ownership and property rights); Ivan 
Stepanov, Introducing a Property Right Over Data in the EU: The Data Producer’s 
Right—an  Evaluation, 34 INT’L REV. L., COMPUTS. & TECH. 65 (2020) (advocating for 
the recognition of formal data producer’s rights under EU law).  See also VIKTOR 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG 
DATA 179 (2018) (“The system, even if perhaps appearing to promote liberal values, 
would make George Orwell blush and the East German Stasi salivate: seeming 
freedom on the outside but total state control on the inside.”). 
 106  RHYS JENKINS, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: SELF-REGULATION IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2001), 
https://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/E3B3E78BAB9A8
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development, arguably, remained the attempt on the part of 
different sovereign states to render their corporate governance 
regimes more amenable and, effectively, more attractive for capital 
flows and investment practices which have become increasingly 
volatile and impatient.  In recent years, however, states have come 
under even greater pressure from powerful private actors that 
administer enormous financial funds and have begun to claim a 
growing stake in setting the regulatory parameters for world-wide 
corporate investment, often in concomitance with market-driven 
regulatory incentives.107 
The new and continuously evolving processes of regulatory 
innovation are generating a diversified and particular set of norms, 
which go far beyond the governance scope that had still 
characterized the first-generation corporate governance codes. 108  
Today, there is no doubt that, despite the shareholder value 
maximization idea’s fast rebound after the GFC, the discourse has 
begun to shift in a number of directions. 109   Leaving behind a 
somewhat stale and never fully satisfactory track record of corporate 
social responsibility (“CSR”) initiatives, at least since the 1960s, it 
appears that today CSR is being transformed into a more ambitious 
and more comprehensive governance idea.110  This new generation 
 
86F80256B5E00344278/$file/jenkins.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8Z7-ZZKF] (“The 
1990s saw a proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and an increased emphasis 
on corporate responsibility.  This was a result of economic developments in the 
1980s, which saw a major shift away from the social democratic and Keynesian 
interventionism of the postwar period in the North, and from import substituting 
industrialization and statism in the South.  The emphasis on monetarist economic 
policies and increased integration of international markets for goods and finance, 
the massive privatization of state assets and, in developing countries, the shift to 
trade liberalization and export promotion, all served to redefine the economic role 
of the state.”). 
 107 See infra Part VI. 
 108 See infra Part V.c.   
 109 See infra Part V.a.   
 110 See, e.g., Banu Ozkazanc-Pan, CSR as Gendered Neocoloniality in the Global 
South, 160 J. BUS. ETHICS 851, 856-57 (2019) (“CSR initiatives in the Global South 
focus on ‘giving’ factory workers a particular set of rights that mimic those we 
might see in developed nations in the West, such as safe working conditions.”); Dirk 
Matten & Jeremy Moon, Reflections on the 2018 Decade Award: The Meaning and 
Dynamics of Corporate Social Responsibility, 45 ACAD. MGT. REV. 7, 9 (2020) (“First, 
many CSR issues are concerned with the wider responsibilities that companies take 
for some of their potential negative impacts in their supply chains and even their 
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of CSR no longer pits shareholders against stakeholders as 
representatives of two neatly distinguishable constituent groups of 
the modern business corporation, but is grounded in the societal 
transformation that companies have been involved in the context of 
the privatization of formerly public functions on the level of the 
nation state and beyond. 
What emerges before our eyes is both a fragmented—in terms of 
the specific regulatory authority of various involved actors—and, at 
the same time, spatialized—in terms of the global reach of relevant 
regulatory regimes—assemblage of corporate governance 
architectures.  While their focus is still on the business corporation 
and its core concerns as an investment vehicle, corporate 
governance norms today take on board a diverse and pluralistic set 
of concerns and interests, which are in turn promoted by traditional 
(state) and non-traditional (private) “lawmaking” actors.  The 
proliferation of the latter is grounded in different countries’ 
particular histories of state transformation and privatization, on the 
one hand, while developing in tandem with a global rise of private 
ordering and standard setting, on the other.111  It is this co-existence 
of public and private normative institutional frameworks of 
contemporary corporate governance that gives rise to a 
transnational multiplication of hybrid, public and private, national 
and international corporate law production.112  Given the extensive 
role that corporations play in the context of an almost infinite 
number of societal affairs and in consideration of the variation of 
 
value chains (e.g., unsafe working conditions, slavery-like terms of employment, 
pollution, resource depletion). Second, many companies are increasingly focused 
on the impacts of their operations on the planet at large (e.g., policies related to 
climate change, species diversity, natural resource depletion).“ (citation omitted)). 
 111  See NILS BRUNSSON & BENGT JACOBSSON, A WORLD OF STANDARDS 46-47 
(2002) (arguing that private standards embody expert knowledge which is used for 
governance purposes); see also TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL 
RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5 (2013) 
(arguing that in a number of regulatory areas governments continue to delegate 
regulatory authority to private sector bodies).  
 112 See generally Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Andreas Nölke & Henk Overbeek, 
The Transnational Political Economy of Corporate Governance Regulation: A Research 
Outline (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Working Papers Political Science No. 5, 
2003), https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/74100928/137F9259-D62F-
46C8-AC0A5F4C6F592E4B [https://perma.cc/8J4J-5PAK] (outlining a research 
project to analyze what led to the hybridization of public and private corporate 
regulation). 
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specific instruments and institutional forms that corporate 
governance rules take on in different parts of the world, we can 
speak of a plurality of political economies of corporate governance today. 
In the context of this newly emerging transnational geography 
of corporate governance, the traditional corporate governance 
narratives, which have their foundation in a law and economics 
understanding of the corporation, have limited analytical value.  By 
contrast, while the contextual approach suggested here places 
corporate governance in a field of contestation, that arguably 
extends beyond organizational matters related to executive pay or 
board composition, it also seems the only way to effectively address 
the corporation in its actual operational environment.  It is in that 
regard that we argue for a reconceptualization of corporate law and 
corporate governance as a transnational regulatory concern which is 
part of a law and political economy analysis of how corporations are 
regulated as part of a larger critical engagement with the 
relationship between states and markets.113  Corporate governance 
regulation must, in our view, be described as transnational because 
it cuts across the boundaries between the domestic and the 
international, the public and the private.  Transnational as a 
category, then, is of lesser value in neatly demarcating jurisdictional 
borders than it is in exposing the doctrinal and conceptual premises 
based on which an issue is associated with the domestic or the 
international arena.  By instead focusing on the transnational 
landscape of different actors, norms, and processes, which include, but 
are not limited to, states, laws, court decisions, and parliamentary 
lawmaking, it becomes possible to understand the transnational law 
of corporate governance as a methodology of (or a particular area 
of) law in a global context.114 
 
 113 See GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13-
14 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (identifying a number of 
financial disasters caused by the lack of governmental regulation and oversight); 
YVES TIBERGHIEN, ENTREPRENEURIAL STATES: REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
FRANCE, JAPAN, AND KOREA 1 (2007) (contrasting stakeholder or coordinated 
economies with liberal Anglo-Saxon systems concerning the different approaches 
towards regulating corporations).  
 114 Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, 898, 898-925 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012) (arguing that 
transnational law is global and interdisciplinary); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational 
Law, With and Beyond Jessup, in THE MANY LIVES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL 1 (Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020).  
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V. THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE I:  MISCONCEPTIONS, 
DEAD ENDS, AND CIRCULARITY 
In this Part, we set out to chart the emerging political economies 
of contemporary corporate governance against the historical and 
sociological background of corporate governance regulation and 
state transformation over the past four decades.  We will do so 
through a critique of the three aforementioned scholarly binds 
which have largely determined corporate law debates through the 
present moment.  The first one concerns the juxtaposition of 
shareholder primacy and stakeholder-oriented theories of corporate 
governance.  The second bind results from a dualistic, either-or 
thinking that has been shaping much of the debate around 
convergence/divergence and harmonization versus so-called 
“regulatory competition.”  Finally, the third one, which we will 
critically review, concerns the distinction between so-called “hard” 
and “soft” law.  In each case, we will try to show how a more 
differentiated, less oppositional thinking can bring the analysis 
much closer to the actual reality of corporate governance today. 
a. “Scholarly Bind One”: The Vain Competition between Shareholder 
Versus Stakeholder Conceptions of the Corporation 
The emergence of corporate governance as a topic of interest 
among scholars, policymakers, and practitioners of corporate law 
and the political economy of the firm coincided with the fading of 
the “business stateman”115 and the rising prevalence of what has 
variously been termed as the “contractarian,” “nexus of contracts,” 
or “private ordering” theory of the firm.116  During a period when 
economic theories prevailed, corporate governance was mainly 
 
 115 A magisterial presentation can be found in BERLE, supra note 27.  
 116 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972) (arguing that in a 
corporation decisions are based on a contractual arrangement as part of a team 
productive process); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 311 (“The private 
corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for 
contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of 
divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can 
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.”).  
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studied through the neoclassical economic lens of agency theory.117  
For the proponents of agency theory, corporate governance mainly 
deals with the balance of power between “the three key players—
the executives, the board of directors and the shareholders,”118 while 
the aim of analysis is to reduce the organizational costs of running 
business through corporations, 119  and to maximize shareholder 
value on the basis of shareholders’ residual claims on the 
corporation.120  Agency theory, along with other economic theories 
of the firm,121 had far-reaching effects on the study of the internal 
organization and power structure of the corporation, the 
functioning and interrelationships among the allegedly key 
corporate actors (board of directors, shareholders, and 
management), and their relationships with other stakeholders—
particularly labor and creditors.122 
For the time being, however, much of the political contestation 
surrounding corporate governance continues to be organized 
around the dualistic poles of shareholder primacy versus 
stakeholder welfare.  From this opposition follows the assertion of 
whether and, if so, which countries have “converged” towards 
 
 117 See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 81 (analyzing the separation of 
management and risk-bearing functions, a characteristic of corporations, in non-
corporate entities). 
 118 ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINNOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE xvii (5th ed. 
2011).  For a recent account of corporate governance, see Marianna Pargendler, The 
Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359 passim (2016).  
 119 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1200-01 
(1984) (examining the issue of corporate governance as that of “transaction cost 
economics” which approaches “the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and 
contends that a leading but widely neglected purpose of economic organization is 
to economize on the costs of transacting over time”).  
 120 Fama & Jensen, supra note 81, at 302-03. 
 121 Transaction cost economics also supported shareholder governance, 
perceiving shareholders as the only corporate constituents that cannot protect 
themselves from firm-specific risk.  See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); see 
also Benjamin M. Oviatt, Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-
Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for Congruent Interests, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 214, 
216-23 (1988) (using agency and transaction cost theories to propose ten hypotheses 
to explore the relationship between top managers and shareholders and stimulate 
further research).  
 122  See JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR 
PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH 120-26 (2004) (discussing the role of “agency problems” 
in corporate decision-making).  
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shareholder value or continue to “diverge” in that regard.  But in the 
post-GFC world the convergence theorists’ claim of shareholder 
primacy’s quasi-universal status has come under attack in both 
theory and practice circles.123  While the “normative” embers of both 
the shareholder primacy norm and the stakeholder theory still 
smolder even after more than ten years since the GFC, one of the key 
aspects of corporate governance regulation of the 21st century is the 
increasing emphasis on the what might (again) be called the 
“public” dimension of the corporation and of the law relating to it 
in the unfolding political economies of regulatory corporate 
governance. 124   As we see in the increasingly heated discussion 
around the “purpose” of the corporation, the calls for a 
reconceptualization of the corporation and of corporate law have 
come a long way from the CSR stand-offs in the early 1930s125 and 
the convergence/divergence discussion in the 1990s and early 
2000s.126 
Looking at the United States as a case in point for the dominance 
of the shareholder primacy view, much of American corporate law 
scholarship in the last fifty years is aimed at finding a mechanism to 
minimize the agency costs that arise from separation of ownership 
and control and bolstering better corporate governance through 
hostile takeovers, independent directors, performance-based 
remuneration, and activist shareholders.127  At the same time, from 
a teleological perspective, three alternative analytic models, that is 
 
 123 See, e.g., BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING 
(César Rodriguez-Garavito ed., 2017); BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017).  
 124 See supra Part II.  
 125 For a discussion of CSR during the 1930s, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For 
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 126 See infra Part V.b. 
 127  See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 70; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 863, 868-71 (1991); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). 
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shareholder primacy,128 director primacy,129 and team production,130 
prevailed (and still do, to a large extent) in U.S. scholarship, offering 
differing views on what should be seen as the proper purpose of the 
corporation.  Both shareholder primacy and director primacy 
models—derived from neoclassical views of the firm—privilege 
shareholders relative to other corporate constituents and are 
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization,131 even though 
they take contrary positions to the retention of the status quo of 
managerial control in U.S. companies and the merits of shareholder 
governance.132  By contrast, the team production theory of Margaret 
M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout133 insulates directors from shareholders’ 
direct control, exposing shareholder primacy as a myth.134  Even 
though the team production theory seems to align with stakeholder 
theories of corporate governance,135 Blair and Stout focus only on 
 
 128 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
680-82 (2007) (analyzing the checks available to shareholders over directorial 
power). 
 129  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002) (“Managerialism perceives 
the corporation as a bureaucratic hierarchy dominated by professional managers.”); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 601, 616-18 (2006) (arguing that shareholders, in practice, have little power 
over corporate decision-making). 
 130  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (noting that under the team production 
approach, the purpose of concentrating managerial powers in the board of directors 
is to “protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the corporate 
‘team’”).  But see Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial 
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 129, 142 (2009) (arguing that the team production theory does not account 
for the varying degrees of shareholder influence over corporate decision-making). 
 131 STEPHEN M BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 65-72 (2008). 
 132  See, e.g., Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 641, 655-
56 (2011). 
 133 Blair & Stout, supra note 130.  This theory is built on Raghuram C. Rajan 
and Luigi Zingales’ theory of the firm which is based on the property rights 
approach.  See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 
113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 390-91 (1998).  
 134 See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2002). 
 135 Blair & Stout, supra note 130, at 280-81 (arguing that directors are “trustees 
for the corporation itself”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3
2020] New Geographies of Corporate Governance 99 
   
 
the firm-specific contributions of numerous constituencies.  A 
“mediating” board, meanwhile, does not necessarily protect 
stakeholders, 136  as it “remain[s] subject to equity market 
pressures.” 137   Critics of shareholder value maximization in the 
United States advanced the argument that the firm-specific 
contributions of all corporate constituents should be considered.138  
In the same vein, they championed the board’s superior decision-
making freedom to weigh various interests in the balance defending 
(perhaps paradoxically for the non-U.S. audience) the status quo of 
managerial control.139 
Economic literature associated the stakeholder perspective with 
the property rights analysis of the firm in asserting that not only 
shareholders but also other corporate constituents, such as 
employees, can be residual claimants in investing in specific human 
capital. 140   Alternative arguments in support of a stakeholders 
mandate in the firm have often been associated with the CSR 
movement, 141  while being mainly derived from the stakeholder 
theory of the corporation.  Even though the classic stakeholder 
theory statement can be traced to Dodd’s writings in the early 20th 
century, 142  stakeholder theories made their way into academic 
circles (mainly in management literature) after the 1980s,143 relying 
 
 136 David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team 
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 passim (2000); George W. Dent, 
Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of 
Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213 passim (2008). 
 137 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating 
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 435 (2001). 
 138  Blair & Stout, supra note 130, at 253 (“Boards exist not to protect 
shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the 
members of the corporate “team,” including shareholders, managers, rank and file 
employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.”). 
 139  See Gelter, supra note 132, at 646 (elaborating that “pro-stakeholder” 
arguments served completely different aims in the US from similar theories in 
France and Germany). 
 140 See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765-73 (1989); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and 
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1121-22 (1990). 
 141  The CSR literature is voluminous.  For a good summary of the CSR 
literature, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of 
Economic Globalization, 35 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 711-17 (2002). 
 142 See Dodd, supra note 125. 
 143 The literature is voluminous.  For a landmark publication, see R. EDWARD 
FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984). 
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on a range of theoretical bases and evidently displaying varying 
definitions of normative and policy purpose. 144   Under the 
stakeholder perspective, corporations engage with a variety of 
different stakeholders including insiders—shareholders, managers, 
and employees—and outsiders—creditors, suppliers, and 
customers.  “Progressive” U.S. corporate scholars have advanced a 
multi-stakeholder concept of the corporation under which corporate 
managers and directors can be understood to owe consideration 
(and perhaps even fiduciary duties) to a wider range of corporate 
constituents than shareholders, including obligations to employees, 
consumers, suppliers, communities, and the environment.145  Yet, 
such a broad stakeholder approach has mostly remained on the 
sidelines and stakeholders mainly refer to non-shareholder 
constituencies who bear the risk of the firm’s activities.  At the same 
time, the predominant academic assumption in the United States—
except for the middle decades of the century (1940’s-1970’s) where 
managerialism in North America and Europe coincided with public, 
societal interests—maintains that corporations as private, economic 
entities should be run for the collective benefit of shareholders.   
Corporate governance in the UK, like the United States, has been 
largely occupied by the assumptions of neoclassical economics and 
the agency problems between investors and management,146  and 
has, in general, privileged shareholders among all the corporate 
constituents.  Departures from the doctrine of shareholder value can 
be found in the work of the Bullock Committee in the 1980s and, 
more recently, in reforms addressing the directors’ account to wider 
stakeholders. 147   The latter has its roots in the statutory 
 
 144 See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 66-67 
(1995); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 passim.  
 145  See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE & SOCIETY (1995); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006).  
 146 For a comprehensive law and economics analysis of English company law, 
see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (1997). 
 147 See ALAN BULLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY (1977); DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REFORM, GREEN PAPER 34-43 (2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/584013/corporate-governance-reform-green-paper.pdf 
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reformulation of the common law directors’ fiduciary duty to act 
bona fide for the interest of the company148  into the “enlightened 
shareholder value” (ESV) principle encapsulated in section 172 of 
the UK Companies Act 2006.149  Section 172 provides a legislative 
imperative blended with improved information flow and greater 
disclosure that enables directors to consider wider stakeholder 
interests when making decisions.150  The UK stance, therefore, parts 
course to some degree from the counterpart United States 
shareholder-oriented model,151 but section 172 lags behind in terms 
of setting a true stakeholder mandate.152  This is despite the recent 
strengthening of the reporting requirements relating to section 
 
[https://perma.cc/BV8X-Q3AB] (offering approaches to strengthening a wider 
stakeholder voice); DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REFORM: THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER 
CONSULTATION 24-35 (2017),  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/640631/corporate-governance-reform-government-response.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T7AE-TR8D] (discussing efforts to strengthen wider 
stakeholder voices).  
 148 Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, 425 (UK) (“Directors must dispose of 
their company’s shares on the best terms obtainable, and must not allot them to 
themselves or their friends at a lower price in order to obtain a personal benefit.  
They must act bona fide for the interests of the company.”).  
 149 The Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172 (UK). Note that UK policymakers 
have rejected the pluralist approach, a variant of stakeholder theory based on a 
property analysis of the firm.  See COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN 
COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK  83-150 
(2000); 1 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 43 (2001) (referring to paragraph 3.16 
addressing liability upon insolvency); DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS 135-38 (2009) (referencing Annex 3, discussing broadening 
statutory responsibility of the board to place employees and others on par with 
shareholders).  
 150 For recent empirical evidence on the effectiveness of strategic reporting in 
the UK, see Irene-Marie Esser, Iain MacNeil & Katarzyna Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna, 
Engaging Stakeholders in Corporate Decision-Making Through Strategic Reporting: An 
Empirical Study of FTSE 100 Companies, 29 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 729 (2018).  
 151 For a distinction between the UK stance and the United States shareholder-
oriented model, see BRUNER, supra note 76, at 29-65. 
 152 On the effectiveness of the ESV, see Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder 
Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the 
United Kingdom Take?, 17 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 329, 341-43 (2006); Georgina 
Tsagas, Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006: Desperate Times Call for Soft Law 
Measures, in SHAPING THE CORPORATE LANDSCAPE: TOWARDS CORPORATE REFORM AND 
ENTERPRISE DIVERSITY 131-50 (Nina Boeger & Charlotte Villiers eds., 2018). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
102 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:1 
   
 
172, 153  which aims to assist non-shareholder groups in holding 
company directors accountable as part of a broader framework to 
enable more effective board engagement with the workforce and 
wider stakeholders in order to gain a better and more grounded 
understanding of their views.154  Neither, however, fundamentally 
changed the UK corporate governance system due to the lack of 
consensus regarding the desirability of employee participation on 
company boards.155  As one of us has argued elsewhere,156 the recent 
reforms cannot alone strengthen the way in which the interests of 
employees, customers, and wider stakeholders are considered at 
board level.  This is partly because increasing the stakeholder 
orientation of UK companies will require a more fundamental 
“cultural” change, and partly because UK corporate governance still 
mainly relies on the combination of transparency, disclosure, and 
market participants’ actions to remedy undesirable outcomes.  
Qualifying such reform as impossible, given the supposedly 
overwhelming requirement of a wholesale transformation of the 
prevailing “culture,” echoes the corporate governance debate of the 
late 1990s, which was steeped in seemingly uncompromising 
positions of ideological opposition.157  Over time the circumstances 
of the opposition of the “convergence” and “divergence” camps 
have continued to change.  While it is too early to provide any 
reasonable assessment of what a post-Brexit UK culture of corporate 
 
 153  See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE  
Provision 5, at 5 (2018); The Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 414CZA (UK).    
 154 This link between ESV and board composition is manifested in Provision 
5 of the 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code itself, supra note 149, which combines 
the reporting requirements relating to § 172 with three alternative mechanisms to 
engage with the workforce: a director appointed from the workforce, a formal 
workforce advisory panel, or a designated non-executive director. 
 155 For more on this long-standing debate, see Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly, 
Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 110 
passim (2001). 
 156 Dionysia Katelouzou, Aditi Gupta & Gerhard Schnyder, ‘More Teeth Needed 
for Corporate Governance Reforms’: Response to the Dept. BEIS Green Paper on Corporate 
Governance Reform 3 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921800 
[https://perma.cc/RQ5J-XQXY].  
 157 Compare Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, with Simon Deakin, The 
Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 11 passim (2005). 
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governance could look like, 158  the example of Hong Kong’s 
surprising tenacity in opposing a centralist Chinese government in 
the drawn-out summer of 2019 might serve as a reminder of how 
cultures can change and adapt.159   
In addition, what requires our attention is that despite the 
predominantly shareholder-oriented perspective of corporations 
and business performance, the UK debate has often arrived at 
different conclusions in relation to the corporation’s obligations and 
duties to society, which are explained by the fact that UK company 
law, unlike U.S. corporate law, is conceptually built on shareholder 
governance, 160  and UK shareholders—particular institutional 
investors that have dominated UK public equity since the 1990s—
have been portrayed as “stewards”161 of the companies in which 
they invest.  Yet, what the UK example shows is that scholarly 
arguments in support of a broader stakeholder mandate were 
deeply influenced by economic theories.  The dissenting pluralist 
approach in the UK,162 similar to the team production theory in the 
United States, supports the allocation of governance rights to all the 
 
 158 But see John Armour, Holger Fleischer, Vanessa Knapp & Martin Winner, 
Brexit and Corporate Citizenship, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 225, 231-47 (2017) 
(evaluating the future possibilities of the legal status of corporate citizens of the EU 
in light of the Brexit decision).  See also Peter Swabey, Corporate Governance: The 
Brexit Effect, CHARTERED GOVERNANCE INST. BLOG, 
https://www.icsa.org.uk/knowledge/blog/corporate-governance-the-brexit-effe
ct [https://perma.cc/7ZUZ-6REQ] (suggesting Brexit will have a minimal impact 
on corporate governance but emphasizing the highly uncertain nature of such 
impact).  
 159  See Jean-Philippe Béja, Is Hong Kong Developing a Democratic Political 
Culture?, 2 CHINA PERSP. 4 passim (2007); Francis L. F. Lee & Joseph M. Chan, Making 
Sense of Participation: The Political Culture of Pro-democracy Demonstrators in Hong 
Kong, 193 CHINA Q. 84, 84-90 (2008); Chuanli Xia & Fei Shen, Political Participation in 
Hong Kong: The Roles of News Media and Online Alternative Media, 12 INT’L J. 
COMMC’N. 1569 (2018); Peter Pomarantsev, The Counteroffensive Against Conspiracy 
Theories Has Begun, ATLANTIC, (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/evolution-protests
-conspiracy-theories-disinformation/595639/ [https://perma.cc/89TL-TUW4]. 
 160 See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 76, at 29-36.  
 161 See infra Part VII.  
 162 See JOHN E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE 
THEORY OF COMPANY LAW (1993) 23, 32-50 (viewing companies as “social 
enterprises” and arguing that companies purpose is to create “social wealth” on the 
basis of a revised property rights theory); see also Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly, 
Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 110, 115 
(2001).   
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corporate constituents that bear firm-specific risk and is, therefore, 
normatively different from the more “societal” stakeholder theories 
of company law as these developed in Continental Europe and 
Japan in the 20th century.   
In Germany and France, for instance, institutional theories of 
corporate law had a great appeal for most of the 20th century as they 
were seen as a tool to protect the firm and all of its stakeholders 
against controlling shareholders’ opportunism, an issue that was of 
little significance in countries with dispersed ownership structures 
such as the United States and the UK.163  However, institutionalism 
along with the idea of stakeholderism that tends to be associated 
with it seems to have been losing some of its once important status 
as German corporate governance gradually shifted in the 1990s 
away from state control and further towards capital markets.164  One 
explanation for this could be the internationalization of the debate 
in the wake of the ECJ case law following the Centros case,165 the rise 
of regulatory competition and other forces of international 
convergence.166 
Japan’s corporate governance system, on the other hand, 
displayed a high degree of “institutional isomorphism,” particularly 
from the 1960s to 1990s, with a strong emphasis on maintaining 
firm-specific capabilities generated by the investment of 
 
 163  For a good overview of the influence of the theory of the German 
corporation as “enterprise in itself” (Unternehmen an sich) and the French doctrine 
of the “interest of the association of the corporation” (intérêt social or intérêt de la 
société) to the stakeholder orientation of Germany and France, respectively, see 
Gelter, supra note 132, at 678.  
 164 See Jackson & Moerke, supra note 4, at 352-53; Gregory Jackson, Stakeholders 
Under Pressure: Corporate Governance and Labour Management in Germany and Japan, 
13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 419, 419-25 (2005) (evaluating the linkage between changes 
in corporate governance and labour management in Germany and Japan); see also 
PHILIPP KLAGES, THE CONTRACTUAL TURN: HOW LEGAL ACADEMICS SHAPED 
CORPORATE LAW REFORMS IN GERMANY (2008), 
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Contractual-Turn-%3A-How-Lega
l-Academics-Shaped-Klages/36c0182a983dbbc638bff07847ea807abc85ac9b 
[https://perma.cc/57FE-LCUH] (detailing the evolution of Germany’s corporate 
governance regime and the role of legal scholarship in such reforms).  
 165 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 
I-1459. 
 166 See infra Part V.b.  
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stakeholders, such as employees.167  Despite the substantial changes 
in corporate governance practices and the related reforms in the past 
thirty years that aimed to help Japanese firms to adapt their 
stakeholder model of corporate governance to market pressures, 
such reforms mainly serve a symbolic function.  As a result, a 
complete shift to a shareholder-oriented model of corporate 
governance is unlikely to take place in Japan.168   
Having already pointed to some of the limitations of insisting on 
the “comparative advantages” of different national corporate 
governance systems without taking into account the consequences 
of financialization and hybridization of transnational corporate law 
norm creation, the just offered glimpses into the cases of German 
and Japanese corporate governance suggest that, in effect, context 
matters.  As such, it is important to keep at least some cautious 
distance from an overly self-fulfilling law and economics argument 
whereby the rise of shareholder value maximization is not only 
inevitable, but also comprehensive and without alternatives.  
Scrutinizing the tunnel vision of the dominant shareholder value-
oriented understanding of corporate governance, Lynn Stout found, 
for instance, that such thinking “drives directors and executives to 
run public firms like [British Petroleum] with a relentless focus on 
raising stock price.“169   
More recent literature, especially in the context of transnational 
human rights litigation against multinational corporations 
(“MNCs”) and with regard to corporations as part of global value 
chains, underscores the importance of local context and emphasizes 
the need to closely scrutinize the relations between corporations and 
 
 167 For a detailed account of the traditional Japanese corporate governance 
system, see Gregory Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima, Introduction: The Diversity and 
Change of Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 1 passim (Masahiko Aoki, 
Gregory Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima eds., 2007).  
 168  See SANFORD M. JACOBY, THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 166-67 
(2007) (empirically elaborating that “[t]hose who think that the large Japanese 
corporation will gradually morph into its American counterpart are mistaken” and 
concluding that “there is a symbolic motivation behind some of the governance 
reforms being adopted by Japanese companies, who wish to appear sensitive to 
foreign shareholders even when – or because – the reforms do not cut deep”).  
 169 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 3 (2012).   
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local communities.170  This orientation casts a new light, on the one 
hand, on who must be considered as a “stakeholder” and as being 
affected by the corporation and, on the other, which wider societal 
and environmental interests may be considered to be in the scope of 
a corporation’s “sphere of influence,” a term which, since the failure 
of the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, was widely perceived as needing further specification and 
contributed to the mandate for John G. Ruggie as the then newly 
appointed U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Business and Human Rights. 171   What both VoC and post-VoC 
critiques of corporate governance developments show is a much 
more differentiated and layered landscape of norm production, 
which cannot adequately be depicted on the basis of uni-directional 
normative assessments.172  The same critique can apply to part of the 
comparative corporate governance literature where it evolves 
around the adaptation of purportedly global standards as we will 
explore further in the next section. 
 
 170 See, e.g., POOJA PARMA, INDIGENEITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN INDIA: CLAIMS, 
HISTORIES, MEANINGS (2015); Christiana Ochoa, Generating Conflict: Gold, Water and 
Vulnerable Communities in the Colombian Highlands, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW PERSPECTIVES 142 
(Celine Tan & Julio Faúndez eds., 2017); Lauren Coyle, Tender Is the Mine: Law, 
Shadow Rule, and the Public Gaze in Ghana, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY? 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 297 (Charlotte Walker-Said & John 
Dunham Kelly eds., 2015).  
 171 A helpful, critical discussion is provided by Denis G. Arnold, Transnational 
Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 371 (2010).  
See also John Gerard Ruggie, The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights 11 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Corp. Resp. Initiative, Working 
Paper No. 67, 2017) (“The mandate was modest: to identify and clarify standards 
and best practices in the area of business and human rights, for both states and 
business enterprises; to clarify such concepts as ‘corporate complicity’ in human 
rights abuses committed by a related party, as well as ‘corporate sphere of 
influence . . . .’”).  
 172 See Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, 
Incomplete, and Important, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413, 1428-34 (approving of Rafael La 
Porta’s, Francisco Lopez-de-Salinas’s, Andrei Shleifer’s, and Robert Vishny’s 
research noting evidence of some companies with controlling shareholders 
outperforming those without); see also Ronald Gilson, From Corporate Law to 
Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE  1, 18 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (arguing that 
such “one-factor corporate governance models are too simple to explain the real-
world dynamics we observe”).  
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b. “Scholarly Bind Two”:  Convergence versus Divergence and 
Harmonization Versus Regulatory Competition 
Comparative work in corporate governance has been largely 
shaped by the shareholder value oriented agenda. 173   Despite a 
widely shared appreciation of corporate law being both an 
ingredient as well as a product of a national legal culture, the last 
twenty years at least have seen an enormous boost of the idea of 
there being an overarching set of principles in corporate law which 
contribute to what many scholars have been describing as a global 
convergence of corporate governance principles.  The law and 
economics narrative has been crucial here as it has been 
emphasizing agency costs as a core problem being faced across 
different corporate governance systems.174  In the background of this 
debate lies the older and more fundamental distinction of corporate 
governance systems along the degree to which they may be 
categorized as being either “outsider”/arm’s length or 
“insider”/control-oriented systems.175  The received wisdom is that 
the former—characterized by publicly held companies with diffuse 
share ownership structures—exist in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, while the latter—characterized by fewer publicly 
traded companies per capita and more ownership concentration—
predominates in different forms in Continental Europe and Pacific 
Asia.176  Under agency theory, the primary principal-agent conflict 
unfolds in a different manner across the two corporate governance 
 
 173  See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing But Wind”? The Past and Future of 
Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 105-09 (2011).  For an 
insightful discussion of the different institutional environments that shape the 
shareholder value norm, see John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. 
Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531 passim (2003), and Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value, 
Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance: A Post-Enron Reassessment of the 
Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 53 (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003). 
 174 See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE STATE OF THE ART 
AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy 
Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge eds., 1998).  
 175  See Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction, in THE CONTROL OF 
CORPORATE EUROPE 1 (Fabrizo Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001). 
 176 Id. at 1-3.  
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systems. 177   The conflict between shareholders and the board of 
directors is predominant in outsider systems, while in insider 
systems the dominant agency problem is generated by the conflict 
between minority and majority shareholders.178  Despite the agency 
problem being different, comparative corporate governance 
literature, especially in the late 1990s, focused on the core agency 
problem between management and shareholders even in countries 
with prevailing block holders, such as Germany,179 even though a 
separation of ownership and control is the exception worldwide 
rather than the rule.180  More recently, the now eleven authors of The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law argue that one of the functions of corporate 
law (irrespective of the laws of specific jurisdictions) is to minimize 
coordination costs and agency problems among corporate 
constituents, including those between managers and shareholders, 
minority and majority shareholders, and other stakeholders. 181  
They emphasize the “functional” 182 commonality of legal responses 
to these problems across different jurisdictions.183 
The law and economics approach to comparative corporate 
governance and the associated advancement of the social norm of 
 
 177 See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in 
Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 117, 137-38 (2007) (exploring the impact of 
different corporate governance reforms in Continental Europe and the United 
States). 
 178 Becht & Mayer, supra note 175, at 7. 
 179  See, e.g., Stefan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH 943 (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & 
Stefan Prigge eds., 1998).  
 180  See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 502-05 (1999) (finding the 
controlling shareholder does not have another large shareholder in the same firm  
in  seventy-five  percent  of  the  cases,  and  this  number  is  seventy-one  percent  
for  family controlling shareholder).  
 181 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 2-3.  This latest edition focuses on seven 
countries, namely Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the United 
States. 
 182 See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, 
34-40 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998); Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of 
Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 340, 340-43 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (providing a detailed 
overview of the functional method of comparative law).  
 183 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 2-3.   
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shareholder primacy 184  was famously epitomized by Hansmann 
and Kraakman in their highly influential article, “The End of History 
for Corporate Law.”185  Published just at the turn of the 21st century, 
the two leading corporate law scholars proclaimed the dominance 
of the economic-oriented analysis of corporate law and corporate 
governance, and the convergence towards what they describe as the 
“Anglo-American shareholder-oriented model” of corporate 
governance. 186   Hansmann and Kraakman emphasized economic 
(efficient) market considerations based on accelerated competition 
among firms over “best practices” triggered by globalization forces 
and the rise of the “shareholder class.”187  They referred to both 
functional and formal convergence with the latter following rather 
than leading the former.188  The convergence thesis was met with 
immediate attention and led to voluminous literature attacking and 
replying to it.  An early criticism came from Douglas Branson who 
argued that the “The End of History for Corporate Law” consists of 
“bald assertions” and that any convergence in corporate governance 
is more likely to be regional rather than global.189  In a similar vein, 
Curtis Milhaupt argued—on the basis of a property rights 
 
 184 For a distinction between the social norm of shareholder primacy and the 
legal requirement of shareholder value maximization in the UK and other 
jurisdictions, see Beate Sjåfjell, Andrew Johnston, Linn Anker-Sørensen & David 
Millon, Shareholder Primacy: The Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies, in COMPANY 
LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 79 (Beate Sjåfjell & 
Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2015). 
 185 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4. 
 186 Id. at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). 
 187 Id. at 450-53.  On the impact of globalization on comparative corporate 
governance, see Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J.  477, 485-91 (2005).  
 188 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 455 (predicting that “the reform 
of corporate governance practices will generally precede the reform of corporate 
law, for the simple reason that governance practice is largely a matter of private 
ordering that does not require legislative action”).  For further information on 
functional convergence, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects 
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
641 passim (1999); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of 
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 passim (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., Convergence 
and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control?, 
in  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 83 (Joseph A. 
McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002).  
 189 Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in 
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 328, 362 (2001). 
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analysis—that any convergence of national corporate governance 
systems will be “slow, sporadic, and uncertain.”190  William Bratton 
and Joseph McCahery also recognized the possibility of an 
“improved variety of governance systems” or a “set of viable 
distinctive governance systems” rather than a complete 
convergence, 191  while, more recently, Franklin Gevurtz has 
contended that corporate convergence through imitation and 
transplant is occurring but in an incomplete and impermanent 
rather than linear fashion.192  On the other side of the spectrum, 
Hansmann and Kraakman defended the convergence thesis in 
subsequent writings even after the Enron scandal and the GFC,193 
while additional support for the convergence thesis came from the 
law and finance literature and the influential “legal origin matters” 
thesis.194  Yet, subsequent “leximetric” research has challenged the 
claim that there has been a significant Americanization of other 
countries’ laws and shows that, despite global trends, lawmakers are 
able to deviate from influential models in corporate law and 
corporate governance.195 
 
 190 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Essay, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1185 
(1998). 
 191  William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate 
Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 23, 30 (Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, 
Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002).  
 192 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or 
a Never-Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 479 (2011). 
 193 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single Model of Corporate 
Law?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 56  (Joseph 
A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002); 
Henry Hansmann, How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L. 745, 748 (2005).   
 194 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1151-52 (1998) 
(concluding that the quality of legal protection of shareholders helps determine 
ownership concentration). 
 195 See Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Corporate Governance: A Leximetric 
Approach, 45 J. CORP. L. 729 passim (2010) (using leximetrics to conclude that whether 
there has been convergence, divergence, or persistence of the legal rules that shape 
country-level differences in corporate governance depends on the area of law); 
Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder 
Protection: Leximetric Evidence for 30 Countries, 1990-2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 127, 
160 (2015) ([A]ll legal origins now have about the same level of shareholder 
protection on average . . . .”). 
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Similarly, and as we have already discussed in the context of 
showcasing the contribution made by the VoC school to the 
corporate governance debate, a number of prominent political 
theories of comparative corporate governance challenged the main 
assumptions of the convergence argument.  Most prominently, 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark Roe posited that the social forces 
and structures that shape legal rules, including history, politics, and 
ownership structures, are path dependent and will constrain the 
globalized forces pushing for corporate governance convergence.196  
Extending this line of thought, Reinhard Schmidt and Gerald 
Spindler added the concept of complementarity to the analytical mix 
of path dependence, which relates to the internal “fit” of the 
institutional components of a governance system.197  Because of the 
complementarity found in both insider and outsider corporate 
governance systems, Schmidt and Spindler rule out a rapid 
convergence towards a universally best corporate governance 
system.198 
While Schmidt and Spindler analyzed the aspect of 
complementarity within a (national) corporate governance system, 
VoC scholars such as Peter Hall and David Soskice have elaborated 
path-dependent, institutional complementarities between different 
sub-systems of a country’s or a region’s political economy.199  By 
distinguishing, as we discussed, 200   the political economies of 
developed Western countries as between Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), they were able 
to paint an arguably more differentiated picture of what actually 
marked up the landscape of corporate governance and its attendant 
 
 196  Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129-32 (1999). 
 197   Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate 
Governance and Complementarity, 5 INT’L FIN. 311, 318, 325 (2002) (introducing the 
concept of complementarity as a reason for path dependence).  
 198   Id. at 325-28 (demonstrating through multifactor analysis of 
complementarity why it is unlikely that individual innovators and national 
politicians could bring about a change of corporate governance systems which 
would ultimately lead to convergence).  
 199 See Hall & Soskice, supra note 62. An important, earlier contribution to this 
field was J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, Coordination of Economic Actors 
and Social Systems of Production, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS 
OF INSTITUTIONS 1 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997).  
 200 See supra Part II. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
112 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:1 
   
 
trials and tribulations.  Importantly, they inquired how firms 
coordinate their activities in five sub-systems of the political 
economy, including industrial relations, vocational training and 
education, corporate governance, inter-firm relationships and 
employees and, based on their findings, argued that the level of 
coordination between the different sub-systems would make 
national corporate governance systems (especially CMEs) resilient 
to convergence.201  The VoC approach has been criticized on various 
grounds, including for concentrating too much on firms while 
paying less attention to other actors such as the state,202 for focusing 
only on Western, developed countries, 203  for lumping together 
common law countries,204 and for disregarding the tension between 
path dependency and the need for a particular variety (or sub-
variety) of capitalism to adapt to changes in markets and 
products.205   Despite these criticisms, VoC had a profound impact 
on the larger debates around the then still very undecided fate of 
national political economies under the threat of what Joseph Stiglitz 
famously called “The Roaring Nineties.” 206   With a focus on 
institutional diversity, the VoC scholars explicitly addressed the 
embedded, historically-grown socio-political and cultural national 
corporate governance systems and thus underlined the relevance of 
competitive advantages of national differences.207  Based on these 
comprehensive findings, which themselves were the result of 
extensive empirical and quantitative work, they argued against a 
 
 201 See Hall & Soskice, supra note 62, at 62-66. 
 202 On the central role that the state still plays in political economies such as 
France, see Vivien A. Schmidt, French Capitalism Transformed, Yet Still a Third Variety 
of Capitalism, 32 ECON. & SOC’Y 526, 531-32 (2003). 
 203 But see Andreas Nölke & Simone Claar, Varieties of Capitalism in Emerging 
Economies, 81/82 TRANSFORMATION 33, 33-34 (2013) (noting that the VoC inspired 
approach has been extended to emerging economies). 
 204  But see Michael A. Witt & Gregory Jackson, Varieties of Capitalism and 
Institutional Comparative Advantage: A Test and Reinterpretation, 47 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 
778, 797 (2016) (suggesting that at least two different institutional configurations 
are associated with comparative advantage in the presence of radical innovation).  
 205 See Gilson, supra note 188. 
 206 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S 
MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE (2003).  
 207 See, e.g., Hall & Soskice, supra note 62, at 56 (arguing that “[c]omparative 
institutional advantages tend to render companies less mobile than theories that do 
not acknowledge them imply,” thereby calling into question the assumptions of 
globalization).  
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one-way convergence towards the Anglo-American market-
oriented corporate governance system.208 
While the convergence/divergence conundrum clearly left its 
mark on the scholarly and policy debates in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, being furthermore associated with efforts to “export” Anglo-
American corporate governance principles internationally, a slightly 
different debate began to unfold on the European front, which 
would soon dominate scholarly discussions for years to come.  Just 
as “quite” in the United States means something else than “quite” in 
the United Kingdom, federalism, harmonization and regulatory 
competition meant very different things in the United States and the 
European Union.  From an early point onwards, the varied history 
of European corporate law exposed the challenges of 
harmonization,209 given the extensive differences in locally rooted 
and historically grown and consolidated company law systems 
across Europe. 210   In comparison, this constellation looked very 
different from the history and experience of U.S.-style regulatory 
competition. 211   While the polarities between the United States 
 
 208 See, e.g., Hall & Gingerich, supra note  82, at 478-480 (empirically showing 
that despite some liberalization of institutional practices CMEs have not converged 
towards LMEs). 
 209 The failed attempts to harmonize board structures in the EU with the 5th 
company law directive, the tumultuous history of the Takeover Directive, and the 
European Company Statute, respectively, tell an important story in that regard.  See, 
e.g., Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization between Convergence and Varieties 
of Capitalism (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 355, 2017), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/3552017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6HM-DJ9U]; Peer Zumbansen, European Corporate Law and 
National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 
867 passim (2004). 
 210  See Antoine Réberioux, European Style of Corporate Governance at the 
Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 111, 117-20 
(2002) (exploring the main competing economic theories that explain international 
diversity in corporate governance); see also GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER 
ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL 
PRIVATE LAW 181, 196 (2010) (noting that the intricate embeddedness of regulatory 
innovation in locally  defined  governance structures alongside their integration in 
transnationally unfolding rule-making processes is characteristic of the current 
regulatory landscape in corporate governance). 
 211  See, e.g., David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating 
Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the 
European Communities, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 456 (1991) (highlighting the 
institutional differences behind the regulatory systems in United States and 
European Communities). 
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pattern of competitive federalism and the different conflict of laws 
regimes of the EU Member States had occupied scholars for a long 
time, the debate over the exportability of U.S.-style regulatory 
competition took a different turn in light of the European Court of 
Justice’s case law on the free movement of companies.  Following 
the Centros line of cases around the turn of the 21st century, the 
introduction of a Delaware-type form of inter-jurisdictional 
competition among EU Member States’ company laws 
metamorphosed into a pressing actuality, with severe repercussions 
on EU Member States’ diversity.212  As a result, European corporate 
law and European corporate governance tended to be squeezed into 
an uncomfortable either-or position with choices between 
harmonization and regulatory competition or between shareholder 
primacy and stakeholder theories, largely reflecting the tension 
between the market integration project, on the one hand, and the 
ambition of (certain) Member States to boost national champions, on 
the other.213 
c. “Scholarly Bind Three”:  Private Ordering and the Binary 
Distinction between “Hard” and “Soft” Law 
There can be no doubt that, along with its impact on national, 
international, and comparative debates about the purpose of the 
corporation and corporate governance reforms, the law and 
 
 212 Simon Deakin, Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism 
Versus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros, 
2 CAMBRIDGE. Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 231, 232 (1999-2000) (arguing harmonization 
standards are needed to provide the conditions under which diversity is 
preserved).  But see John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation 
Versus Regulatory Competition, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 369, 370 (2005) (arguing 
regulatory competition between Member States’ company laws is a better way to 
stimulate the development of appropriate legal rules than is the European 
legislative process). 
 213  For an insightful, retrospective assessment, see Stefano Lombardo, 
Regulatory Competition in European Company Law. Where Do We Stand Twenty Years 
After Centros? (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 452, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392502 
[https://perma.cc/S88V-T26C].  With regard to the “Volkswagen” landmark 
decision by the European Court of Justice, see Peer Zumbansen & Daniel Saam, The 
ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping the European Varieties of 
Capitalism, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1027 passim (2007). 
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economics approach to corporate governance provided strong 
support for the argument regarding the superiority of private and 
decentralized methods of internal governance at the micro 
(individual firm) level over public policy.  One of the principal 
normative achievements of the “private ordering” or 
“contractarian” theory of the firm is the treatment of corporate law 
and corporate governance regulation as contractually determinable 
and market facilitative private law, rather than public regulatory 
law.214  The explicitly anti-regulatory bias fit the time and did not 
have much trouble prevailing in policy and scholarly circles, as 
corporate governance regulation displayed an increasing reliance on 
market-based, privately created best practice norms, codes, 
standards, and recommendations.  The proliferation of national as 
well as company-specific corporate governance codes,215 codes of 
conduct,216 statements of “good” or “recommended” practices by 
international organizations, 217  and, more recently, stewardship 
codes for institutional investors218 testify to the growing consensus 
around a more indirect approach to “regulating” corporate actors by 
enabling, encouraging, and nudging them to use their internal 
structures and processes, particularly the board of directors and, 
more recently, the shareholders to formulate self-regulatory regimes 
rather than turning to “the state” to issue strong commands. 
Where did it start?  Arguably, the UK Cadbury Report219 is seen 
as an important milestone in the more recent history of corporate 
governance regulation.  Shortly after being issued, the Cadbury 
 
 214 For a famous and biting critique, see William W. Bratton Jr., The “Nexus of 
Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 410-11 (1989). 
 215  See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good 
Governance Worldwide: What is the Trigger?, 25 ORG. STUD. 415, 419 (2004) (detailing 
the exponential rise of national corporate governance codes in the 1990s). 
 216 See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of 
“Private” and “Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 617 
passim (2011) (advancing various arguments that corporate codes feature functions, 
structures, and institutions of genuine constitutions). 
 217  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-
corporate-governance.htm [https://perma.cc/UD27-2VLN].   
 218 See infra Part IV. 
 219 ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1992, 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files//codes/documents/cadbury.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9EC-S45R].  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
116 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:1 
   
 
Report resonated around the world, triggering a true surge of 
comparable “regulatory” initiatives.220  Corporate governance codes 
have developed out of the interactions of governmental or quasi-
governmental entities, stock exchanges, and business, academic and 
industry communities, and investor-related groups as a response to 
corporate catastrophes,221 and have proliferated across more than 
sixty countries recommending detailed governance frameworks 
mostly for publicly-listed companies. 222   Even though they vary 
considerably in terms of content, legal status, and origin, a 
distinctive feature of these codes is their extensive resort to 
(perceivably, at least) non-statist, non-binding “soft-law” 
techniques, which provide flexibility and responsiveness to 
individual, firm-level circumstances while keeping regulating detail 
to a minimum.  This feature is prominently manifested in the 2018 
UK Corporate Governance Code (and its previous versions), the 
enforcement of which rests on the investor-driven practice of 
“comply or explain.” 223   The “comply or explain” enforcement 
mode, in turn, rests upon two pillars:  sufficiently high-quality 
disclosure by companies and an informed evaluation of the 
perceived compliance or non-compliance by the companies’ 
shareholders (especially institutional ones) and the market. 
 
 220 See Cally Jordan, Cadbury Twenty Years On, 58 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (2013) 
(exploring how the Cadbury Report quickly gained worldwide popularity and its 
effects on international corporate governance initiatives). 
 221 See HOLLY J. GREGORY & ROBERT T. SIMMELKJAER, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER 
STATES 285 (2002) (providing a comparative analysis of corporate governance codes 
in the fifteen EU member states), https://ecgi.global/code/comparative-study-
corporate-governance-codes-relevant-european-union-and-its-member-states 
[https://perma.cc/2KWU-YX6T].  See also Dimity Kingsford Smith, Governing the 
Corporation: The Role of Soft Regulation, 35 UNSW L.J. 378 (2012) (exploring the role 
of soft regulation in the development of corporate governance codes); Aidan 
O’Dwyer, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis: The Role of Shareholders in 
Monitoring the Activities of the Board, 5 ABERDEEN STUDENT L. REV. 112 (2014) 
(discussing the foundations of UK corporate governance along with the 
developments that have come about since the 2008 financial crisis).  
 222 The European Corporate Governance Institute maintains a list of most of 
the corporate governance codes that have been released worldwide.  Codes, ECGI, 
https://ecgi.global/content/codes [https://perma.cc/HZN9-9ZT4].  
 223  FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 1-3 
(2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-
d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/M4HR-L735].  
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“Comply or explain” is, therefore, an “obligation” to shareholders 
(not regulators) to make an informed evaluation as to whether non-
compliance is justified given the company’s particular 
circumstances and then to take action in cases of non-conformance 
or poor explanations.  While much ink has been spilled on the 
effectiveness of the “comply or explain” system with many good 
arguments on both sides,224 what is less explored is the degree of 
coerciveness of this investor-determinable norm production and 
enforcement, which is generally assumed to be entirely voluntary. 
Prior literature notably speaks in binary terms by distinguishing 
between “soft” and “hard” law and mostly associates the former 
with informal, non-binding norms generated through non-statist 
processes.225  The lack of any state involvement in initiation and/or 
monitoring and enforcement is for most seen as critical to “soft” 
norms, and has sometimes raised concerns about the legitimacy of 
non-state-made, “soft,” law.226  Others emphasize the nature of legal 
norms and equate “soft” law with voluntary, non-binding rules.227  
This presumable lack of express legalization of “soft” law (namely 
 
 224 See, e.g., Andrew Keay, Comply or Explain in Corporate Governance Codes: In 
Need of Greater Regulatory Oversight?, 34 LEGAL STUD. 279 (2014) (weighing the 
benefits and costs of introducing a hard regulatory enforcement scheme for 
corporate directors).  For an analysis of the introduction of the comply-or-explain 
rule in the German Stock Corporation Law, see David Seidl, Paul Sanderson & John 
Roberts, Applying ‘Comply or Explain’: Conformance with Codes of Corporate Governance 
in the UK and Germany (Ctr. for Bus. Rsch., Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 
389, 2009), https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-
business-research/downloads/working-papers/wp389.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7ZPR-QVWA]. 
 225 See, e.g., Francis Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European 
Community, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 197, 198 (Stephen Martin ed., 1994); 
Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Antto Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and 
Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soft Law: An Analytical Framework, 3 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 400 (2009) (developing an analytical framework for comparing norms 
on different positions along the continuum of “hard” and “soft” law). 
 226 See Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 171-
72 (1996) (asserting it is not all that obvious that states can conclude agreements yet 
at the same time deny that such agreements would amount to hard law). 
 227 Snyder, supra note 225, at 198.  See also Francis Snyder, Governing Economic 
Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law, 5 EUR. L.J. 334, 342 (1999) (“In 
the governance of global economic networks, however, both soft law and legally 
binding norms, or ‘hard law’, are important.  Indeed, the relationship between hard 
law and soft law has long been controversial, and today it is one of the most 
interesting—and difficult—questions currently raised by the governance of 
globalization.”). 
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its alleged lack of enforceability) has been the key dimension 
between the early corporate governance codes and best practices, on 
the one hand, and traditional company law, on the other, with the 
latter being highly regulatory in nature, containing many 
mandatory rules. 228   Crucially, the binary distinction between 
“hard” and “soft” law must be seen and relativized in the context of 
institutional and normative pluralism229 that has emerged from the 
fundamental transformation of the regulatory state through 
decentralization, privatization, and marketization.  Seen against that 
background, “soft” legal norms can be both weaker regulatory 
instruments that might or might not be hardened at some point 
through parliamentary or governmental law making230 and, simply, 
alternative governance modes that complement and co-exist with 
stronger, harder ones less distinguishable through an either-or but 
marking choices along a continuum.231 
“Soft” legal norms, whether or not they emanate from the state 
or civil society, have become an important regulatory tool in 
corporate governance regulation with far-reaching and often more 
coercive implications than traditional regulatory theories suggest.  
“Soft” corporate governance norms do not lack force and effect and 
continue to raise difficult questions as to whether they can be flouted 
without consequences.232  For example, a common misapprehension 
 
 228 On this dichotomy in the context of United States corporate law, see Coffee, 
Jr., supra note 78 at 1653-64. 
 229 See Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-
Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY 
NORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145, 149 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur 
eds., 2004). 
 230 See Justine Nolan, Hardening Soft Law: Are the Emerging Corporate Social 
Disclosure Laws Capable of Generating Substantive Compliance with Human Rights?, 15 
BRAZ. J. INT’L L. 65, 67-68 (2018) (providing an overview of some of the recent 
corporate social disclosure and due diligence legislative initiatives aimed at 
increasing transparency in global supply chains and illustrating how these laws are 
hardening the human rights expectations of business that have previously and 
predominantly been set out in soft law frameworks). 
 231  Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 716 
(2010) (“[H]ard and soft law are best seen not as binary categories but rather as 
choices arrayed along a continuum.”).  
 232 See, e.g., Keay, supra note 224.  See also Peer Zumbansen, The Privatization of 
Company Law? Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self Regulation, 3 
JURIDIKUM 136, 139-41 (2002), 
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regarding the UK Corporate Governance Code has long been that it 
is an example of “private” law making or self-regulation.  It’s 
important to note, however, that while the code is promulgated and 
administered by the Financial Reporting Council, which itself has no 
statutory footing (at least for now233), it is still dependent on the 
regulatory state, insofar as it is expressly sanctioned by the 
government, through the UK’s Listing Authority, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). 234   Therefore, despite the apparent 
voluntariness of the Code’s provisions and the market-dependency 
of its enforcement, the FCA’s delegated statutory powers to enforce 
the “comply or explain” obligation have a significant coercive 
element.235  This approach to corporate governance regulation is, 
therefore, incorrectly described as private or self-regulation, and can 
be more appropriately regarded as “associationism,” “co-
regulation” or as a form of “regulated autonomy,” which is 
exercised by the market but is supported by state-ordered 
 
https://www.juridikum.at/fileadmin/user_upload/ausgaben/juridikum%203-2
002.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA84-HTUM] (arguing that the different layers of 
norms that can be found in the code, the recommendations, as well as the 
reformulations of otherwise codified law, show that this form of norm setting 
cannot be detached from its socio-legal environment).  
 233  The current transition from the FRC to the new regulator, the Audit, 
Reporting and Governance Authority (ARGA) will be accountable to the 
Parliament.  JOHN KINGMAN, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL REPORTING 
COUNCIL: INITIAL CONSULTATION ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS 13 (2019), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/independent-review-of-the-fin
ancial-reporting-council-initial-consultation-on-recommendations 
[https://perma.cc/JX95-9CVE].  See also FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PLAN & BUDGET 
2019/20, at 3-4 (May 2019), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/44ad6509-
5fb8-4645-b945-5fcee5689290/Final-FRC-Plan-Budget-May-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R6GN-D79Y].  
 234  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., LISTING RULES, CH. 9: CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS, 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/9.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LBN9-C3RW].  
 235  Regarding the low degree of enforced sanctions by the FCA, see John 
Armour, Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical 
Assessment (Eur. Corp. Goverance Inst., Working Paper No. 106, 2008), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542 [https://perma.cc/UXV5-7TQZ].  By 
comparison, see the regulatory practice in the context of the German Stock 
Corporation Act. AKTIENGESETZ [German Stock Corporation Act] §161 (1), Sept. 6, 
1965, translated in Norton Rose LLP (2016); see also Holger Fleischer, A Guide to 
German Company Law for International Lawyers – Distinctive Features, Particularities, 
Idiosyncrasies 3, 12 (2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597062 
[https://perma.cc/H4EY-B2LW].  
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regulation. 236   The occasional tendency among corporate 
governance scholars237 to overlook these implications reflects, we 
believe, both an incomplete understanding of “soft” law—with 
regard to its impact on individual companies and on stakeholders at 
the micro (individual firm) level as well as on financial markets at 
the macro level, and a more deeply rooted bias towards market-
based private ordering and against state intervention.  This 
overlapping of sociological, empirical markers (“how things are”) 
and normative choices (“how I believe they ought to be”) constitutes 
the complex institutional-symbolic space of corporate governance 
that can never be fully grasped by focusing only on one aspect. 
VI. THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE II: WHO AND WHERE 
IS THE ARCHITECT? 
Today, “corporate governance,” which for years had been 
depicted as a decidedly shareholder-driven regulatory area, is being 
reshaped by a comprehensive and far-reaching critique of what the 
corporation is, does, and for whom it operates.238   As part of this 
renewed emphasis on the social role and purpose of the corporation, 
it is being rediscovered as belonging to historically and socio-
culturally evolved, national corporate governance systems, 
something that VoC scholars had long been demanding.  This 
interest in the embeddedness of the corporation in a complex 
political economy is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi’s influential 
observation of a “double movement” in modern market economies 
in which laissez-faire economics result in an expansion of self-
regulating markets, against which efforts ensue to (re)-embed 
 
 236 See, e.g., John Holland, Self Regulation and the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, (1996) J. BUS. L. 127 (using case study data to conclude that considerable 
“behind the scenes” efforts by companies and financial institutions to avoid 
financial malpractice fraud occurs). 
 237 For a notable exception, see MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 168 (2013) (highlighting that the UK Corporate 
Governance Code “whilst formally classifiable as non-governmental in nature 
nevertheless operate[s] within the substantial shadow of the regulatory state”).  
 238 Lipton, supra note 68. 
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market forces in social institutions. 239   But despite mounting 
evidence that the corporate governance terrain continues to expand 
in a significant manner in terms of its substantive scope and its 
geographical relevance, there remain considerable misconceptions 
and communication gaps between the conventional debate, as it 
were, and the increasingly diversified camp of critics.  For instance, 
while the VoC approach and its refinements has made an immensely 
important contribution to the sometimes too acontextual 
comparative study of corporate governance, we contend that VoC’s 
dominant focus on national institutional structures is ill-suited to 
address the challenges posed by the significant transformation of 
corporate law-making.  This transformation is marked by 
substantial privatization of norm-making in corporate law and 
corporate governance in recent years and has to be interpreted in 
light of not only the rising influence of international actors, such as 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the World Bank, and the United Nations, but also private 
actors and wider civil society in corporate governance law-making.  
At the same time, while not always directly related to corporate 
governance rules, the intensifying public critique directed at 
Western multinationals and their entanglements with egregious 
labor and human rights violations in their supply chains has been 
an important factor in driving regulatory and adjudicatory 
initiatives in recent years.240 
 
 239 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 138 (2d ed. 2001).  See also Fred Block, Polanyi’s Double 
Movement and the Reconstruction of Critical Theory, 38 REVUE INTERVENTIONS 
ÉCONOMIQUES, 2008, at  2, 
https://journals.openedition.org/interventionseconomiques/274 
[https://perma.cc/8FK4-HV5W] (attempting to develop a theoretical 
reconstruction of Polanyi’s double movement concept by exploring its theoretical 
foundations and arguing that this reconstructed theory has the potential to be an 
important element of a 21st century critical theory).  
 240  See LAURA KNÖPFEL, CSR COMMUNICATION IN TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LITIGATIONS AGAINST PARENT COMPANIES 2-4 (2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311545 [https://perma.cc/PX4F-3H4P] (examining 
how courts reacted to corporate social responsibility communication, which had 
not been intended for a judicial context); see also Justine Nolan & Gregory Bott, 
Global Supply Chains and Human Rights: Spotlight on Forced Labour and Modern Slavery 
Practices, 24 AUSTRALIAN J. HUM. RTS. 44 (2018), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1323238X.2018.1441610 
[https://perma.cc/5N96-R358] (focusing on emerging legislative disclosure 
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While there is no doubt that the privatization of norm-making in 
the field of corporate governance will continue to deepen, it is 
important to recognize how public actors continue to both intervene 
and steer but also engage with private actors in carving out a 
redefined role in facilitating new relationships between corporate 
actors, labor groups, and consumers.241  In addition, while corporate 
law scholars began recognizing the growing prominence of “soft” 
law in corporate governance regulation (especially with regard to 
corporate governance codes and codes of conduct), only rarely was 
the step taken to actively embrace “soft” law as a new mechanism of 
regulation.242   This is particularly important in the transnational 
context, where we can observe a high degree of interpenetration 
between “hard” and “soft” law and domestic and international 
norms. 243   Given the increasing reliance on public monitoring, 
“governance through disclosure,” and transparency, it comes as 
little surprise that “soft” law norms aimed at companies’ self-
imposed (or mandated) obligations to disclose their activities, 
 
regimes as a mechanism for regulating modern slavery in supply chains and 
considering how regulatory frameworks could be crafted to maximize their 
effectiveness).  
 241 Examples of multi-stakeholder processes of negotiating and developing 
regulatory reform often emerge in contexts where the relationship between state 
and private actors is already shaped by the dynamics and constraints of foreign 
investment.  See, e.g., Manoj Dias-Abey, Using Law to Support Social Movement-Led 
Collective Bargaining Structures in Supply Chains, 32 AUSTRALIAN J. LAB. L. 123 (2019); 
Ronald C. Brown, Up and Down the Multinational Corporations’ Global Labor Supply 
Chains: Making Remedies that Work in China, 34 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103 (2017).  
 242 See Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational 
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 48 (2010) (“Soft law is a novel mechanism for 
constraining corporate behavior. In reconciling financial and social imperatives, 
firms must consider its impact on reputational capital.”). 
 243 See, e.g., INT’L BAR ASS’N, REFERENCE ANNEX TO THE IBA PRACTICAL GUIDE ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 2 (2016), 
https://www.ibanet.org/LPRU/Reference-Annex-to-the-IBA-Practical-Guide.asp
x [https://perma.cc/7LCW-4VZJ] (amplifying and focusing in detail on some of 
the potential implications for the legal profession of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights); John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/121/90/PDF/G1112190.pdf?OpenElement 
[https://perma.cc/F9LD-H4HG].   
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earnings, as well as their labor practices, down to their subsidiaries 
and contractors are more and more under public scrutiny.244 
But how helpful are the categories of “hard” and “soft” law in 
this context?  The expansion of “soft” law into a growing number of 
areas of corporate conduct prompts us to review the seemingly too 
stark choice between “hard” and “soft” law.  As John Ruggie, then 
Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Special Secretary on Business and 
Human Rights and responsible author of the Guiding Principles,245  
observed:  “in light of the multinationals power, authority, and 
relative autonomy, the time-worn mandatory/voluntary dichotomy 
inhibits rather than advances our coming to grips with the 
challenges posed by corporate globalization.”246  In effect, today’s 
regulatory toolbox of corporate governance does not really reflect a 
neat separability of “hard” and “soft” law instruments.  Instead, 
contemporary governance dynamics unfold in a transnational realm 
in which states, private actors, civil society groups, and a myriad of 
interest groups are interacting and competing with one another.  As 
a result, traditional national, comparative or international law do not 
yet adequately offer the necessary analytical and conceptual 
categories and tools to unpack the complex regulatory landscape 
which has been forming before our eyes and which is marked by a 
proliferation of hybrid norm-making processes in the context of 
highly specialized, sector-specific, and yet functionally structured, 
spatial, de-territorialized regimes, which are not confined to 
national or regional boundaries.  Nation states no longer have—if 
they ever did—a monopoly on regulating the way companies, both 
MNCs and domestic alike, are controlled and held accountable, 
while the shift from state-centered government to an increasingly 
fragmented system of self-steering by public and private actors 
continues.247 
 
 244 See Dhir, supra note 58, at 72 (emphasizing social disclosure as a means of 
strengthening the position of human rights-conscious shareholders, rather than as 
a process that will result in self-correcting behavior modification on the part of 
corporate decision makers); see also Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply 
Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 419, 421 (2015) (analyzing the effectiveness of using 
domestic law to regulate global supply chains with respect to human rights and 
labor practices). 
 245 Ruggie, supra note 243. 
 246 Ruggie, supra note 9, at 329-30.   
 247 GUNTHER TEUBNER, GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (1997).  
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Still, while the binary categorization of norms as “hard” or “soft” 
remains relevant in distinguishing between different enforcement 
mechanisms and with regard to the legitimacy basis that is being 
claimed for a particular norm,248 it is less effective in regard to the 
actual performative role played by these norms and the actors 
engaged in their production.249  Corporate governance regulation, 
like any other arena with a complex history and pitting competing 
policies against one another, encompasses both a host of 
institutional/normative and symbolic dimensions.  In other words, 
there is a complex relationship between the law (and the policies a 
lawmaker might pursue at a given moment) and the culture which 
is both shaping these policies and which has been and will be shaped 
by them.250   As such, the institutionally-regulated as well as the 
symbolic-cultural spaces of corporate governance have different 
material qualities: while they are shaping and are being shaped by 
various public and private actors in the actual creation of new and 
innovative processes of norm-generation, these spaces are also 
epistemic realms which consist of self-referential discursive 
processes and logics.  The framing of corporate law from the 
perspective of shareholder value maximization 251  can hardly 
capture these materialities.  An adequate analysis of these 
materialities must draw on insights by governance and regime 
scholars who emphasize not only that “hard” and “soft” law are best 
seen as choices along a continuum252 but also emphasize that “soft” 
law can no more remain confined to rules of conduct which are 
 
 248 See supra Section V.c.  
 249 For a critical assessment, see Fleur Johns, Performing Power: The Deal, 
Corporate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal Order, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 116 (2007). 
 250 Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 489 (2003) 
(“[L]aw does not merely reflect the norms of a pre-existing culture, but is instead 
itself a medium that both instantiates and establishes culture.”).  
 251  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4.  But see Armour, Deakin & 
Konzelmann, supra note 173. 
 252 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 436 (2000) (arguing that states face tradeoffs in 
choosing levels of legalization, and that choices along this continuum of tradeoffs 
determine the "hardness" of legalization, both initially and over time); Shaffer & 
Pollack, supra note 231, at 716 (2010) (agreeing with the approach that hard and soft 
law are best seen not as binary categories but rather as choices arrayed along a 
continuum).  
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believed to have no legally binding force.253  In addition, we must 
acknowledge the power which is concentrated in and perpetuated 
by—dominant—discursive regimes, which, as we saw in the 
example of the law and economics narrative of corporate 
governance, effectively create a justification framework seen as 
value neutral and objective.  As has been shown again and again,254 
the so-called “end of history” and its related allegation of a global 
triumph of shareholder value maximization “works” because its 
narrow premises are hidden from view. 
Meanwhile, beyond the scholarly debate around corporate law 
and corporate governance, a broader, richer, and growing literature 
aims at addressing the increasingly profuse normative and 
regulatory mosaic that forms against the background of the state’s 
changing regulatory role,255 and prompts the reconceptualization of 
law and regulation through notions of transnational law,256 global 
law, 257  and legal pluralism. 258   Irrespective of the terminological 
 
 253  See Klaas Hendrik Eller, Private Governance of Global Value Chains From 
Within: Lessons From and for Transnational Law, 8 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 296, 301 
(2017) (demonstrating that transnational law has not yet risen to the challenge of 
projecting and rearranging institutional guarantees of national democratic 
lawmaking beyond the state). 
 254 See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 169; Armour, Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note 
173. 
 255 See Shaffer, supra note 43.  See also Peer Zumbansen, Rethinking the Nature of 
the Firm: The Corporation as a Governance Object, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1469, 1470 
(2012).  
 256   See, e.g., PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) (unpacking the notion 
and concept of transnational law); Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of 
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism, 21 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (2012); César Arjona, Transnational Law as an 
Excuse. How Teaching Law Without the State Makes Legal Education Better (ESADE, 
Working Paper No. 219, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1940274 
[https://perma.cc/G88T-MZRZ].  
 257 See generally GIULIANA  ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS OF GLOBAL LAW 
(2008) (investigating, inter alia, the role of international organizations in 
contributing to a global repository of commonly shared values and norms); RAFAEL 
DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW (2010) (pursuing the idea of a global people as a 
source and legitimate foundation of legal order that addresses humanity’s pressing 
problems).  
 258  See Teubner, supra note 216, at 626; see generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, 
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012) 
(providing a comprehensive account and analysis of distinct, coexisting, and 
overlapping normative orders inside and beyond national jurisdictional systems).   
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debate,259 legal, social and political thinkers have been mobilizing a 
rich array of approaches to address the changing face of legal 
(private and public) regulation in globally integrated markets.  
Arguably, corporate governance regulation has been a latecomer to 
this dynamic scholarly discussion of the dynamic nature of private 
regulation, which has mainly focused on other non-public law 
fields, including consumer protection, labor regulation, finance, 
banking, human rights, environmental regulation, accounting 
standards, and e-commerce.260 
The suggestion of thinking of corporate governance as a 
transnational regulatory field and of approaching it from a legal 
pluralist perspective 261  builds on the insights of VoC and 
comparative political economy scholars but reads them against the 
background of a longer-standing critique of the all-too-often 
assumed exclusionary status of law as originating in and from the 
state.  In contrast, when we study corporate governance through the 
lens of transnational legal methodology and legal pluralism with a 
focus on the actual actors, norms, and processes that make up the 
field, the intricate relations between formal and informal, “public” 
and “private,” “hard” and “soft” law norms which make up the 
multiple and spatialized political economies of corporate 
governance regulation today become visible.262  The transnational 
dimension of public and private actors, the newly emerging legal 
and social forms of norms and the multi-level rule-setting processes 
 
 259  For an insightful critique, see Frank J. Garcia, Globalization’s Law: 
Transnational, Global or Both?, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 2015 at 31 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed., 
2016). 
 260 For a transnational discourse of other areas of private law, see Fabrizio 
Cafaggi, The Many Features of Transnational Private Rule-Making: Unexplored 
Relationships Between Custom, Jura Mercatorum and Global Private Regulation, 36 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 875 (2015). 
 261 See, e.g., Zumbansen, supra note 61, at 248; Peer Zumbansen, Transnational 
Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 141 passim (2010). 
 262 See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a 
Global Context, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29 passim (2013) (exploring the 
challenges facing the theory of transnational governance today); Peer Zumbansen, 
The Constitutional Itch: Transnational Private Regulatory Governance and the Woes of 
Legitimacy, in NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL 
AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM 84 (Michael A. Helfand ed., 2015) (discussing how 
developments in privacy law “address the normative challenges of transnational 
private regulatory governance”).  
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radicalize the “semi-autonomous” nature 263  of transnational 
corporate governance regulation and reveal the tension between 
binding state-law, on the one hand, and market-based, but still not 
necessarily non-binding “law,” on the other.264 
It is against this background that earlier scholarly depictions of 
the traditional corporate governance debates of the past decades 
need to be read more critically.  We suggest revitalizing the idea of 
the “embeddedness” of corporations within the social and political 
system, albeit under present-day conditions.265  In that regard, we 
have to acknowledge the challenges that arise for a project which 
seeks to track and trace the corporation in a complex, historical, 
cultural, political, and legal context.  This inevitably leads to difficult 
questions of sociology in a context that sociologists such as Niklas 
Luhmann and others266 have called the “world society”—namely a 
world which is both multi-level and trans-territorialized and whose 
defining feature is the radical fragmentation of systems across 
different governing rationalities.267  While being partially grounded 
in the VoC story of corporate law and corporate governance as 
regulatory regimes that are shaped by the national, historically 
 
 263 Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field 
as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 720 (1973).  
 264 See Jaakko Salminen, Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Mechanisms: 
Conceptualizing Fragmented and Globalized Production as Collectively Governed Entities, 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 709, 710 (2016) (using the term “contract-boundary-
spanning governance” to refer to “the increasingly sophisticated mechanisms that 
are used by private actors to govern chains or networks of contracts for a particular 
purpose”); Eller, supra note 246; Zumbansen, supra note 55, at 66.  
 265  See Sabine Frerichs, Transnational Law and Economic Sociology, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen ed., forthcoming 
2020); Sabine Frerichs, Re-embedding Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism: A Polanyian Case 
for the Economic Sociology of Law, in KARL POLANYI: GLOBALISATION AND THE 
POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 65 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke 
eds., 2011); see generally POLANYI, supra note 239; Robert Boyer & J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth, From National Embeddedness to Spatial and Institutional Nestedness, in 
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 433 (Robert Boyer 
& J. Rogers Hollingworth eds., 1997). 
 266 See Niklas Luhmann, The World Society as a Social System, 8 INT’L J. GEN. 
SYST. 131, 131-38 (1982); see also John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & 
Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOCIO. 144 passim 
(1997); CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 210.   
 267 See Peer Zumbansen, The Next ‘Great Transformation’? The Double Movement 
in Transnational Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Regulation, in KARL 
POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 
181 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011).  
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evolving political economies of their times, our focus on the 
“transnationally embedded firm” goes beyond the VoC account.  
Because we place the corporation in the context of domestic and 
transnational state transformation with its attendant rise of diverse 
and hybrid forms of norm creation and implementation, on the one 
hand, and in the context of a globally financializing economy,268 on 
the other, corporate governance is for us always “already” 
transnational—that is, it is embedded in processes of regulatory 
transformation and market dynamics which are never fully confined 
by the state and its territory. 
This, then, is the main reason why a corporate governance 
analysis that alludes to the connections between the corporation and 
global capital markets but reduces the political analysis of the 
corporation to the juxtaposition of shareholders and stakeholders is 
not only misleading, but, in the end, unproductive.  In both respects, 
much of the current analysis of corporate governance transposes the 
corporation into a realm that is simultaneously abstract and 
politically charged.  By contrast, we side with those scholars who 
insist on and invest in the messy, detailed work of political economy 
analysis as it promises to show how the financialized corporation 
today is both the object and subject in a complex and changing 
physical, geographical legal environment.269  The political economy 
analysis allows us to study corporate governance not as a distinct 
field of ideological warfare over directors’ duties or a corporation’s 
“social responsibilities,” but in the context of the rise and ensuing 
transformation of the “post-regulatory,” globalizing state since the 
1980s.  While any conversation about the corporation and about 
corporate law carries the seed of a larger investigation into the 
relationship between state and market in it, it is really only when we 
take the concrete political economy changes into account, which 
shape our engagement with corporations, that we can hope to arrive 
 
 268 See Ronald Dore, Financialization of the Global Economy, 17 INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANGE 1097, 1101-02 (2008) (“This vast superstructure of gambling transactions is 
built on the needs of the producers and consumers of goods and non-financial 
services for (i) credit, (ii) insurance against uncertainty, and (iii) profitable ways of 
using their savings.”).  
 269 See, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 168, passim (discussing the embeddedness of 
corporations and corporate governance systems); THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer 
Zumbansen eds., 2011) (providing a detailed discussion of the embeddedness of 
corporations and corporate governance systems).  
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at a more comprehensive understanding of what corporate 
governance is really about.  And it is at that point that the 
inseparability between corporate law and these ominously “bigger” 
questions of democracy, equality, and justice show themselves.270  
When we speak of corporate governance as part of a national 
discourse on how corporations should be run271, we believe that it 
should become normal to consider the very wide range of social 
constituencies that make up the stakeholders of a corporation—
rather than having to fight for an occasional, exceptional 
acknowledgement of the corporation’s impact on and exclusion of 
vulnerable interests as has long been the main orientation of CSR 
work. 272   When we speak of multinational or transnational 
corporations and of corporate governance as a transnational site of 
regulatory conflict we want to direct attention to the complex 
interplay between a corporation’s locally embedded stakeholders, 
including respective host governments, on the one hand, and an 
immensely diversified, as well as spatially diffused, transnational 
set of claimants of rights towards and in the corporation, on the 
other.  In both respects, we argue that the corporation should no 
longer be treated as a token in a relatively clean-cut ideological 
struggle between “state” and “market” à la Friedrich Hayek, Milton 
Friedman, or Mark Zuckerberg, but rather as a crucial 
organizational platform and policy arena which is rife with 
regulatory potential and vivacity. 
 
 270  See Wolfgang Merkel, Is Capitalism Compatible with Democracy?, 8 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 109, 128 (2014), 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12286-014-0199-4 
[https://perma.cc/5AMN-V5W6]; DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: 
DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011). 
 271 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 68. 
 272  See Charles Eesley & Michael J. Lenox, Firm Responses to Secondary 
Stakeholder Action, 27 STRAT. MGT. J. 765, 765 (2006) (“While firms are not 
contractually obligated to these secondary stakeholders, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that these groups can bring pressures to bear to induce firms to respond 
to stakeholder requests. In particular, outside stakeholder groups can engage in a 
set of actions such as protests, civil suits, and letter-writing campaigns to advance 
their interests. These actions can provide strong incentives for firms to meet 
stakeholder demands . . . .”).  
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VII. THE EMERGING LEGAL DOCTRINE AND LEGAL THEORY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDER 
STEWARDSHIP AS CASE IN POINT 
As is often said, verba docent, exempla trahunt.  As such, we shall 
now turn to our case study.  The recent regulatory initiative around 
the concept of shareholder stewardship, which we will now focus 
on, is illustrative of the fundamentally transnational nature of the 
normative evolution of corporate governance today.  The meteoric 
growth in the presence of institutional investors—such as pension 
funds, open-end mutual funds, index funds and hedge funds—in 
global equity markets in the last three decades and changing 
corporate governance practices (ranging from informal forms of 
shareholder engagement to more aggressive forms of hedge fund 
activism 273 ) prompted the resurrection of the old corporate 
governance scholarly dogma of “shareholders as monitors.” 274  
Inspired by law and economics theories, scholars put forward the 
idea that institutional shareholders, especially pension funds, have 
the skills and incentives to engage in efforts to influence or discipline 
managerial activity. 275   Post-GFC, however, such benign 
assumptions with regard to an effective monitoring function 
attributed to institutional shareholders have not always fared so 
well.  While some were concerned with the purported ability of 
institutional investors, especially hedge funds, to influence 
 
 273 See, e.g., Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: 
Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459 (2013) (providing original empirical 
data on activist hedge fund campaigns outside the United States and dismantling 
some of the key myths surrounding hedge fund activism).  For a recent account of 
shareholder activism, see Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of 
Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971 (2019). 
 274 For an analysis of the changed nature of shareholders in recent decades, 
see Dionysia Katelouzou, Reflections on the Nature of the Public Corporation in an Era 
of Shareholder Activism and Stewardship, in UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 117 (Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin, 
eds., 2017).  
 275 See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor 
as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 passim (1991); Gilson & Kraakman, 
supra note 127.   Note, however, that team production theorists and those who view 
directors as stewards do not see the role of shareholder monitoring as being 
essential to the health of a company’s corporate governance.  See, e.g., Blair & Stout, 
supra note 130; James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson, Toward a 
Stewardship Theory of Management, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20 (1997).  
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companies at their own benefit,276  others have been pressing the 
need to address investors’ short-termism and myopia as well as the 
challenges posed by the increasing equity intermediation.277  This 
transformed the prevailing narrative relating to the corporate 
governance role of institutional shareholders,278 and currently it is 
widely accepted, especially in policy circles, that institutional 
shareholders’ engagement is a desirable corporate governance 
attribute only when it ensures long-term returns for both 
beneficiaries (investment management) and shareholders (corporate 
governance) and advances social responsibility.279 
It is within this ideological and institutional framework that 
post-GFC corporate governance reforms aimed at encouraging 
institutional shareholders to actively engage with their investee 
companies while promoting long-term corporate performance and 
becoming active “stewards” have emerged.  Inaugurated by Sir 
David Walker in his 2009 review of corporate governance in UK 
banks and other financial institutions,280 and manifested in the UK 
Stewardship Code, (hereinafter UK Code) introduced in 2010 and 
revised in 2012 and 2020, 281  shareholder stewardship refers to 
 
 276 See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1283-92 (2008) (portraying the activist minority shareholders 
as “conflicted” ones and proposing a widening of fiduciary duties so that they 
apply to activist minority shareholders).  
 277 See, e.g., Alan Dignam, The Future of Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of 
the Financial Crisis, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639, 653 (2013).  But see Joseph McCahery, 
Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance 
Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2915 (2016) (reporting recent 
findings in support of the view that shareholder activism is not driven by short-
term myopic investors). 
 278 For one of the competing narratives about shareholders, see Jennifer G. 
Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 497, 506-13 (2018).  
 279 On the dualistic nature of investment stewardship as consisting of both 
corporate governance and investment management elements, see Dionysia 
Katelouzou, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: The Path to 
Enlightened Stewardship (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 280 WALKER, supra note 149.  
 281 FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012) [hereinafter 
UK CODE 2012], https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-
b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5ZJ8-RFSA].  For the 2020 version, see FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, 
THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2020) [hereinafter UK CODE 2020], 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87
/Stewardship-Code_Final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKS8-VN4C]. 
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constructive shareholder engagement and monitoring of companies 
on the part of asset managers and asset owners for the long-term 
interests of their beneficiaries, their investee companies, and society 
as a whole.  This idea that institutional investors should behave as 
long-term oriented “stewards” has caught on globally.  Ten years 
after the launch of the landmark UK Code, stewardship codes can 
be found in a number of other countries in Europe, e.g. Denmark,282 
Italy,283 the Netherlands,284 Norway285 and Switzerland,286 and as a 
basis for the amended EU Shareholder Rights Directive 2017 (SRD 
 
 282  COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP CODE (2016) [hereinafter 
DANISH CODE], 
https://corporategovernance.dk/sites/default/files/erst_247_opsaetning_af_anb
efalinger_for_aktivt_ejerskab_uk_2k8.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG3U-VMPX].  
 283  ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2016) (It.) [hereinafter 
ITALIAN CODE], 
https://www.assogestioni.it/sites/default/files/docs/principi_ita_stewardship0
72019.pdf [https://perma.cc/958Y-H895]. 
 284  EUMEDION, DUTCH STEWARDSHIP CODE (2018) [hereinafter DUTCH CODE], 
https://www.eumedion.nl/nl/public/kennisbank/best-practices/2017-09-consul
tatiedocument-stewardship-code.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ5G-TPQE].  
 285  VERDIPAPIRFONDENES FORENING [NORWEGIAN FUND & ASSET MANAGER 
ASS’N], BRANSJEANBEFALING FOR MEDLEMMENE I VERDIPAPIRFONDENES FORENING: 
UTØVELSE AV EIERSKAP [THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATION ON 
EXERCISE OF OWNERSHIP] (2020) [hereinafter NORWEGIAN CODE], 
https://vff.no/assets/Bransjeanbefaling-ut%C3%B8velse-av-eierskap-januar-2020
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KML2-ZAEP]. 
 286  SWISS ASS’N OF PENSION FUND PROVIDERS, ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GOVERNING THE EXERCISING OF PARTICIPATION RIGHTS IN 
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES (2013) [hereinafter SWISS CODE], 
https://swissinvestorscode.ch/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Richtlinien_16012
013_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QVD6-75PC].  
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II),287 but also as far as Australia,288 Brazil,289 Canada,290 Japan,291 
Hong Kong, 292  India, 293  Kenya, 294  Korea, 295  Malaysia, 296 
 
 287 See SRD II, supra note 52.  
 288 In Australia two different industry bodies have issued stewardship codes, 
one for asset managers and another for asset owners.  See FIN. SERVS. COUNCIL (FSC), 
FSC STANDARD 23: PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND ASSET STEWARDSHIP 
(2017) [hereinafter FSC CODE], https://www.fsc.org.au/web-page-resources/fsc-
standards/1522-23s-internal-governance-and-asset-stewardship 
[https://perma.cc/LF96-8D67]; AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPERANNUATION INV. 
(ACSI), AUSTRALIAN ASSET OWNER STEWARDSHIP CODE (2018) [hereinafter ACSI 
2018], https://acsi.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/AAOSC_-
The_Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF52-E6L9]. 
 289 ASSOCIAÇÃO DE INVESTIDORES NO MERCADO DE CAPITAIS, AMEC 
STEWARDSHIP CODE (2016) [hereinafter AMEC CODE], 
https://en.amecbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Amec-Stewardship-
Code-Final-Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KFG-DLY4].  
 290 CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES (2017) 
[hereinafter CANADIAN CODE], https://www.ccgg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Stewardship-Principles-2019-update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XQL9-8Q8E].  
 291 COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS “JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE” (2017), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20170529/01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Y8B-U4ZX].  The Code was amended in 2020, see COUNCIL OF 
EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS “JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE” (2020) [hereinafter JAPAN CODE], 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20200324/01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6RGE-TX5L].  
 292 SEC. AND & FUTURES COMM’N, PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP (2016) 
[hereinafter HONG KONG CODE], 
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Principles%20of%20Responsible%2
0Ownership_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/37KZ-38XJ].  
 293 In India, three stewardship codes each with a different scope have been 
introduced.  See Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India, 
Guidelines on Stewardship Code for Insurers in India, 
IRDA/F&A/GDL/CMP/059/03/2017 (Issued on March 20, 2017) (amended in 
2020); Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PRFDA), Common 
Stewardship Code, PFRDA/2018/01/PF/01 (Issued on May 4, 2018) [hereinafter 
PFRDA], https://www.pfrda.org.in/writereaddata/links/circular-
%20common%20stewardship%20code%2004-05-186ec9a3b4-566b-4881-b879-c5bf0
b9e448a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XUE-TDUY]; Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI), Stewardship Code for all Mutual Funds and all Categories of AIFs, in 
Relation to Their Investment in Listed Equities, CIR/CFD/CMD1/168/2019 
(Issued on December 24, 2019) [hereinafter SEBI], 
https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/dec-2019/stewardship-code-for-all-mu
tual-funds-and-all-categories-of-aifs-in-relation-to-their-investment-in-listed-equit
ies_45451.html [https://perma.cc/R6PR-QRW6]. 
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Singapore,297 South Africa,298 Thailand,299 Taiwan,300 and the United 
States, 301  and advocated globally by the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN), 302  and other regional investor 
 
 294  CAP. MKTS. AUTH., THE STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
(2017) [hereinafter KENYA CODE], https://www.manifest.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Stewardship-Code_for-Institutional-Investors-Gazette
d.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G4V-N9EQ].  
 295 KOREA STEWARDSHIP CODE COUNCIL, KOREA STEWARDSHIP CODE: PRINCIPLES 
ON THE STEWARDSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2016) 
[hereinafter KOREA CODE], http://sc.cgs.or.kr/eng/about/sc.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/3MJ7-WZ2G].  
 296 MINORITY S’HOLDER WATCHDOG GRP. & SEC. COMM’N MALAYSIA, MALAYSIAN 
CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2014) [hereinafter MALAYSIA CODE], 
https://www.sc.com.my/api/documentms/download.ashx?id=9f4e32d3-cb97-4f
f5-852a-6cb168a9f936 [https://perma.cc/GN8M-PN7G].  
 297  STEWARDSHIP ASIA, SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTORS (2016) [hereinafter SINGAPORE CODE], 
http://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/2020-09/Section%202%
20-%20SSP%20%28Full%20Document%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5XE-5VB4].  In 
October 2018, Stewardship Asia introduced the first-of-its-kind stewardship code 
for family owners. See STEWARDSHIP ASIA, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR FAMILY 
BUSINESSES, http://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/2020-
09/SPFB-brochure-0913.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4Y-7PP7].  For an in-depth 
analysis of the complexities of Singapore-style stewardship, see Dan W. Puchniak 
& Samantha S. Tang, Singapore’s Puzzling Embrace of Shareholder Stewardship: A 
Successful Secret, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 (2020).  
 298 INST. OF DIRS. S. AFR., THE CODE FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(2011) [hereinafter CRISA], 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/crisa/crisa_19_july
_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HDH-CCD6].  
 299 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (2017) [hereinafter THAILAND CODE], 
https://www.sec.or.th/cgthailand/EN/Documents/ICode/ICodeBookEN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/49XV-4GE7].  
 300  TAIWAN STOCK EXCH., STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (2016), http://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/stewardship_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HZ43-DUX5]. The Principles were amended in 2020, see 
TAIWAN STOCK EXCH., STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2020) 
[hereinafter TAIWAN CODE], 
https://cgc.twse.com.tw/docs/Revision%20of%20Stewardship%20Principles%20
for%20Institutional%20Investors-20200810.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QL8-XGT8]. 
 301  INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (2017), https://ecgi.global/code/stewardship-framework-institutional-
investors-2017 [https://perma.cc/4G5Z-2D8H]. 
 302 INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK (ICGN), ICGN GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP 
PRINCIPLES (2016) [hereinafter IGCN CODE], 
https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pd
f [https://perma.cc/KBY3-M83C]. 
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associations, such as the European Fund and Asset Management 
Association.303  This gradual internationalization, and at the same 
time fragmentation, of shareholder stewardship as a body of “soft” 
law for institutional investors has led to a substantial but still far 
from comprehensive body of literature in recent years, focusing 
primarily on the effectiveness of the inaugural UK Code and its 
exportability to other jurisdictions. 304   Here, we examine the 
development of the law of shareholder stewardship under the lens 
of transnational regulatory governance, focusing on four key issues 
which we believe are critical for norm-creation:  functions, 
authorship, nature and enforcement. 
In general, stewardship codes are relatively short collections of 
principles and best practices that are accompanied by 
recommendations and suggestions directed to institutional 
investors (mainly asset owners and asset managers) and, by 
extension, to service providers, or in some cases, to the lawmaker.305  
They concern the corporate governance role of investment 
institutions and asset managers, including engagement and 
monitoring of investee companies (corporate governance aspects) as 
well as their responsibilities towards the ultimate investors (whether 
pension fund beneficiaries, mutual fund investors, insurance 
beneficiaries or hedge fund investors).  This can include strategies to 
avoid conflicts of interests as well as reporting duties (investment 
management aspects).306  Coming into existence with the 2010 UK 
 
 303  EUR. FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N (EFAMA), EFAMA STEWARDSHIP CODE, 
PRINCIPLES FOR ASSET MANAGERS’ MONITORING OF, VOTING IN, ENGAGEMENT WITH 
INVESTEE COMPANIES (2018) [hereinafter EFAMA CODE], 
https://www.efama.org/Publications/Public/Corporate_Governance/EFAMA%
20Stewardship%20Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5MB-PWFF]. 
 304 See, e.g., David William Roberts, Note, Agreement in Principle: A Compromise 
for Activist Shareholders from the UK Stewardship Code, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 543, 
549-561 (2015). 
 305 See, e.g., ICGN Code, supra note 302, at 7. 
 306 While stewardship was initially developed as a corporate governance 
concern aimed at transforming “rationally apathetic” institutional investors into 
actively engaged shareholders, stewardship had important investment 
management aspects from the outset as many stewardship codes’ principles are 
dealing with the relationships between the investors and their beneficiaries, 
including conflicts of interests and transparency.  These investment management 
aspects are becoming more pronounced now as stewardship codes increasingly 
promote ESG and interests beyond shareholder value maximization. See 
Katelouzou, supra note 279.  
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Code, stewardship codes espoused investor-led governance as a 
positive regulatory mechanism.  For instance, one of the key 
objectives of the first two versions of the UK Code, which traces back 
to the 2010 Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors of the 
since dissolved Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC Code),307 
is to promote “the long term success of companies in such a way that 
the ultimate providers of capital also prosper.”308  Such an objective 
reflects the rationale whereby “shareholders” function “as 
monitors.”309  Meanwhile, the (rebuttable) assumption is that such 
monitoring of corporate affairs by institutional investors should not 
only improve the governance and performance of investee 
companies, but should also assist in the efficient operation of the 
markets while strengthening the credibility of the market economy 
as a whole.  But the objectives of stewardship codes are more 
perplexing.  Shareholder stewardship (perhaps optimistically) 
conceptualizes investors as performing a two-fold function:  (1) a 
monitoring (corporate governance) function promoting long-term 
shareholder value and broader stakeholder welfare;  and (2) an 
accountability function protecting the interests of the investors’ clients 
and ultimate investors (investment management) as well as the 
shareholders and stakeholders of their investee companies 
(corporate governance).  Under the spell of this so-called investor 
paradigm, 310  which dovetails with the theory of “universal 
 
 307  FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, CONSULTATION ON A STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2010), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/frc_stewardship_code
_consultation_jan2010.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Q9CQ-NLE2].  
 308 UK CODE 2012, supra note 281, at 1. 
 309  It is noteworthy, however, that the current 2020 UK Code defines 
stewardship as “the responsible allocation, management and oversight of capital to 
create long-term for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for the 
economy, the environment and society” and therefore prioritizes the investment 
management perspective of stewardship to the corporate governance one.  See UK 
CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 4. 
 310 See Katelouzou, supra note 274, at 122 (“Within this paradigm, institutional 
investors are expected to act . . . as a monitoring mechanism promoting share-
holder value maximization and . . . as an accountability mechanism protecting the 
interests of other shareholders and the economy as a whole through the promotion 
of shareholder stewardship.”). 
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owners”, 311  the key tenets of the institutions’ investment 
management and corporate governance functions and how they 
relate to institutions’ long-term liabilities and long term corporate 
performance are regarded as blessed by a broader public interest in 
the creation of social value, beyond the maximization of profits.  
Clearly, the (perhaps) magic regulatory formula of stewardship is 
aimed at protecting the private interests of ultimate clients and 
beneficiaries, while at the same time promoting long-term corporate 
governance and sustainability coalescing shareholder with 
stakeholder interests and private with public interests. 
On a substantive level, this important institutional characteristic 
of stewardship codes is exemplified in their corresponding regard 
for public policy concerns, which are extraneous to considerations 
of shareholder welfare.  Even though there are differences in terms 
of the specific content, authorship, and nature across the various 
stewardship codes,312 they all reflect the view that engagement by 
institutional investors is an enforcer of good corporate governance, 
while they recognize that powers come with responsibilities at both 
the investment management and corporate governance levels, 
thereby, tapping into a major problem with increasing solicitude for 
shareholders, namely the rise of financialization and short-term 
shareholder value processes at the expense of other stakeholders.313  
In addition, all the current twenty-three national stewardship codes 
link the interests of ultimate investors with those of the stakeholders 
of the investee companies, despite variations in emphasis, 
substantive details, and context. 314   Further, the overwhelming 
majority (sixteen) clearly links stewardship to the creation of long-
 
 311  For a criticism of the theory of universal owners, see Benjamin J. 
Richardson & Maziar Peihani, Universal Investors and Socially Responsible Finance: A 
Critique of a Premature Theory, 30 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 405 (2015). 
 312 For a detailed comparative and empirical analysis of these differences, see 
Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, The Global Diffusion of Stewardship Codes 
(Eur. Corp. Goverance Inst., Working Paper No. 526, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3616798 [https://perma.cc/YYU9-MGXH]. 
 313  See Katelouzou, supra note 6, at 582-87 (examining how eighteen 
stewardship codes around the world view shareholder engagement).   
 314  For instance, the Japanese Stewardship Code tends to emphasize 
shareholders’ interests rather than the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries and 
wider stakeholders.  On a detailed comparison between the UK and Japanese 
Stewardship Codes, see Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Code: The Case 
of Japan, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 365 (2018). 
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term sustainable value for the investee companies. 315   Sixteen 
stewardship codes specifically refer to environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) considerations thereby re-bundling “sustainable 
and responsible investment” (SRI) 316  into shareholder 
stewardship.317  This trend of advocating long-term and ESG-aware 
investing through stewardship codes and principles is also 
supported by the ICGN Global Stewardship Principles,318 and the 
EFAMA Code,319 while the recently revised UK Code elevated social 
and environmental factors, including climate change, to central 
components of stewardship.320 
In a similar vein, the SRD II is very much premised on the 
acceptance that an active corporate governance role for institutions 
will be aligned with the interests of their beneficiaries and the wider 
stakeholders of their portfolio companies.321  Article 3(g) of the SRD 
II requires institutional investors and asset managers to develop an 
 
 315 See ACSI 2018, supra note 288, at 5; CANADIAN CODE, supra note 290, at 7; 
CRISA, supra note 298, at 4, 7; DANISH CODE, supra note 282, at 3; DUTCH CODE, supra 
note 284, at 1; FSC CODE, supra note 288, at 3; HONG KONG CODE, supra note 292, at 
1; ITALIAN CODE, supra note 283, at 16; JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, at 3; KENYA CODE, 
supra note 294, at 2892; KOREA CODE, supra note 295, at 3; MALAYSIA CODE, supra note 
296, at 4; SINGAPORE CODE, supra note 297, at 3; SWISS CODE, supra note 286, at 4; 
TAIWAN CODE, supra note 300, at 2; and UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 1. 
 316 For more information on the meaning of SRI, see EUROSIF, EUROPEAN SRI 
STUDY 2016, at 9 (2016), http://www.eurosif.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/SRI-study-2016-HR.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB9R-
2XNZ]. 
 317 See AMEC CODE, supra note 289, at 4; CANADIAN CODE, supra note 290, at 7; 
CRISA, supra note 298, at 4; DUTCH CODE, supra note 284, at 7; FSC CODE, supra note 
288, at 10; HONG KONG CODE, supra note 292, at 3; ITALIAN CODE, supra note 293, at 
16; JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, at 2; KENYA CODE, supra note 294, at 2892; MALAYSIA 
CODE, supra note 296, at 13; PFRDA, supra note 293, at 1; SEBI, supra note 293, at 3; 
SINGAPORE CODE, supra note 297, at 6; TAIWAN CODE, supra note 300, at 8; THAILAND 
CODE, supra note 299, at 37; UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 15.  For information on 
how stewardship codes around the world can support sustainability finance, see 
Dionysia Katelouzou & Alice Klettner, Sustainable Finance and Stewardship: 
Unlocking Stewardship’s Sustainability Potential (Eur. Corp. Goverance Inst., Working 
Paper No. 521, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578447 
[https://perma.cc/L56G-NDWE]. 
 318 See ICGN CODE, supra note 302, at 5, 11. 
 319 See EFAMA CODE, supra note 303, at 5. 
 320 See UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 4, Principles 4, 7 (Environmental, 
particularly climate change, and social factors, in addition to governance, have 
become material issues for investors to consider when making investment decisions 
and undertaking stewardship.”). 
 321 SRD II, supra note 52, at Recitals 14 & 15. 
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engagement policy with the aim of improving both the financial and 
non-financial performance of their investee companies, including 
the reduction of social and environmental risks and compelling 
institutional investors and asset managers to engage with 
stakeholders (in particular employees) in developing a balanced, 
long-term framework of corporate governance. 322   The directive, 
therefore, reflects a broad-based public interest in making 
institutional shareholders accountable for broader concerns in 
respect of companies’ operations and to wider constituents in the 
exercise of their engagement powers.323  Public disclosure imposed 
on institutional investors and asset managers 324  also seems to 
indicate the imposition of accountability on institutions beyond the 
private contours of their investment management relationship with 
their beneficiaries. 
Overall, the development of stewardship codes and principles 
bring a “public” coloration into a shareholder engagement, which is 
essentially a “private” matter and can be seen as an effort, but 
arguably an optimistic one, to realign the relationship between 
ownership and control of public companies, which had become 
increasingly divorced in the post-war decades and reinforced 
corporate governance and investment management into society.325  
For transnational corporate governance regulation, the rise and 
expansion of stewardship codes reflect the significant change over 
the past ten years concerning the question of output legitimacy:  
more than ever are questions asked today that focus on who is 
“affected” by institutional investors’ behavior and, by consequence, 
by the promotion or the absence of relevant stewardship codes. 
The expansion of the stewardship codes’ regulatory 
prerogatives and directions further mirrors the transformation of its 
associated constituencies.  It is important to note in this respect that 
 
 322  SRD II, supra note 52.  
 323  On the public interests of the SRD II, see Iris H.-Y. Chiu & Dionysia 
Katelouzou, From Shareholder Stewardship to Shareholder Duties: Is the Time Ripe?, in 
SHAREHOLDERS’ DUTIES 131 (Hanne S. Birkmose ed., 2017).  This is part of a broader 
and deepening connection between corporate regulation and the public.  See 
BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC (2019). 
 324 See Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of 
long-term shareholder engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132/1) 3(g), 3(h), 3(i).  
 325 See Katelouzou, supra note 274. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
140 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:1 
   
 
with regard to corporate governance’s “input legitimacy,” 
numerous private and public actors have become direct intervenors 
in the design of the stewardship codes and investors’ sustainability 
compliance regimes.326  Increasingly, we witness a cross-fertilization 
and a deterritorialized production of norms produced by various 
private and public actors and the implications of such norm-
production for the nature and enforcement of these codes.327  For 
instance, as noted above, the UK Code evolved out of the 2010 Code 
of the now dissolved ISC, which was set up at the behest of the Bank 
of England in the 1970s as part of the Heath government’s attempts 
to improve the relationships between institutional investors and 
public companies.328  The members of the ISC were originally the 
four major UK institutional investors’ associations, i.e. the National 
Association of Pension Funds and the associations (then separate) 
representing investment trusts, unit trusts, and insurers.329  In 1991, 
the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (“ISC”) published a 
statement on the “Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders”330 
which set out non-binding, best practices for institutional investors 
and agents in relation to their responsibilities in respect of their UK 
 
 326  For an analysis of the nature of the issuers of stewardship codes around 
the world, see Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 312, and Hill, supra note 278.   
 327 For an approach in that direction, see Ruth Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, 
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447 (2003). 
 328  See ALED DAVIES, THE CITY OF LONDON AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCE IN BRITAIN 1959-1979, at 42-52 (2017) (analyzing the 
role of the Heath conservative government in developing effective relationships 
between institutional investors and public companies).  
 329  See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 307, ¶ 2.2.  “The Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) is a forum of UK trade associations formed to allow 
the UK institutional shareholding community to exchange views and, on occasion, 
co-ordinate their activities in support of the interests of UK investors.  It currently 
[as of 2010] consists of the Association of British Insurers, the Association of 
Investment Companies, the Investment Management Association and the National 
Association of Pension Funds.”  Id.  It is noteworthy that the Investment 
Management Association (IMA) was created in 2002 with the merger of the 
previously separate Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds with the 
Fund Managers’ Association.  In 2014 IMA merged with the investment department 
of the Association of British Insurers to create the Investment Association.  For a 
brief history of the Investment Association, see About Us, INV. ASS’N, 
https://www.theia.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/Y6RX-4RB5]. 
 330 Id. ¶ 2.3. 
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investee companies.331  This statement was revised in 2002, 2004, and 
2007 before being upgraded to its status as a Code in 2009 (revised 
in 2010) that applied to institutional investors on a “comply-or-
explain” basis. 332   The ISC’s principles were an attempt by the 
institutional investors to self-regulate and thereby push back any 
governmental intervention in respect of institutional shareholder 
engagement, 333  especially following the Myners Review’s 
recommendation in 2001 to impose a statutory duty on asset 
managers “to intervene in companies—by voting or otherwise—
where there is a reasonable expectation that doing so might raise the 
value of the investment.”334  UK policymakers had long regarded 
institutional shareholder engagement as vital to the corporate 
governance of public companies, but had deliberately sought 
(especially since the 1990s) to induce institutional shareholders to 
develop their own self-regulatory responses to public concerns 
arising from the reluctance of institutional investors to take an active 
stance in relation to corporate underperformance.335  Notably, the 
Cadbury Report fully endorsed the ISC’s 1991 statement and called 
on institutional investors to play a more active role in the corporate 
governance of UK public companies.336  The Combined Code and 
subsequent versions of the UK Corporate Governance Code (now 
2018) invariably encouraged institutional investors to engage 
constructively with the board of directors and to use their ownership 
influence to pressure companies towards compliance with the 
 
 331 Id. ¶2.6.  
 332 Id. ¶¶ 2.4-2.7. 
 333 See id. ¶¶2.4-2.6. 
 334  PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A 
REVIEW 14 (2001), http://uksif.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MYNERS-P.-
2001.-Institutional-Investment-in-the-United-Kingdom-A-Review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y6VJ-FB5N]. 
 335  See, e.g., CADBURY, supra note 219, § 6.10, 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files//codes/documents/cadbury.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9EC-S45R] (“Given the weight of their votes, the way in which 
institutional shareholders use their power to influence the standards of corporate 
governance is of fundamental importance.”). 
 336 Id. §§ 4.59, 6.11, 6.12 & 6.16; see also Holland, supra note 236. 
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Code’s provisions,337 while the Myners Review338 and Higgs Review 
both endorsed the ISC’s principles.339 
The upgrade of the ISC’s principles to a soft Stewardship Code 
introduced by the FRC in 2010340 is an example of “enforced self-
regulation,”341 otherwise referred to as “meta-regulation,”342 and is 
part of an emerging market-oriented governance landscape which is 
closely associated with the long tradition of corporate governance 
codes.  The 2010 (and 2012) UK Code, like the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, adopted the “comply or explain” approach, that 
voluntary signatories to the Code should comply or else explain 
why they do not comply with the Code’s seven principles.343  In a 
significant break with the long tradition of “comply or explain” in 
the area of corporate governance regulation, the 2020 UK Code 
adopts the stricter apply and explain approach emphasizing 
stewardship outcomes rather than policies. 344   Both approaches, 
however, are investor-led based on what UK regulators envisage as 
a “market for stewardship.”345  Stewardship signatories are expected 
to provide good annual reporting on stewardship, while asset 
owners are expected to monitor the stewardship activities of their 
 
 337 FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 223, at 2. 
 338 MYNERS, supra note 334, § 5.73-5.94 (endorsing institutional shareholder 
activism); HM TREASURY, UPDATING THE MYNERS PRINCIPLES: A CONSULTATION § 
4.10-.11 (2008), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_myner_310308.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBC9-4ELF]. 
 339 DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTORS 70 (2003), 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121106105616/http://www.bis.g
ov.uk/files/file23012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DPH-FSHQ]. 
 340 Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 307, ¶ 2.6. 
 341 See John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate 
Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1467 passim (1982) (outlining the concept of 
“enforced self-regulation” and “its application in the context of corporate 
accounting standards”).   
 342 Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, & 
Martin Lodge eds., 2010). 
 343 UK CODE 2012 , supra note 281, at 4. 
 344 UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 4. 
 345  See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. & FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, BUILDING A 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE STEWARDSHIP 11-12 (2019) (defining 
stewardship and discussing generally the market for stewardship), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp19-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7RDR-ZHH4].  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3
2020] New Geographies of Corporate Governance 143 
   
 
asset managers.  This emerging “market for stewardship” in the UK 
is supported by the facilitating role of the FRC’s tiering exercise,346 
as well as the support provided by the Investor Forum347 and the 
Investment Association’s Public Register and Long-term Reporting 
Guidance. 348   At the same time, social enforcement (reputation) 
mechanisms, such as public esteem or shaming carried out by 
investors themselves,349 the media,350 and civil society groups, 351 are 
becoming a key device for promoting stewardship and 
sustainability, especially climate change.  Correspondingly, the 
enforcement of stewardship becomes an example of “dynamic 
accountability” within what Michael Dorf, Charles Sabel, and  
Jonathan Zeitlin call “experimentalist” governance where public 
and private (market and social) actors work together to create 
 
 346 Tiering of Signatories to the Stewardship Code, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (Nov. 
14, 2016), https://www.frc.org.uk/news/november-2016/tiering-of-signatories-
to-the-stewardship-code [https://perma.cc/93FA-EKQW]. 
 347  The Investor Forum was established in 2014 following the 2012 Kay 
Review to promote long-term shareholder engagement with UK companies.  For 
more information about the role and activities of the Investor Forum, see INV. F., 
https://www.investorforum.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/5F6A-GA92]. 
 348 The Investment Association introduced the public register to shareholder 
dissent in December 2017 at the request of the UK Government.  Also, following the 
introduction of a new reporting requirement by the 2018 UK Corporate Governance 
Code, for companies that see twenty percent or more of votes being cast against the 
board recommendation for a resolution, the Investment Association published 
guidance on long-term reporting.  For more information regarding the 
requirements, see Public Register, INV. ASS’N, https://www.theia.org/public-
register [https://perma.cc/5LBB-KAEN]. 
 349 See, e.g., Larry Fink’s Letter to CEOs, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, 
BLACKROCK (2017), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/Z2MY-X8Z2]; Letter from 
Ronald P. O’Hanley, CEO, State St. Glob. Advisors, to Bd. Members (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/20
17/Letter-and-ESG-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/34BW-MVX2].  For the 
potential shaming capacity of regulators, see Andrew Pearce, FRC Threatens to 
‘Shame’ Fund Managers Over Stewardship, FIN. NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015, 12:32 PM), 
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/frc-threatens-to-shame-fund-managers-over
-stewardship-code-20151214 [https://perma.cc/U5AD-5QLR].  
 350 See, e.g., Michal Goldstein, Does Flight-Shaming Over Climate Change Pose 
An Existential Threat to Airlines?, FORBES (June 4, 2019, 2:45 PM EDT), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelgoldstein/2019/06/04/does-flight-shami
ng-over-climate-change-pose-an-existential-threat-to-airlines/#204458b83cfc 
[https://perma.cc/86LS-CRZD].  
 351 See, e.g., CERES, https://www.ceres.org/ [https://perma.cc/H9UZ-
ARMR].  
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regulatory arrangements and support enforcement. 352   This 
accountability-through-peer-review has a more coercive effect for 
all UK-authorized asset managers as it is backed by the FCA’s Code 
of Conduct Handbook.353  This element of coerciveness of the UK 
Code through the introduction of an associated disclosure 
obligation on asset managers authorized by the FCA is broadly 
equivalent in effect to the effect of the UK Listing Rules for public 
companies, albeit different in scope and detail. 
Similar to the UK Code, all the other national stewardship codes 
are voluntary, “soft” law developments based on self-proclamation 
and market enforcement, but the degree of their softness largely 
depends on the issuing body.  From the twenty-three total national 
stewardship codes, twelve have been issued by regulators or quasi-
regulators and they all adopt a variant of the “comply or explain” or 
“apply and explain” enforcement model.354  Yet from these, the UK, 
Dutch, Indian (SEBI) and Japanese Codes are supported in their 
function from an underpinning body of mandatory rules and/or 
institutions as there is an obligation on the part of domestic investors 
to comply or (apply and) explain.355  From the other eleven codes, 
which have been issued by various industry participants or 
investors themselves, six adopt the comply (apply) or explain 
 
 352  Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan 
Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance 
in the EU, 14 EUR. L. J. 271 passim (2008). 
 353  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK, § 2.2.3, 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/COBS/2/2 
[https://perma.cc/WFM5-M7FD].  
 354 DANISH CODE, supra note 282, HONG KONG CODE, supra note 292, PFRDA, 
supra note 293, and SEBI, supra note 293, JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, KENYA CODE, 
supra note 294, MALAYSIA CODE, supra note 296, SINGAPORE CODE, supra note 297, 
TAIWAN CODE, supra note 300, THAILAND CODE, supra note 299, and the UK CODE 
2020, supra note 281. 
 355 See, e.g., JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, at 6.  It is expected that this coercive 
element will be expanded in the EU following the transposition of the SRD II.  For 
a comprehensive analysis of the enforcement parameters of stewardship, see 
Dionysia Katelouzou & Konstantinos Sergakis, Shareholder Stewardship Enforcement 
(Eur. Corp. Goverance Inst., Working Paper No. 514, 2020), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/katelouzose
rgakisfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR6C-NK2A]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3
2020] New Geographies of Corporate Governance 145 
   
 
principle, 356  one has a mandatory element, 357  while the rest are 
completely voluntary in nature.358 
At the supranational level, Article 3(g) of the SRD II also adopts 
the “comply or explain” approach.359  However, it has been argued 
elsewhere that the SRD II is not far short of imposing a duty to 
demonstrate engagement, as there is a duty on the part of asset 
owners and asset managers to publicly disclose the implementation 
and achievement of such engagement under Articles 3(h) and 3(i).360  
Arguably, the disclosure-based regulation requires that certain 
engagement conduct needs to be carried out in order for there to be 
sufficient matters to report and moves away from treating 
shareholder engagement as a voluntary practice, as is the case under 
national stewardship codes.  The SRD II, in a “capital market 
regulation facet,” 361  is, therefore, a step towards legalizing or 
juridifying shareholder engagement and stewardship as a response 
to the social appetite for increasing regulation after the GFC.  
Moreover, Article 14(b) enables—but not obliges—Member States to 
provide for public enforcement of violations of the SRD II provisions 
transposed into national law. 362   While only Italy and the 
Netherlands have introduced such penalties for violations of 
engagement and disclosure duties, the directive does not operate in 
a normative vacuum since four Member States—Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and the UK—have their own domestic soft-law 
stewardship codes.  These different approaches in enforcing 
stewardship are reflective of the increasing poly-centricity of 
stewardship norms and raise important questions about the future 
 
 356 ASCI 2018, supra note 288, ITALIAN CODE, supra note 283, DUTCH CODE, 
supra note 284, CRISA, supra note 298, SWISS CODE, supra note 286, and KOREA CODE, 
supra note 295. 
 357 ACSI 2018, supra note 288.  
 358 AMEC CODE, supra note 289, CANADIAN CODE, supra note 290, NORWEGIAN 
CODE, supra note 285, and the United States, INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., STEWARDSHIP 
FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2017), 
https://ecgi.global/code/stewardship-framework-institutional-investors-2017 
[https://perma.cc/4G5Z-2D8H]. 
 359  SRD II, supra note 52.  
 360 Chiu & Katelouzou, supra note 323. 
 361 For a critical approach, see Alessio M. Pacces, Shareholder Activism in the 
CMU, in CAPITAL MARKETS UNION IN EUROPE 507, 523 (Danny Busch, Emilios 
Avgouleas & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2018). 
 362 SRD II, supra note 52.   
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symbiosis of soft and semi-hard law norms.363  Finally, in terms of 
“output legitimacy,” while it is questionable whether “soft” law can 
efficiently serve more paternalistic objectives, subjecting 
institutional investment management to standards and scrutiny is 
arguably a form of re-regulation, in order to ensure that the 
privatized and financialized form of social welfare provision may 
deliver public interest objectives in due course. 
Our analysis shows that the development of the law of 
shareholder stewardship over the last decade is a powerful example 
of the complex intricacies between shareholder primacy and 
broader stakeholder welfare as regulatory objectives, and between 
internalized, self-regulatory processes of market-invoking 
regulation and official law making at both domestic and 
supranational levels.  The development of stewardship codes also 
confirms the inseparability of corporate governance regulation and 
investment management regulation (and wider law-making reform) 
when it comes to introducing standards of optimal institutional 
shareholders’ behavior.  Shareholder stewardship can also be seen 
as an example of an increase in the national “policy space” in the 
global economy.364  Following in the steps of the development of 
corporate governance codes, the rapid diffusion of stewardship 
principles through replication and adaptation is a powerful 
illustration of how private ordering walks a fine line in relation to 
the embedded, institutional frameworks for official law-making.  
While some convergence towards universally acceptable 
stewardship principles can arguably arise from the operation of 
institutional investors, the stewardship codes themselves are 
embedded in the complex emerging political economies of corporate 
governance.  The development of stewardship in countries with 
various shareholder, legal, institutional, economic, and cultural 
environments suggests that stewardship codes may have taken on a 
different role—perhaps multiple different roles—than the original 
“investor paradigm” underpinning the UK Code.  Indeed, a few 
examples suggest that this may be occurring in myriad ways, with 
 
 363 Katelouzou & Sergakis, supra note 355.  
 364 See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in Transnational 
Governance: Emergent Pathways and Diffusion Mechanisms 7 (GR:EEN, Working Paper 
No. 3, 2011), 
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important implications for norm creation and law-making processes 
yet to be explored.  In South Africa, CRISA appears to prioritize 
responsible investment and ESG factors over all other ownership 
responsibilities.365  In Japan, the Code appears to be a policy tool 
aimed at fulfilling a political and economic goal of reorienting 
governance away from its traditional lifetime employee stakeholder 
form of corporate governance.  In effect, it is geared towards a more 
shareholder focused form of governance to promote risk taking and 
to improve returns on capital, while distinctly lacking, it seems, the 
public interest orientation that we have identified in other codes.366  
In Singapore, stewardship principles developed and promoted by a 
government supported entity, Stewardship Asia, have set the rules 
of the game for how institutional investors should engage with 
listed companies—yet many of the most important listed companies 
are themselves government controlled.367  In Europe, it is unlikely 
that the SRD II will facilitate a convergence movement towards a 
single, harmonized set of stewardship principles as it engages in 
open competition with pre-existing domestic stewardship codes or 
principles.368  At the same time, the ICGN Principles still have to 
play the role of an international benchmark for good stewardship 
similar to the global relevance of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. 
At the end of this exemplary case study, we find that the 
evolving law of shareholder stewardship can shine some light on the 
new forms of transnational embeddedness of regulatory innovation 
in locally defined governance structures on the one hand, and their 
integration in spatially unfolding rule-making processes, on the 
other.  Regarding the relevant actors, norms, and processes, we find 
a tension that has long been growing between private and state, 
domestic and international actors, between shareholder primacy 
 
 365 CRISA, supra note 298, at 4. 
 366 Goto, supra note 314. 
 367 Puchniak & Tang, supra note 297 (arguing that the development of the 
Singaporean Code serves the function of “halo signaling” demonstrating 
commitment to global standards of good corporate governance). 
 368 See Dionysia Katelouzou & Konstantinos Sergakis, When Harmonisation is 
not Enough: Shareholder Stewardship in the European Union, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (on file with author); see also Gen Goto, Alan K. Koh & Dan W. 
Puchniak, Diversity of Shareholder Stewardship in Asia: Faux Convergence, 53 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 829 (2020) (arguing that the development of stewardship codes in 
Asia leads to the phenomenon of “faux convergence”).  
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and broader stakeholder welfare, and between market-invoking and 
official-law making processes.  Correspondingly, the development 
of the law of shareholder stewardship is a powerful illustration of 
the promise of a new methodology of transnational corporate 
governance in offering the necessary tools and the required 
analytical framework for understanding corporate governance 
regulation in the 21st century. 
VIII. CONCLUSION:  THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND THE POLITICAL STAKES OF NORM CREATION  
The development of stewardship codes and principles by 
private and public actors to define institutional investors’ and asset 
managers’ responsibilities is part of an emerging market-oriented 
governance landscape which has seen a significant rise in corporate 
governance codes and codes of conduct, a development which still 
begs an important explanation of cause, agency and, certainly, 
legitimacy.  To simply attribute the expansion of private corporate 
governance norm production to the “retreat” of the state or to 
mounting public pressure on the state and on corporations to 
embrace the idea of “corporate (social, environmental) 
responsibility” and more recently “stakeholderism,” falls short of 
fully capturing the regulatory dynamics which have been shaping 
this field.  But their very nature—their blended private and public 
objectives, their oscillation between “hard” and “soft” law and 
between state intervention and market ordering—has begun to 
fundamentally alter the already demarcated regulatory landscape of 
corporate governance and poses difficult questions, which are not 
confined to the issues of regulatory governance in the area of 
corporate regulation.  Effectively, the attempt undertaken in this 
Article to focus on the emerging plurality of political economies of 
corporate governance as a transnational regulatory problem has 
opened up perspectives on the bigger picture of which corporate 
governance is but a part. 
We used shareholder stewardship to illustrate the expansion 
and, at the same time, the deepening of national and regional policy 
spaces in a global economy.  It is here where we came up with 
unexpected results.  The development of stewardship codes speaks 
to the emergence of legal regimes that can no longer adequately be 
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explained with reference to the “state” or the “market,” and is an 
example of intricate, domestic, and transnational, multi-level 
processes of norm generation involving different national, 
supranational, and private actors, using non-traditional processes 
through which norms are being generated, which do not wholly 
comply with categories of statute, rule or treaty.  We also found that 
in times of perceived and increasingly critically scrutinized market 
failures, the generation of “soft” law in the form of not always non-
binding norms is being outsourced, but not to the markets directly.  
Instead, the task of coming up with a suitable regulatory regime is 
uploaded and relegated to supranational actors.  The SRD II is an 
example of pursuing the harmonization of an area of law which had 
for a long time been perceived as overly privatized and, 
normatively, market focused.  In the SRD II, the originally soft, 
investor-driven law of shareholder stewardship appears to coalesce 
into hard, regulatory law after arriving at a state of what Luhmann, 
referred to as “counterfactually stabilised behavioural 
expectations.”369  Given the continuously growing pressure of global 
securities markets and their attendant rules on the normative 
architecture of corporate law, a key question we need to ask is 
whether we are indeed facing a re-bundling of “soft” law corporate 
governance norms into “hard” law capital markets law. 
A related question concerns the normative assessment of 
emerging transnational corporate governance regimes such as the 
stewardship one.  The so-called and endlessly abused “public 
interest” might function as a reference point when calling private 
investment management of financialized social wealth to account.  
But, more likely is the re-characterization of any future stewardship 
legalization as a form of regulatory accountability framework which 
goes beyond the traditional, law and economics approach to the 
corporate governance role of institutional shareholders to a broader 
“regulatory ecology” serving both private and public interests.370   
 
 369 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW  33 (Martin Albrow 
ed., Elizabeth King-Utz & Martin Albrow trans., 2d ed. 2014) (“Norms are 
counterfactually stabilized behavioral expectations. Their meaning implies 
unconditional validity, in so far as the validity of the norm is experienced, and thus 
institutionalized, as independent of actual fulfilment or non-fulfilment.”). 
 370 See Beate Sjåfjell & Mark B. Taylor, Clash of Norms: Shareholder Primacy vs. 
Sustainable Corporate Purpose, 13 INT’L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 40 passim (2019) 
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There is also the issue of the chosen enforcement mode.  Unlike 
the tradition of market-invoking regulation in the area of corporate 
governance which is based very much on the premise of enabling, 
private and market-driven regulatory modes, the development of 
shareholder stewardship serves more paternalistic objectives of 
aligning institutional investors’ corporate governance role with 
long-term corporate wealth creation as a social good.  But if this is 
the purported regulatory aim behind the development of 
shareholder stewardship, the adoption of soft “comply or  explain” 
or “apply and explain” enforcement approaches seems out of step.  
While market discipline has long served as the default enforcement 
mode in corporate governance regulation and has been extensively 
examined within the context of corporate governance codes, 
allowing asset owners and other market participants to be the only 
monitors of the veracity of both the signatory statements and the 
actual outcomes of stewardship is not only of questionable 
effectiveness but is also out of step with the stated “public” 
regulatory objectives.371 
It is therefore necessary to ask whether this infused paternalism 
and the gradual hardening of the shareholder stewardship norms in 
the SRD II is but a superficial change or whether, instead, we should 
welcome it as an opportunity to place the institutional investors and 
the corporation more broadly in a post “embedded liberalism” 
context.  From the perspective of transnational corporate 
governance, the development of stewardship codes shows how the 
tradition of “market-focused” corporate governance regulation can 
and should no longer rely on the path-dependent trajectories of 
national law-making processes.  The emergence of transnational 
corporate governance is characterized by an intricate combination 
of public and private agency, but also of a variety of evolving 
regulatory instruments where “hard” law is not stable.  In that sense, 
domestic corporate governance reform must be seen as part of an 
 
(examining the interaction of corporate regulation with the social norms of 
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emerging transnational legal pluralism, which is shaped by 
continuing normative legacies as well as institutional and 
processual path-dependencies of particular local political 
economies.  But, at the same time, the legal pluralism of 
transnational corporate governance reveals itself in the co-existence, 
interpenetration, and interaction of different regulatory forms. 
Seen in this light, the case of shareholder stewardship is 
illustrative of how “soft” law recommendations can enter a 
regulatory realm which is occupied by both public and private 
norm-entrepreneurs.  While the former includes “the state,” which 
pursues corporate law reform, the latter encompasses a wide range 
of private actors such as banks, investments funds, and expert 
groups who are calling for new rules to govern investment conduct.  
But it also includes other stakeholders such as unions and labor 
activists as well as civil society groups uniting and campaigning 
under different flags and themes.  From this perspective, 
shareholder stewardship denotes how “soft” law recommendations 
may grow into widely accepted norms of “good governance” and 
solidify perceived public interest.  Shareholder stewardship is not 
the only case where we can draw out complex correlations between 
different actors, levels, and spaces of norm creation or where we can 
trace the infusion of public stakeholder objectives into shareholder 
welfare.  The well-examined examples of the development of 
corporate governance codes and corporate codes of conduct already 
show the “law’s poly-contextualization.” 372   As for the newly 
amplified public interest in transnational corporate governance 
regulation, this traceable trend can be, for example, found in post-
GFC corporate governance regulations in the UK and elsewhere 
where efforts are underway that aim to solidify public policies, such 
as wealth distribution, equality in the boardrooms and labor force, 
and various social goals, including long-term enterprise 
sustainability, wider stakeholder welfare, the protection of the 
environment, or gender and racial equality in economic 
organizations.  Such policies are concerned with the objectives and 
outcomes of corporate activity within the wider fabric of the 
economy and society and go well beyond law and economics 
perceptions of the corporation and its perceived purpose, effectively 
feeding into the changing policies of transnational corporate 
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governance regulation in globally integrated, yet locally distinct 
market and regulatory places. 
The analysis offered in this Article should be seen as woven into 
the broader transformative trends in transnational law, global law, 
and legal pluralism.  It seeks to cut through the distinct layers of 
comparative company law and institutional analysis to shed a new 
light on the far-reaching reform processes in domestic corporate 
governance systems worldwide but also on the proliferation of fora 
where, through new (and old) actors and in reliance on and through 
the development of new processes of participation, drafting, 
dissemination, and implementation, new norms are being created.  
Transnational corporate governance is here rendered as a 
methodological laboratory to inquire into emerging forms of 
authority and legitimacy, scrutinizing competing claims of 
effectiveness and testing the “real world” impact that emerging 
regulatory forms have on a wider set of stakeholders and “affected” 
populations.  These new actors are directly engaged in negotiating 
competing interests regarding the economic—but also the larger 
social—function of the firm, as they all operate in intertwined local 
and global contexts. 373   They make competing claims regarding 
participation and control while being equally concerned with 
accountability, long-term orientation, and the protection of a wide 
range of local and distant interests.374  It comes as no surprise then 
that the scope of corporate governance regulation—whether it is the 
state or particular market actors who are taking the lead—continues 
to expand significantly.  Concerns around environmental, social and 
economic sustainability, risk and reputation, equality and minority 
protection have become part of the field’s “common lexicon,”375 
while technological advances have an impact not only on the way 
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both boardrooms and shareholder operate,376 but also, with regard 
to artificial intelligence’s fundamental transformation of financial 
markets operation.377  In that vein, a critical project of transnational 
corporate governance promises an inclusive and transformative 
reconceptualization of the corporation and its key actors and 
constituents in a world, which is marked by a growing 
disillusionment among the marginalized, excluded, and most 
vulnerable populations. 
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